People v. Huddleston
Decision Date | 04 June 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 96367.,96367. |
Citation | 816 N.E.2d 322,212 Ill.2d 107,287 Ill.Dec. 560 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Gerald Scott HUDDLESTON, Appellee. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Thomas J. Brown, State's Attorney, Pontiac (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda Woloshin, Domenica A. Osterberger, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Nancy L. Vincent, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellee.
Defendant, Gerald Huddleston, was charged by information in the circuit court of Livingston County with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault pursuant to section 12-14.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2002)). Each count pertained to a separate victim. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion seeking to have section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code declared unconstitutional, arguing that it violates state principles of proportionality and due process. Section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) mandates a sentence of natural life imprisonment when a person is "convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child committed against 2 or more persons regardless of whether the offenses occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts." 720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(b)(1.2) (West 2002). The circuit court deferred ruling on the motion until after it had heard evidence in the case.
After the court found defendant guilty on all three counts, the court entertained arguments on defendant's motion and ultimately ruled that the statute is not unconstitutional "on its face." The court left open the question of whether the statute might be unconstitutional as applied to defendant until the court considered the evidence adduced at sentencing. Following the presentation of that evidence, the circuit court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to defendant in that it violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). The court sentenced defendant to consecutive 10-year sentences of imprisonment. The State appealed directly to this court. See 134 Ill.2d R. 603. The sole issue we are asked to consider is whether the circuit court erred in holding section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code unconstitutional as applied to defendant. We hold that it did.
The information in this case, filed on May 9, 2002, alleged that defendant had committed an act of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, on or about March or April of 2002, in that he had placed his penis in the mouth of C.D., a child "nearly" 10 years old. The other two counts charged that defendant had committed similar acts with 10-year-old K.F. and D.R. on or about May 7, 2002.
On September 12, 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppress a statement he had made to the police and a motion challenging the constitutionality of the sentencing provisions of section 12-14.1(b)(1.2) of the Code on grounds that it violates constitutional principles of proportionality and due process. On October 31, 2002, the circuit court heard testimony and argument on defendant's motion to suppress. The evidence presented indicated that defendant initially denied having engaged in any sexual activity with the children and he continued to do so for "a period of time." However, he eventually acknowledged that he had engaged in acts of sexual penetration with the children, and he gave a statement to that effect. The court ultimately denied defendant's motion to suppress, ruling that defendant's statement was "both voluntarily and knowingly given." The court deferred ruling on defendant's other motion until it had heard the evidence in the case.
The matter was tried before the court on November 12 and 13, 2002. Detective Earl Dutko of the Livingston County sheriff's department testified that he and Detective John Johnson met with defendant on May 8, 2002, at defendant's home in Fairbury. They arranged for the defendant to meet with them at the Fairbury police department. At the police department, defendant was informed of his rights and apprised of the allegations against him. Defendant initially denied any involvement. At some point in the questioning, defendant was asked about a criminal "conviction" in McLean County in 1996. The presentence report indicates that defendant had pled guilty to public indecency in 1996. After a time, defendant acknowledged improprieties with the children and he agreed to provide a written statement of his activities. He declined to participate in an audio/video statement. Detective Dutko identified defendant's written statement, which was subsequently admitted into evidence. The statement, with appropriate modification to protect the privacy of the juvenile victims, reads, verbatim, as follows:
Detective Johnson testified, corroborating what Detective Dutko said in his testimony. Johnson stated that defendant "eventually * * * confided * * * that he had in fact had sexual acts with the children." Johnson also noted that the officers had questioned defendant about a 1996 incident in his criminal history. The officers asked defendant what had occurred during that incident, and whether the conduct might have involved young victims.
C.D. testified that she was born on June 19, 1992, and, in the spring of 2002, she was in the fourth grade at Chatsworth Elementary in Livingston County. At that time, defendant was her art teacher. Sometime in March of 2002, defendant asked her to come to the art room. She was alone with defendant in the art room for about 15 minutes after school, and he suggested that they play a food taste-test game. Defendant seated her in a "really tiny" chair, along the same wall as the only door to the room, but at the other end of the room from the door.
After he blindfolded her, defendant gave her foods and she tried to guess what they were. Defendant first placed pickles in her mouth; she recognized the taste. He then gave her chocolate pudding. She testified that she could taste the chocolate, but she could not identify the type of food or the object it was on. Defendant did not place a spoon in her mouth; it was, rather, a cylindrical object. After she guessed incorrectly, defendant told her it was pudding, he took off the blindfold, and she left the room. Sometime later, she spoke to the other two victims and they came to the consensus that "something weird" was going on. Subsequently, they mentioned the incidents to the lunchroom teachers.
K.F. testified that she was born on October 7, 1991, and, in the spring of 2002, she was in the fourth grade at Chatsworth Elementary in Livingston County. At that time, defendant was her art teacher. Pursuant to defendant's designation, she was the helper in defendant's art class on May 7, 2002. She stayed after school to help clean up. Defendant told her if she did a good job she would get to play a taste-test game. After she had finished cleaning up, defendant placed her in a small chair back in the corner of the room, where she could not be seen from the door. He blindfolded her and the "game" began.
Defendant first gave her marshmallows and then pretzels to taste. She guessed correctly and was given Starburst candy as a reward. Defendant then put either pudding or peanut butter in her mouth. The object he used was not a spoon or a wooden stick or tongue depressor. Defendant was so close to her at the time that she could feel her breath back in her face. She felt "kind of weird." Defendant told her to open her mouth wider, so he could get the object into her mouth. K.F. said the substance she was given did not taste at all like pudding or peanut butter. She described it as "sour and salty and nasty."
When K.F. told defendant she was going to take off her blindfold, defendant said, "No, wait," and ran behind her. She heard defendant get a paper towel out of the towel dispenser and wipe something off. She also heard a sound like pants going together. It took defendant a while, but he finally told her she could take the blindfold off, get her Starburst, and go. K.F. talked about the incident with her friends afterward.
D.R. testified that she was born on April 17, 1992, and, in the spring of 2002, she was in the fourth grade at Chatsworth Elementary in Livingston County. At that time, defendant was her art...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343 (U.S. 6/25/2008), No. 07-343.
...the constitutionality of the death penalty for prison assaults); equivocal in its conclusion, see People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 141, 816 N. E. 2d 322, 341-342 (2004) (citing law review articles for the proposition that the constitutionality of the death penalty for nonhomicide crim......
-
People v. Hallak
...(discussing the long-term developmental problems sexually abused children can experience), and People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill.2d 107, 135, 287 Ill.Dec. 560, 816 N.E.2d 322 (2004) ("The child's life may be forever altered by residual problems associated with the event."). Though it may certai......
-
City of Chi. v. Alexander, 1–12–2858.
...applied, a facial challenge must fail.” ’ ” Id. at 537, 304 Ill.Dec. 336, 852 N.E.2d 792 (quoting People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill.2d 107, 145, 287 Ill.Dec. 560, 816 N.E.2d 322 (2004), quoting Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill.2d 151, 157, 269 Ill.Dec. 875, 781 N.E.2d 1065 (2002) ). We agree with the Cit......
-
Kennedy v. Louisiana
...the constitutionality of the death penalty for prison assaults); equivocal in its conclusion, see People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill.2d 107, 141, 287 Ill.Dec. 560, 816 N.E.2d 322, 341–342 (2004) (citing law review articles for the proposition that the constitutionality of the death penalty for n......