People v. Howell
| Decision Date | 14 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-02-0643.,3-02-0643. |
| Citation | 831 N.E.2d 681 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher HOWELL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Robert C. Lucenti, Chicago, for Christopher Howell.
Lawrence M. Bauer, Deputy Director, Robert M. Hansen, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, Kevin W. Lyons, State's Attorney, Peoria, for the People.
A jury found the defendant, Christopher Howell, guilty of (1) home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 2000)) and (2) witness harassment (720 ILCS 5/32-4a(a)(2) (West 2000)). He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 15 and 30 years for these offenses, respectively, to be served consecutively with his sentence in another case.
During the pendency of this appeal, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), which concerns one of the issues in this case. Consequently, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs concerning the effect of Crawford on this case.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting (1) testimony that a witness recognized the defendant's voice without the State supplying a sufficient foundation; and (2) the hearsay grand jury testimony of a State's witness in violation of his sixth amendment right of confrontation under Crawford. The defendant also contends that the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal remarks were prejudicial (1) by vouching for the veracity of a witness; (2) by implying that the defendant had committed other crimes; (3) by defining the term "reasonable doubt"; and (4) cumulatively. Additionally, the defendant submits that the State failed to prove the elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
In its indictment, the State alleged that the defendant committed home invasion and witness harassment in Peoria on September 12, 2001. The victim in both crimes was alleged to be the defendant's former wife, Delilah Russell. She was scheduled to testify in a previous case in which the defendant was charged with her battery by breaking her jaw. In the present case, the State charged the defendant with invading Russell's home and harassing her as a witness in the battery case.
At the trial for this case, the State called Russell as a witness, but she refused to testify. Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor presented an offer of proof concerning Russell's refusal to testify. Russell stated that she did not recall the events of September 12. The court then found that Russell was an unavailable witness.
The prosecutor resumed questioning Russell in the presence of the jury. Russell again refused to testify about the events of September 12. The court then allowed the State to offer redacted versions of Russell's hearsay testimony (1) before the grand jury in this case; and (2) in a hearing to revoke the defendant's bail in the battery case. In response to questions from the prosecutor about this prior testimony, Russell stated that she recalled testifying on those occasions, that she had testified under oath, and that she had testified truthfully. The court overruled the defendant's objection that Russell's grand jury testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it was not subject to cross-examination.
The prosecutor then read Russell's grand jury testimony to the jury. Russell had testified that she had an order of protection against the defendant at the time of the incident. Russell lived in a duplex apartment. At about 10 a.m. on the date in question, she went out her front door to take something to her car. As she returned, the defendant came from behind the apartment building and asked if he could talk with her. She ignored him and went back through the front door. She initially submitted that when she attempted to close the door, the defendant forced it open. Later, Russell said that the defendant did not force the door open, but rather, entered the apartment without her permission. Russell stated, "he was at the door before I was even at the door." She told him that she did not want him in the apartment.
The defendant told Russell that the police had confiscated his car because it contained blood evidence concerning the battery case. Russell said that "he called me a police bitch and said that if I testify against him that my testimony will be nothing because I do have a felony on my record."
Russell repeatedly told the defendant to leave the apartment. The defendant then picked up Russell's phone. When Russell attempted to take the phone from him, the defendant punched her on the chin. An altercation ensued in which the phone landed on the floor. Russell picked up the phone to call the police. The defendant grabbed her arm and bit her hand, causing her to drop the phone. The defendant then took the phone, which Russell described as a "flip phone," and "snapped it in half."
The defendant paced the floor "as if he wasn't going to let [Russell] leave." Russell said that she would have left the apartment, but felt that she could not leave her son alone with the defendant. Russell heard her neighbor, Amy Hennigh, make a "thumping noise" on the wall as a prearranged signal "to let [Russell] know that she's there and she hears it." Then the defendant left the apartment.
Next, the State introduced Russell's testimony from the hearing to revoke the defendant's bail in the battery case. This testimony was substantially similar to her grand jury testimony, but with the following differences:
(1) concerning how the defendant got into the residence, Russell said, "I entered into the apartment and he came in right behind me, because he was already at the door"; (2) regarding the defendant striking her, she stated, "when I reached for the phone to snatch it out of his hand, he punched me in my chin and said that I had attempted to hit him"; (3) Russell testified that, "[h]e told me I was a police bitch and that my credibility wasn't anything and that he could beat the case with a lawyer, [and] he could beat the case of breaking my jaw"; and (4) during her bail hearing testimony, Russell did not mention that the defendant broke her phone or that he prevented her from leaving the apartment.
Next, Hennigh testified that she was Russell's neighbor at the time of the incident. She said that she had seen the defendant on various occasions before the incident in question. At the time of the incident, Hennigh heard "yelling and screaming" coming from Russell's apartment. Then, Hennigh recognized the defendant's voice, but could not specifically hear what he was saying. The defendant did not object to Hennigh's statement that she recognized the defendant's voice. Hennigh said that she pounded on the wall in an attempt to intervene in the argument as she and Russell had previously arranged.
Hennigh stated that after a few minutes, she saw Russell, the defendant, and some other people in the apartment's yard. However, she had not seen Russell and the defendant go from the apartment to the yard. Hennigh then saw everyone leave the yard.
Peoria police officer Jeffrey Kice testified that he interviewed Russell shortly after the incident. He said that she "was very shook up, [and] acted scared." Russell told Kice that the defendant "showed up in her back yard, she didn't want to deal with him, she went inside the house, and he followed her inside the house." Russell told the defendant to get out and then he hit her.
Frank Walter stated that he was an investigator for the Peoria County State's Attorney's office. He photographed Russell's "bruised area to the left jaw chin area" after the incident. He also photographed "an injury to the middle finger of [Russell's] hand, the knuckle area." Walter said that while photographing Russell, "[h]er visible emotional state was very excited, very nervous, crying, [and] shaking." After Walter's testimony, the court took judicial notice of the previous battery case.
During her closing remarks, the prosecutor made the following statements:
"He called [Russell] a police bitch and he starts to tell her that her credibility isn't anything, that his lawyer is going to beat that charge, he's going to destroy her credibility. And why do you think he's telling her this, ladies and gentlemen, because the reason he went over there was to try to get her, the prime witness in that case, back on his side, trying to intimidate her and harass her as he had done before.
And she stated to you [that] * * * she's intimidated by him. She's scared of him and Lord knows she should be. He not only whacked her on that date but she stated that he had broken her jaw before.
* * *
* * * They're struggling over a phone. She's trying to call the police and he bites her hand. That's the kind of guy she's dealing with.
* * *
And, ladies and gentlemen, we're lucky that she was strong enough to come in and testify on those two previous dates against this man after what he had done to her and what she had to go through with him here. * * *
* * *
How do you think he felt being in that car getting pulled over, the car gets seized, now he's got to walk wherever he wants to go * * *.
* * *
So, what is home invasion and what do I have to prove? * * *
* * * [T]he defendant knowingly and without authority entered the dwelling place. * * *
* * * [U]nder Illinois law * * * you could find that his entry into her residence was without authority if at the time of entry into the dwelling the defendant has an intent to commit a criminal act within the dwelling, regardless of whether the defendant was initially invited into or received consent to enter the dwelling.
Intent to commit a criminal act. Well, we...
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