People v. Hulland
| Decision Date | 06 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. B160371.,B160371. |
| Citation | 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 919,110 Cal.App.4th 1646 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ricky HULLAND, Defendant and Appellant. |
Law Offices of Carl K. Osborne, Carl K. Osborne, Beverly Hills, and Philip A. Iadevaia, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Michael W. Whitaker, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A police officer purchases drugs from a defendant, then waits 52 days before seeking a warrant to search two residences where the defendant allegedly lives. When the defendant moves to suppress evidence obtained from the search, the trial court finds the warrant was based on stale information, but denies suppression on further finding that the officer executed the warrant in good faith.
Here we conclude that the officer, who both sought and executed the warrant, should have known that the stale information contained in his search warrant affidavit lacked the necessary indicia of probable cause. Knowing this, an objectively reasonable officer also would have known that he or she could not rely on the magistrate's issuance of the warrant. Although the determination of staleness is always made on a case-by-case basis, the good faith exception only applies to those cases in which that determination presents a close question. Such a limitation on the application of the exception is necessary to avoid evisceration of the staleness doctrine.
Ricky Hulland appeals from the judgment following his no contest plea to possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11359). Hulland was placed on formal probation for three years on the condition that he serve 90 days in jail. He contends the trial court' erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 by concluding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. We agree and, accordingly, reverse.
On November 15, 2001, Pasadena Police Officer Kevin Jackson sought and obtained a warrant to search two residences and two automobiles purportedly belonging to Hulland. The affidavit in support of the warrant stated that in September the officer had been contacted by a confidential reliable informant (CRI) who told him that Hulland was dealing marijuana. A Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records check verified the CRI's statement that Hulland lived in an apartment on Crenshaw Boulevard in Los Angeles. The affiant also stated that the records reflected an address for Hulland on Don Ricardo Drive. The attached DMV printout reflects, however, that a Ricky Holland resides at the Don Ricardo Drive address.
The CRI agreed to participate in a controlled purchase of marijuana from Hulland. Between September 21 and 30, the CRI called Hulland's cell phone and ordered marijuana. Hulland agreed to deliver the marijuana to the CRI at a parking lot in Pasadena. Officer Jackson drove the CRI to the parking lot. Hulland drove next to the driver's side window and handed the officer a sweatshirt wrapped around an unspecified amount of marijuana. In exchange, the officer gave Hulland an unspecified amount of money. The officer removed the marijuana and returned the sweatshirt to Hulland.1
On October 9, Officers Jackson and Medrano conducted surveillance of both the Crenshaw Boulevard and Don Ricardo Drive addresses. Officer Medrano observed Hulland as he left the apartment building on Crenshaw Boulevard and got into the car he had used to deliver the marijuana. Officer Jackson observed a Mercedes Benz parked at the Don Ricardo Drive address that was purportedly registered to Hulland. According to the officer's affidavit, the CRI had verified that Hulland drove a green Mercedes. As the DMV printout indicated, however, the Mercedes was registered to a Ricky Holland who resided at the Don Ricardo Drive address.
After the controlled buy, Officer Jackson made several attempts to contact Hulland by calling his cell phone and pager. Both numbers had been disconnected. Based on his experience, Officer Jackson believed that Hulland had changed his cellular and pager numbers in an effort to avoid apprehension. Officer Jackson also stated in his affidavit that on October 12, an agent of the United States Postal Inspectors Office told him that a "Ricky Hulland" was currently receiving mail at both the Crenshaw Boulevard and Don Ricardo Drive addresses.
Officer Jackson stated that in his opinion "[g]iven the large quantity of marijuana that Hulland sold and transported, it is my belief that he continues to traffic in large quantity narcotics." The officer based his opinion on his six years of experience as a police officer, the past 11 months of which were under assignment in a special section that investigated mid-to-major level, drug-related crimes.2 The officer also stated his belief that the police surveillance and postal inspector's apparent confirmation that Hulland received mail at both the Crenshaw Boulevard and the Don Ricardo Drive addresses provided probable cause to believe that Hulland resided at both addresses.
Officer Jackson and other officers served the search warrant at the Crenshaw Boulevard address on November 15. During the search, they seized approximately 110.97 grams of marijuana, 10.97 grams of rock cocaine, $3,800 in cash, a handgun, a shotgun, a scale, and ziplock baggies. When Officer Jackson attempted to serve the warrant at the Don Ricardo Drive address, he discovered that a Ricky Holland resided there and that the Mercedes identified in the search warrant was registered to him.
On April 10, 2002, Hulland moved to quash the warrant and to suppress the seized evidence on the ground that the information supporting the finding of probable cause was stale. The trial court agreed that the information was stale because the warrant was not issued until at least 52 days after the controlled buy.
In support of the prosecution's contention that the warrant was executed in good faith, Officer Jackson testified that, in his opinion, the information in the warrant was not stale because he had purchased "just under a pound" of marijuana from Hulland and believed that an individual selling such a large amount of marijuana would still be dealing the drug less than two months later. The officer also testified that his delay in seeking the warrant was due to his continuing efforts to confirm that Hulland lived at both addresses. The officer did not indicate what those efforts were, however, nor did he provide any explanation for the 52-day delay. He also stated he had continued calling Hulland's disconnected numbers to determine whether they were only temporarily disconnected. He further testified that he had spelled Hulland's name for the postal inspector prior to receiving the purported confirmation that Hulland lived at the Don Ricardo Drive address. He failed, however, to explain the discrepancy between the CRI's purported representation that Hulland drove the green Mercedes identified in the search warrant and the fact that the vehicle was actually registered to the individual named Holland who resided at the Don Ricardo Drive address and that no green Mercedes was ever linked to Hulland.
The court concluded that Officer Jackson had executed the warrant in good faith, and accordingly denied the motion to suppress. The court reasoned: "I certainly can't fault the police officer from [sic] believing that if he bought some drugs from the individual then went back 52 and 57 days later, with a search warrant, I can't fault him for searching for drugs where the seller resides."
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 585-586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639.) A warrant to search an individual's home shall not be issued unless the magistrate determines there is a "fair probability that ... evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.)
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant, (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 924, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Although we give great deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause (Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317), the purpose of our review "`... is to insure that the affidavit supplies facts of cause to search so that the magistrate issuing the warrant decides upon the existence of cause with judicial detachment and does not act as a rubber stamp. [Citations.] ...'" (People v. Smith (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 843, 851, 166 Cal.Rptr. 778.)
The trial court found that the warrant under which Officer Jackson searched Hulland's residence was not supported by...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Casique, A113636 (Cal. App. 5/29/2009)
...affidavits furnished information that was not stale and supported the finding of probable cause to issue the warrant. (People v. Hulland (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1652; People v. Mikesell, supra, at p. 1718.) Hence, trial counsel was not incompetent for failing to raise an objection to t......
-
People v. Superior Court
...well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization.'" (People v. Hulland (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1653, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 919.) Steve Wahl, the officer who executed the search warrant, testified that he believed that "when the Jeep was l......
-
People v. Carrington
...had continued to the present time, then the passage of time will not render the information stale." (People v. Hulland (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1652, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d 919.) Courts have upheld warrants despite delays between evidence of criminal activity and the issuance of a warrant, when......
-
People v. Lazarus
...judgment [citations],’ ” giving “great deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause.” (People v. Hu l land (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1651, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 919, quoting People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729.) “In cases where the facts......
-
Chapter 5 - §2. Elements for exclusion
...the staleness of the information. A search-warrant affidavit must not be based on stale facts. See People v. Hulland (2d Dist.2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1652. This means a magistrate cannot rely on facts unless they are "so closely related to the [issuance] of the warrant as to justify a f......
-
Table of Cases null
...Rptr. 3d 375 (3d Dist. 2019)—Ch. 3-B, §16.2.3(2)(b); §16.3; Ch. 4-C, §3.2.2(1)(d)[2][b]; Ch. 5-E, §2.4.2; §3.2.2 People v. Hulland, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1646, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 919 (2d Dist. 2003)—Ch. 5-A, §2.2.1(1)(b)[4]; §4.2.1(1) People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 921......
-
Chapter 5 - §4. Evidence subject to exclusion under Fourth Amendment
...as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; e.g., People v. Hulland (2d Dist.2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1655 (finding no reasonable officer could believe probable cause still existed when there was month-long delay between receiving informat......
-
Search and seizure
...activity had continued to the present time, then the passage of time will not render the information stale.” People v. Hulland (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1652. §7:20.1.2 The Collective Knowledge Rule The “collective knowledge” rule permits officers to detain an individual based on the col......