People v. Hughey

• Decision Date: 17 December 1990
• Docket Number: Docket No. 117157
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sebastian Stormin Easter HUGHEY, Defendant-Appellant. 186 Mich.App. 585, 464 N.W.2d 914
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 914

464 N.W.2d 914

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sebastian Stormin Easter HUGHEY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 117157.

186 Mich.App. 585, 464 N.W.2d 914

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 10, 1990, at Grand Rapids.

Decided Dec. 17, 1990, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication Feb. 11, 1991.

[186 MICHAPP 586] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., Tony D. Tague, Pros. Atty., and Kevin A. Lynch, Asst. Pros. Atty., for People.

William E. Jackson, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant.

Before MacKENZIE, P.J., and SAWYER and BURNS, ^* JJ.

SAWYER, Judge.

Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of first-degree felony murder. M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548. Defendant was sentenced to two terms of life in prison without parole. He now appeals and we affirm.

We first collectively consider three arguments raised by defendant that the trial court should have granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Specifically, defendant argues that the motion should have been granted because the prosecutor failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime prior to the introduction of defendant's confession, because the prosecutor could not establish that defendant could form the specific intent to kill because of diminished capacity due to the consumption of drugs, and because the prosecution failed to show all of the essential elements of the crimes charged. We disagree.

Turning to the first issue, whether the prosecutor established the corpus delicti of the crime independent of defendant's confession, we conclude that he did. First, we must determine what constitutes[186 MICHAPP 587] the corpus delicti of the crime of first-degree felony murder. Defendant cites People v. Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973), which adopted the dissenting opinion of Judge Levin in the Court of Appeals decision in Allen, 39 Mich.App. 483, 494, 197 N.W.2d 874 (1972), wherein the Court opined that the corpus delicti rule required that each and every element of the offense be established. See 39 Mich.App. at 496.

However, the Supreme Court revisited the corpus delicti rule, in the context of first-degree premeditated murder, in People v. Williams, 422 Mich. 381, 373 N.W.2d 567 (1985). In Williams, the Court concluded that the corpus delicti rule does not require the introduction of evidence on each of the essential elements of the offense, but rather, for first-degree premeditated murder, the corpus delicti consists of a showing of the death of the victim and some criminal agency as a cause of the death. Id. at 392, 373 N.W.2d 567. The Court explained that it is unnecessary to establish what degree of homicide is committed in order to establish the corpus delicti:

It is an inaccurate and unwarranted reading of the history and purpose of the corpus delicti rule that suggests the need for independent proof of each and every element of the particular grade and kind of common-law or statutory criminal homicide charged as a condition of admissibility of a defendant's confession. Such an understanding of the corpus delicti rule loses sight of the historic reason for the rule; to avoid conviction for a homicide that did not occur. The logic of the rule is not served by extending it to require proof, aliunde the defendant's confession, not only that a particular deceased lost his life and that the loss is a result of criminal agency but, in addition, proof of the aggravating circumstances which move the seriousness of the crime up the scale of criminal [186 MICHAPP 588] accountability (measured by the severity of the penalty) from manslaughter to second-degree murder or to first-degree murder. Whatever the aggravating circumstances which constitute a crime, second-degree murder instead of manslaughter, or first-degree murder instead of second-degree murder, the danger that a defendant would confess to a criminal killing which never occurred is adequately obviated when it is shown, other than by the accused's confession, that the deceased victim died as a result of a criminal agency. [Id. at 391, 373 N.W.2d 567]

Moreover, the Williams Court considered the effect of its earlier ruling in Allen, and distinguished Allen on the basis that Allen involved felony murder, rather than premeditated murder. It further distinguished Allen because Allen preceded the Supreme Court decision in People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980), noting that at the time Allen was decided even an accidental homicide occurring during the commission of a felony would support a felony-murder conviction while, after Aaron, the killing had to constitute common-law murder. Williams, supra, 422 Mich. at 388, n. 3, 373 N.W.2d 567.

The question which arises then is: What effect does the Williams decision have in felony-murder cases? We conclude that the reasoning behind the Williams decision equally applies to felony-murder cases, particularly in light of the decision in Aaron, supra. That is, the purpose of the corpus delicti rule is also served in felony-murder cases if it is merely required that the prosecutor establish a death and that the death resulted because of some criminal agency, without requiring the additional showing of the remaining elements of felony murder, including the commission of the underlying felony. In both cases, by establishing that a death has resulted because of a criminal agency, the possibility of a defendant confessing to a nonexistent homicide is precluded.

[186 MICHAPP 589] Moreover, the Court in Williams specifically stated that the corpus delicti rule does not require a showing of evidence in support of the determination of the particular degree of homicide committed, allowing, instead, for the degree of homicide to be established by the defendant's confession. Id. at 392, 373 N.W.2d 567. We see no reason, therefore, to distinguish between premeditated murder and felony murder by requiring the prosecutor to establish, independently of the defendant's confession, the aggravating circumstance in felony murder--the underlying felony--which raises the homicide to first-degree murder, while in premeditated murder the prosecutor has no such burden of establishing, independently of the defendant's confession, the element of premeditation and deliberation.

For the above reasons, we conclude that the Supreme Court's decision in Williams, had the effect of overruling its prior decision in Allen, and conclude that the corpus delicti rule is satisfied in prosecutions of first-degree felony murder, as well as prosecutions of first-degree premeditated murder, by showing that a death has occurred and that the death resulted from a criminal agency.

Turning to the case at bar, the prosecutor presented the testimony of fifty-two witnesses before offering defendant's confession. Among those fifty-two witnesses was Dr. Henry DeLeeuw, the Muskegon County Medical Examiner, who testified that he had performed autopsies upon the bodies of the victims, that Mae Middleton had suffered a total of twenty stab wounds plus five or six additional lacerations, and that William Middleton also had suffered a number of stab wounds and lacerations. Dr. DeLeeuw further testified that both victims had received a number of defensive wounds to their hands and that, in both cases, the cause of death was hemorrhaging due to the knife wounds. [186 MICHAPP 590] Dr. DeLeeuw also opined that the victims were dead and had, in fact, pronounced them dead at the scene. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor independently of defendant's confession, did establish the corpus delicti of the crimes charged, namely, two counts of first-degree felony murder, in that it was established that Mae and William Middleton were dead and that their deaths were due to a criminal agency.

Next, we consider the question whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict on the basis that defendant had established evidence of diminished capacity and, therefore, was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal with regard to the murder charges. We disagree. In reviewing a motion for directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and a determination made whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the charged offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hampton, 407 Mich. 354, 368, 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979). Defendant argues that his use of drugs precluded him from forming the necessary intent to commit the murder. Voluntary drug intoxication could be a defense to felony murder to the extent that the underlying felony is a specific intent crime (which is the case here since the underlying crime was larceny) and that the intoxication precluded the defendant from being able to form the specific intent required to commit the underlying...