People v. Humphrey

Decision Date30 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2-03-1306.,2-03-1306.
Citation836 N.E.2d 210
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael L. HUMPHREY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Paul T. Whitcombe, Lee County State's Attorney, Dixon, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, Gregory L. Slovacek, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender and Jack Hildebrand (Court-appointed), Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Michael L. Humphrey.

Justice McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals from the order of the circuit court granting the motion of defendant, Michael Humphrey, to suppress evidence and quash arrest. We affirm.

Defendant was charged with two counts of unlawful possession of methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.6)(A), (a)(6.6)(B) (West 2002)). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and quash arrest, which the trial court granted. The State timely filed a notice of appeal and a certificate of impairment, and this appeal followed.

The only witness to testify at the hearing was Trooper Mark Fane of the Illinois State Police, who testified that, on July 22, 2003, he clocked a vehicle traveling at 94 miles per hour in a 65-mile-per-hour zone on Route I-39. As he caught up to the car, he noticed it tailgating another vehicle. He subsequently pulled the car over. As he sat in his squad behind the car, he noticed "a lot of movement" from the passenger of the car. Trooper Fane assumed that the passenger was moving his hands, although he saw only the passenger's shoulders moving. He approached the car on the passenger side and talked to defendant, the driver, through the passenger window. After he asked for defendant's license, Trooper Fane looked down at the passenger-side floorboard and noticed a small, clear plastic container holding several hundred small white tablets partially under the passenger seat and partially visible at the passenger's feet. He also saw some loose tinfoil like that used to package pills. The passenger did not answer when Trooper Fane asked what the pills were. However, when Trooper Fane asked him to hand over the container, the passenger did so and told Trooper Fane that the pills were pseudoephedrine. Trooper Fane had the passenger get out of the car and asked him what the pills were for. The passenger stated that he had gotten the pills in Wisconsin and was taking them to Missouri to make methamphetamine. Trooper Fane later removed defendant from the car and subsequently found more packages of pills scattered throughout the car. Defendant told Trooper Fane that they were taking the pills to Missouri to sell them to someone to make methamphetamine.

Trooper Fane "had not dealt with" pseudoephedrine before and "didn't know at that point if it was an arrestable offense," so he contacted his supervisor. Trooper Fane had been trained regarding traffic stops involving drugs, but he did not know what the pills were, apart from being told by defendant. He "just knew there was a large amount of them." Based on his experience and training as a police officer, he believed that the pills "could possibly be contraband." At the time he searched the car, he "was not exactly sure what the pills were." He believed that they were pseudoephedrine, based on the passenger's statement. Trooper Fane did not perform any field test on the pills before he arrested defendant, and he was not aware if there was such a test for pseudoephedrine. Trooper Fane believed that the pills could be contraband "due to the amount," which he considered to be "highly unusual."

In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this court may reverse the trial court's findings of historical fact only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Morquecho, 347 Ill.App.3d 382, 386, 282 Ill.Dec. 693, 806 N.E.2d 1281 (2004). However, we review de novo the trial court's ultimate conclusion as to the existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Morquecho, 347 Ill.App.3d at 386, 282 Ill.Dec. 693, 806 N.E.2d 1281. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Jones, 215 Ill.2d 261, 268, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541 (2005). Generally, a search and seizure is reasonable only if the government has first obtained a warrant that authorizes the action. People v. Rucker, 294 Ill.App.3d 218, 223, 228 Ill.Dec. 782, 689 N.E.2d 1203 (1998). The fourth amendment is implicated in a traffic stop because stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose. Jones, 215 Ill.2d at 270, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541. A court generally analyzes a fourth amendment challenge to the reasonableness of a traffic stop under the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Jones, 215 Ill.2d at 270, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541. In such a situation, an officer may under appropriate circumstances, briefly detain a person for questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Jones, 215 Ill.2d at 270-71, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541.

Clearly, Trooper Fane's initial stop of defendant's vehicle was supported by probable cause, not just a reasonable belief, and was therefore justified. See Jones, 215 Ill.2d at 271, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541. Trooper Fane testified that he clocked defendant's car traveling almost 30 miles per hour over the posted speed limit and observed defendant tailgating another car. When a police officer observes a driver violate a traffic law, the officer is justified in briefly detaining the driver to investigate the violation. People v. Reatherford, 345 Ill.App.3d 327, 335, 280 Ill.Dec. 415, 802 N.E.2d 340 (2003).

However, stopping an automobile for a minor traffic violation does not by itself justify a search of the detainee or his vehicle; the officer must reasonably believe that he is confronting a situation more serious than a routine traffic violation. Jones, 215 Ill.2d at 271, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541. During a Terry stop, an officer may seize an object without a warrant, pursuant to the plain view doctrine. This doctrine is an established exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches that allows an officer to seize incriminating evidence that is in plain view. Rucker, 294 Ill.App.3d at 223, 228 Ill.Dec. 782, 689 N.E.2d 1203. This doctrine applies only when the evidence is seized incident to an arrest or is contraband. Rucker, 294 Ill.App.3d at 223, 228 Ill.Dec. 782, 689 N.E.2d 1203. The requirements of the plain view doctrine are: (1) the officer is lawfully in a position from which he can view the object; (2) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object; and (3) the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent. Jones, 215 Ill.2d at 271-72, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541.

Clearly, criteria (1) and (2) were met here. As we stated above, Trooper Fane's initial stop of defendant's vehicle was supported by probable cause and was justified. Trooper Fane also testified that, after speaking to defendant through the passenger window, he looked down at the passenger-side floorboard and saw the plastic container holding hundreds of pills partially visible at the passenger's feet. Thus, the traffic stop, and Trooper Fane's approach to the vehicle to speak to defendant, involved no fourth amendment violation, and the uncontroverted evidence showed that Trooper Fane could plainly see the container of pills on the floorboard.

However, we conclude that criterion (3) was not fulfilled, because the incriminating nature of the container of pills was not immediately apparent. Trooper Fane testified that, based on his training, he believed that the pills "could possibly be contraband," but this was "due to the amount" of pills. He did not know what the pills were, apart from being told, after he saw them and was handed the container, that they were pseudoephedrine. He was not sure, even after searching the car, if possession of the pills was an arrestable offense. This evidence does not demonstrate the immediately apparent incriminating character envisioned in the plain view doctrine. If an officer lacks probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object, i.e., if the incriminating character of the object is not immediately apparent, the plain view doctrine cannot justify the seizure. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374-75, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37, 124 L.Ed.2d 334, 345 (1993); Jones, 215 Ill.2d at 272, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541. Such a conclusion does not, as the State argues, create a requirement of near certainty on the part of an officer. The "immediately apparent" or "probable cause" element does not require that an officer "know" that the item he sees is contraband or evidence of a crime; there need be only sufficient evidence to justify the reasonable belief that the defendant has committed or is committing a crime. Jones, 215 Ill.2d at 273-74, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541. However, the reasonable belief necessary to justify a seizure is the same that would justify a finding of probable cause. People v. Haycraft, 349 Ill.App.3d 416, 424, 285 Ill.Dec. 260, 811 N.E.2d 747 (2004). Here, there is no probable cause. Viewing something without understanding what one is viewing, even requiring an explanation of what one is viewing, is not plain view. It is no less "assisted view" than if Trooper Fane asked defendant to move the contents of the car around so that he could get a better view of...

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