People v. Hudgins
| Decision Date | 06 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 63816 |
| Citation | 125 Mich.App. 140,336 N.W.2d 241 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Victor HUDGINS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Deputy Chief Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., Civil and Appeals, and Jerome S. O'Connor, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
Greenspon, Scheff & Washington by Eileen R. Scheff, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Before T.M. BURNS, P.J., and MAHER and HOOD, JJ.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance, M.C.L. Sec. 333.7403; M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7403). Sentenced to from 30 months to 4 years imprisonment, defendant appeals by right.
The testimony received at trial painted two distinct and conflicting portraits of the events underlying the prosecution. According to the arresting officers, they first spotted the defendant standing by an occupied car stopped in the street. The occupants of the car appeared to point in the direction of the officers and then drove away, leaving defendant alone in the street. The defendant walked towards the officers and, as he did so, dropped a cigarette pack from his hand. One of the officers detained the defendant while the other retrieved the pack. The pack enclosed several coin envelopes, at least one of which contained heroin. One of the officers also testified that the area in which these events occurred--near the Highland-Woodrow Wilson intersection in Detroit--is the scene of frequent narcotics deals.
A different scenario emerged from the testimony of defendant and his two witnesses, Joseph Ezidore and defendant's mother. On the day in question, defendant, accompanied by his mother and Ezidore, drove to a local store to pick up some items. Ezidore waited in the car while defendant and his mother went into the store. When defendant emerged from the store, one of the officers stopped him while the other searched the area until he found a cigarette pack about 20 or 30 feet away. Neither Ezidore nor defendant's mother observed defendant drop anything from his hand and defendant denied doing so. Moreover, defendant's mother, who had followed her son out of the store, testified that the cigarette pack was not located in the path defendant had taken from the store.
First, defendant maintains that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to introduce evidence of Ezidore's conviction for use of heroin. M.C.L. Sec. 333.7404; M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7404). Because the defendant neither moved to suppress nor objected to this evidence we can review the issue only if our failure to do so would result in a manifest injustice. See People v. Farnsley, 94 Mich.App. 34, 36, 287 N.W.2d 361 (1979).
The following colloquy opened the prosecution's cross-examination of Ezidore:
Thus, the prosecutor attempted to impeach Ezidore by eliciting from the witness his prior conviction for use of heroin. The admissibility of evidence of a prior conviction for the purpose of impeaching a witness is governed by MRE 609. That rule provides in pertinent part:
Under this rule, evidence of a conviction for use of heroin is not admissible to impeach a witness. The crime is punishable by not more than one year of imprisonment. Nor does the offense involve "theft, dishonesty or false statement". Consequently, evidence of a conviction for use of heroin does not satisfy subsection (1) of MRE 609(a) and, accordingly, is inadmissible to impeach a witness.
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of Ezidore's prior conviction for use of heroin to attack the witness's credibility. Moreover, this error is not harmless. Error is not harmless if, in the absence of the error, it is reasonably possible that one juror would have voted to acquit. See People v. Oliver, 111 Mich.App. 734, 757, 314 N.W.2d 740 (1981). This case presents a classic swearing contest between the police on one side and the defendant and his witnesses on the other. The credibility of the witnesses was critical to the outcome of the case. The improper attack on Ezidore's credibility was, therefore, especially damaging. In the wake of this attack, a juror inclined to believe defendant's version of events may very well have crossed over to the side of the prosecution.
Failure to reverse a defendant's conviction following a trial infected with such prejudicial error would be a manifest injustice. Consequently, we reverse defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial.
Defendant's trial presents yet another ground for reversal. Defendant maintains that remarks made by the prosecutor during his closing argument denied him a fair trial. Because the defendant did not object to these remarks, we cannot review unless our failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v. Duncan, 402 Mich. 1, 15-16, 260 N.W.2d 58 (1977).
During his closing argument, the prosecutor made repeated references to the prevalence of drug trafficking in the area in which the police observed the defendant. These remarks pervaded the prosecutor's argument, giving the jury the impression that--to use the words of the prosecutor: "Everybody is hawking narcotics on Woodrow Wilson and Highland." The import of this suggestion is obvious: the defendant, by virtue of his presence in this area of Detroit, is guilty of a narcotics offense.
A prosecutor must not appeal to the prejudices of the jury. People v. Cowell, 44 Mich.App. 623, 628, 205 N.W.2d 600 (1973). By emphasizing that defendant was present in an area of considerable trafficking in drugs, the prosecutor appealed to that all-too-human tendency to find "guilt by association". This tactic denied defendant a fair trial, requiring reversal.
Finally, the defendant draws our attention to several comments made by the trial judge during jury voir dire and the examination of witness Ezidore. In her colloquy with the trial judge, juror Collins revealed that her father was a security officer in a local automobile plant. The exchange continued:
In her colloquy with the trial judge, another juror stated that it would be difficult for her to sit on the jury on a particular day. On that day, she explained, the organization to which she belonged was to hold "a bingo to raise funds for alcohol and drug abuse". After further questioning, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Whitfield
...38-39, 339 N.W.2d 683 (1983); People v. Miller (On Remand), 128 Mich.App. 298, 301, 340 N.W.2d 858 (1983); People v. Hudgins, 125 Mich.App. 140, 143, 148, 336 N.W.2d 241 (1983); People v. Key, 121 Mich.App. 168, 171, 179, 328 N.W.2d 609 (1982); Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge......
-
State v. Wall
...People v. George, 130 Mich.App. 174, 342 N.W.2d 908 (1983), and not appeal to the prejudices of the jury. People v. Hudgins, 125 Mich.App. 140, 336 N.W.2d 241 (1983). (Emphasis I acknowledge that there is "no hard and fast rule" on what constitutes prosecutorial misconduct and same is deter......
-
People v. Stapf, Docket No. 86153
...we are unconvinced that any juror might have voted to acquit defendant[155 MICHAPP 497] absent this evidence. People v. Hudgins, 125 Mich.App. 140, 145, 336 N.W.2d 241 (1983). Next, we address whether the trial court's jury instructions were deficient because the instructions were inadequat......
-
State v. Blaine, 15679
...People v. George, 130 Mich.App. 174, 342 N.W.2d 908 (1983), and not appeal to the prejudices of the jury, People v. Hudgins, 125 Mich.App. 140, 336 N.W.2d 241 (1983). Arguments that invite the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of a victim are generally improper. State v. Johnson, 324 N.......