People v. Hughes

• Decision Date: 23 February 1895
• Docket Number: 561
• Citation: 11 Utah 100,39 P. 492
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH, RESPONDENT, v. GEORGE HUGHES, APPELLANT

39 P. 492

11 Utah 100

THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH, RESPONDENT, v. GEORGE HUGHES, APPELLANT

No. 561

Supreme Court of Utah

February 23, 1895

APPEAL from the District Court of the First Judicial District. Hon H. W. Smith, Judge.

George Hughes, convicted of robbery, appeals from the judgment rendered, and from an order denying a new trial.

Reversed.

Mr Samuel A. King, for appellant.

Mr. J W. Judd, U. S. Attorney, for the people.

MERRITT, C. J. BARTCH, J., concurs.

OPINION

MERRITT, C. J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the First District Court against the appellant, and from an order denying his motion for a new trial. Appellant was convicted of the crime of robbery, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period of two years. The record in the case discloses that the trouble occurred in Uintah county near Ft. Duchesne, at the saloon of one William M. Nichols, who, it appears, was conducting a gambling game called "Mexican Monte." The appellant, while in an intoxicated condition, went to the saloon, and lost a large sum of money at this game. After losing his money, it is claimed that at the point of a revolver he robbed the game of $ 53 by taking this sum from the card table and from the immediate presence of Nichols, and that he also immediately thereafter robbed Nichols of $ 105, taking this amount from his person. The theory of the defense was that, if the appellant took any money from the person or presence of Nichols, it was under the claim of ownership, and an honest belief that appellant had a right to the money which had been won from him at an unlawful card game.

Counsel for appellant has presented to this court several assignments in his specification of errors, the major portion of them being exceptions to the rulings of the court upon the questions asked the various witnesses. Most of these questions, however, are directed to the question of felonious intent of the defendant at the time of the robbery, and for that reason we do not deem it necessary to consider them at all, but will content ourselves with the consideration of the principal ones. Appellant assigns as error the action of the court in refusing to allow him, when testifying as a witness in his own behalf, to answer the following question: "Did you at that time honestly believe that the money was yours, and that you had a right to take it?" to which question the prosecuting attorney objected, for the reason that it was incompetent, and the court sustained the objection. We think it was competent for the defendant to testify what his intent, belief, and motive were at the time of the alleged robbery; and the court, in excluding this testimony, seems to have proceeded upon the theory in part (and the charge indicates it) "that the intention of the parties is to be derived alone from the act done; from that and the surrounding circumstances determine what he intended to do;" and that in arriving at the intention the defendant's own statement and testimony was not to be considered. This undoubtedly was the common-law rule, which had its origin when the defendant was not allowed to be heard in his own behalf.

The point is discussed in the case of People v. Farrell, 31 Cal. 576. The court there says: "The rule that the intent must be inferred from the acts and words of the party had its foundation in necessity, created by the rule which excluded parties in interest from the witness stand. That necessity is now removed by the abrogation of the rule which created it; and the legal tenet that actions must speak for themselves, and words furnish their own interpretation, is much modified, if not wholly abrogated, by the recent innovations upon the common law by which parties are allowed to testify in their own behalf. Before that time there was no way of ascertaining the motives and intentions of parties except by inference from their acts and sayings, and all experience shows that they may frequently, if not at all times, prove very imperfect guides. It is no answer to say that this enables a party to substitute a false motive for the true one, or to convert words spoken in one sense into another. If the argument proves anything, it proves too much, and shows that the radical change which has been made is in all respects founded in folly, rather than wisdom. For the truthfulness of parties when upon the witness stand we must depend, as in the case of other witnesses, upon the obligations of their oath, and their reputation for truth and veracity. If these can be relied upon for the truth of statements made in reference to acts and words of which the eye and ear may take notice, they may, for the same reason, be accepted as guaranties for the truth of statements made in respect to motives and intents of which the mind or inner man alone can take cognizance. Nor is there, in our judgment, any well-grounded reason for apprehending that this rule will obstruct, rather than advance, the ends of justice. There is no more danger of imposing upon the jury falsehood or pretense in respect to motives and intents than there is of doing the like in respect to visible or external circumstances. The jury can as readily distinguish between the false and true in respect to the former as to the latter. If the motive or intent assigned is inconsistent with the external circumstances, it must be discarded as false; if, on the contrary, they are consistent, there is no reason why they may not be true."

This doctrine was recognized in State v Harrington, 12 Nev. 125, and followed. In that case the following question was asked the defendant by his counsel: "At the moment of the discharge of the pistol at the deceased, did you or did you not really believe that you were in danger of losing your life or receiving great bodily harm?" and Mr. Justice Leonard, in concluding his discussion on this question says: "We are entirely satisfied that, for the purpose of showing the condition of...