People v. Hull

• Decision Date: 26 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. S019254,S019254
• Citation: 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526,820 P.2d 1036,1 Cal.4th 266
• Parties: , 820 P.2d 1036 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alma Mae HULL, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 526

2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526

1 Cal.4th 266, 820 P.2d 1036

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alma Mae HULL, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S019254.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Dec. 26, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1992.

[1 Cal.4th 267] [820 P.2d 1037] Millard A. Murphy, Davis, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, Laurence M. Sarnoff and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defenders, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp and Daniel E. Lungren, Attys. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart and George Williamson, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Louis Vasquez, Shirley A. Nelson, Robert R. Anderson, Michael Weinberger and Carlos A. Martinez, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

Michael D. Bradbury, Dist. Atty., Ventura, and Michael D. Schwartz, Deputy Dist. Atty., Ventura, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

PANELLI, Justice.

We granted review to determine whether a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) ¹ (hereafter section 170.3(d)) is the exclusive means by which a party may seek review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge against a trial judge. (§ 170.6.) We conclude, as did the Court of Appeal in this case, that section 170.3(d) prescribes the exclusive means of appellate review of an unsuccessful peremptory challenge.

FACTS

Petitioner Alma Mae Hull (Hull) was charged by information with the sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf.Code, § 11352). ² She waived arraignment and pleaded not guilty. Jury trial was set for October 16, 1989, at a pretrial conference held before Judge Pierson. Later, the case was assigned to Judge Stone's courtroom. However, after Presiding Judge Cantwell granted a continuance, another pretrial conference was set for October 26, 1989, and the trial was reset for October 30, 1989.

At the second pretrial conference, held before Judge Azevedo, the trial date of October 30 was confirmed. Although Hull's trial counsel was not present at this pretrial conference, Hull herself was present.

On Friday, October 27, 1989, Judge Cantwell presided over another "department setting conference." As a result of this conference, the case was assigned to Judge Pierson's courtroom for trial. Neither Hull nor her trial counsel was present. Subsequently, on Monday, October 30, Hull filed a peremptory challenge before Presiding Judge Cantwell, pursuant to section 170.6, ³ to disqualify Judge Pierson. Judge Cantwell denied the motion as untimely.

Hull waived her right to a jury trial and proceeded to trial before Judge Pierson. Judge Pierson found Hull guilty and also found true the alleged prior conviction. The judge also found that Hull was on her own recognizance pending trial on still another charge at the time of the offense. On November 27, 1989, Hull was sentenced to a total term of six years and four months. This term was to run consecutively to the sentence already imposed for Hull's prior offense.

Hull filed an appeal from the judgment of conviction that raised only the denial of her peremptory challenge motion. The Court of Appeal held that an order denying a peremptory challenge of a trial judge is not an appealable order and hence was not reviewable on appeal. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment.

DISCUSSION

Hull contends that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that review of a denial of a peremptory challenge under section 170.6 was subject to the provisions of section 170.3(d). We disagree.

Chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled "Disqualifications of Judges," prescribes the means by which a party may challenge an assigned judge "for cause" (§ 170.1) or may exercise a peremptory challenge against the judge (§ 170.6). In 1984, as part of a substantial overhaul of the provisions of title 2, chapter 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Legislature enacted section 170.3(d) pertaining to appellate review of disqualification motions. Section 170.3(d) provides: "The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision and only by the parties to the proceeding." (§ 170.3(d); see Stats.1984, ch. 1555, § 1 et seq., pp. 5479-5484.)

A split of authority has developed in the Courts of Appeal as to whether section 170.3(d) applies to both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges, or only to challenges for cause. The Court of Appeal in People v. Jenkins (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 394, 241 Cal.Rptr. 827 (hereafter Jenkins ) addressed challenges for cause and held that section 170.3(d) makes mandamus the sole appellate remedy for review of an order denying a motion to disqualify a judge for cause. (196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 403-404, 241 Cal.Rptr. 827.) According to the court, "[t]he unambiguous language of [section 170.3(d) ] indicates that an order determining disqualification is reviewable 'only' by writ, thereby precluding review on appeal from a judgment. The Legislature obviously opted for speedy review of a disqualification ruling, since permitting that ruling to be attacked later on appeal of the judgment could invalidate every ruling made by the trial court judge after the disqualification motion was denied." (Ibid.) The Jenkins court did not address section 170.3(d)'s applicability to peremptory challenges under section 170.6.

In Woodman v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 407, 241 Cal.Rptr. 818 (hereafter Woodman ), ⁴ the Court of Appeal specifically held that the limitation on appellate review set forth in section 170.3(d) applies only to challenges for cause. The Woodman court examined the legislative history of section 170.3(d) and concluded "that the 1984 revision of the challenge for cause statute, of which [section 170.3(d) ] is part, was to have no effect on the peremptory challenge statute." (196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 413-414, 241 Cal.Rptr. 818.) The court reached this conclusion by relying on the statement of the Senate Final History of Senate Bill No. 1633, 1983-1984 Regular Session, that " 'Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 170.6 provides for the peremptory challenge of a trial court judge. This bill would not amend that section.' " (196 Cal.App.3d at p. 414, 241 Cal.Rptr. 818, italics in Woodman.) The Woodman court concluded that "the mere use of the phrase 'disqualification of a judge' in the time limitation provision of section 170.3, subdivision (d) does not evince a legislative intent that the limitation apply to all disqualification motions." (Id. at p. 413, 241 Cal.Rptr. 818.)

Rejecting Woodman, the Court of Appeal in Guedalia v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1156, 260 Cal.Rptr. 99 (hereafter Guedalia ) held that section 170.3(d) "is the exclusive appellate remedy for any motion to disqualify a judge, including peremptory challenges pursuant to section 170.6." (211 Cal.App.3d at p. 1163, 260 Cal.Rptr. 99.) The Guedalia court expressly agreed with Jenkins' statutory analysis of section 170.3(d) and concluded that the analysis applies to both types of challenges. (211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1159-1160, 260 Cal.Rptr. 99.) Thus, Guedalia stated, "the plain language of [section 170.3(d) ] does not purport to limit its applicability to challenges 'for cause.' To the contrary, it is broadly applicable to any 'determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge....' ... The broad language plainly evinces an intention that [section 170.3(d) ] has generic applicability to all disqualification motions, including section 170.6 motions." (Id. at p. 1160, 260 Cal.Rptr. 99.)

Moreover, Guedalia explained, because section 170.3(d) is part of the provisions of title 2, chapter 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals exclusively with questions of disqualification of judges, the section's "limitation on appellate review of disqualification determinations appears fully applicable to any disqualification motions within the ambit of chapter 3, including motions under section 170.6." (211 Cal.App.3d at p. 1161, 260 Cal.Rptr. 99, italics in original.)

Guedalia recognized that Woodman, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 407, 241 Cal.Rptr. 818, reached a contrary conclusion based on its review of section 170.3(d)'s legislative history. However, Guedalia stated, its "review of that same legislative history ... reveals no intention to exclude section 170.6 determinations from the appellate review provisions enacted by the Legislature." (211 Cal.App.3d at p. 1161, 260 Cal.Rptr. 99, italics in original.) According to Guedalia, in excluding peremptory challenges from section 170.3(d)'s provisions, the Woodman court adopted an incorrect and unnecessarily broad interpretation of the legislative history. (See post, p. 532 of 2 Cal.Rptr.2d, p. 1042 of 820 P.2d.)

Finally, Guedalia explained, holding section 170.3(d)'s 10-day limitation applicable to section 170.6 peremptory challenges had the added benefit of promoting the twin policies advanced by section 170.3(d)--judicial economy and elimination of the unfair manipulation of erroneously denied challenges. (211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1162-1163, 260 Cal.Rptr. 99.) ⁵ Hull urges us to resolve the split between Guedalia and Woodman by adopting the Woodman rationale. We begin our analysis by noting that "[t]he fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.]" (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420.) In determining this intent, courts look first to the words contained in the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 90, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v....