People v. Hunt

Citation2022 IL App (4th) 210001
Decision Date19 May 2022
Docket Number4-21-0001
PartiesTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT D. HUNT, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

2022 IL App (4th) 210001

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

SCOTT D. HUNT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-21-0001

Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fourth District

May 19, 2022


Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clark County No. 03CF68 Honorable Tracy W. Resch, Judge Presiding.

Attorneys for Appellant: James E. Chadd, Catherine K. Hart, and Simone A. Patras, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

Attorneys for Appellee: Kyle P. Hutson, State's Attorney, of Marshall (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and David E. Mannchen, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

HARRIS, JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Cavanagh and Steigmann concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

HARRIS, JUSTICE

¶ 1 Defendant, Scott D. Hunt, was convicted of various sex offenses and sentenced to a total of 47 years in prison. He filed a pro se postconviction petition but voluntarily withdrew his petition during the second stage of postconviction proceedings. Less than a year after his voluntary withdrawal, defendant filed a "Motion to Refile and Reinstate" an amended pro se postconviction petition. The Clark County circuit court granted the motion and later entered a first-stage dismissal of defendant's amended petition on the basis that it was frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant appeals, arguing his amended postconviction petition should have been reinstated at the second stage of postconviction proceedings because that was the stage his original postconviction petition had reached when he voluntarily withdrew it. Alternatively, he contends his amended postconviction petition set forth the gist of a constitutional claim that both his appellate counsel

1

and trial counsel were ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court relied on an improper aggravating factor at his sentencing. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In 2003, the State charged defendant with multiple sex-related offenses in connection with allegations that he sexually abused his nine-year-old adopted daughter, S.H.; possessed child pornography on his home computer; and engaged in sexual intercourse in the presence of S.H. and J.W., S.H.'s younger half-brother. S.H.'s mother, Jeannie Hunt, was defendant's wife and codefendant. Evidence in the case showed S.H. resided in Illinois with defendant, Jeannie, and J.W. However, defendant also worked as an over-the-road truck driver, and Jeannie, S.H., and J.W. would travel with him as he worked. S.H. reported sexual abuse that occurred both at the family's residence in Illinois and while traveling in defendant's semitruck.

¶ 4 Following a jury trial in December 2003, defendant was found guilty of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2002)) (counts I, II, and III); two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id. § 12-16(b), (c)(1)(i)) (counts IV and V); five counts of child pornography (id. § 11-20.1(a)(6)) (counts VII through XI); and one count of sexual exploitation of a child (id. § 11-9.1(a)(1)) (count XII). In February 2004, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 45 years in prison. It imposed consecutive, 15-year prison sentences for each predatory-criminal-sexual-assault count. The court also imposed concurrent sentences of four years in prison for both aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse counts, two years in prison for each child-pornography count, and 364 days in jail for the sexual-exploitation-of-a-child count.

¶ 5 On direct appeal, this court reversed defendant's convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of a child (counts IV, V, and XII) based on a lack of

2

subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., a lack of evidence that the offenses were committed in Illinois. People v. Hunt, No. 4-04-0473 (2006) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). We also held defendant's sentences were unauthorized by statutory law, which required that defendant's concurrent sentences for child pornography be served consecutively to the 15-year sentence the court imposed on his third count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Id. Accordingly, we vacated defendant's sentences and remanded for a new sentencing hearing in conformity with statutory requirements. Id.

¶ 6 On remand, the trial court imposed the same sentences as before on defendant's surviving counts. However, consistent with this court's decision, it ordered defendant's concurrent sentences for child pornography to be served consecutively to his 15-year prison sentence on count III. As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total of 47 years in prison. He appealed, and this court affirmed the trial court's judgment. People v. Hunt, No. 4-07-0795 (2008) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 7 In October 2009, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. He raised 12 claims of error, including a claim that his appointed counsel on remand, Kaye DeSelms, provided ineffective assistance due to a conflict of interest that arose from her simultaneous representation of Jeannie in postconviction proceedings. Defendant included a complaint that DeSelms "refused to challenge any of the 'aggravating factors' that was [sic] presented at [his] original sentencing hearing." Specifically, he alleged he asked DeSelms to object to the trial court considering that he "committed fraud to obtain the adoption of S.H.," arguing such an" 'aggravating factor' must be presented to a jury to determine before the court can use it as an aggravating factor to impose *** sentence." Defendant further maintained that DeSelms's proper investigation of "issues" for his resentencing could have adversely affected Jeannie and, thus, DeSelms could not effectively

3

represent both codefendants.

¶ 8 In December 2009, the trial court entered a written order advancing defendant's pro se petition to the second stage of postconviction proceedings. The court's order reflects that it found 2 of defendant's 12 claims were sufficient to warrant further consideration. The first was defendant's claim that DeSelms provided ineffective assistance. As to that claim, the court stated as follows:

"While it is questionable that [defendant's claim is sufficiently pled to establish either prong of the Strickland test [(see Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984))], the court will give [defendant's claim all benefit of doubt and accept its sufficiency as a constitutional claim. The [d]efendant took a direct appeal from the resentencing hearing and had the opportunity to raise all issues affecting the resentencing hearing, including the trial court's consideration of factors in aggravation or mitigation. By failing to challenge the weight and consideration accorded to aggravating factors on his direct appeal from the sentencing hearing, the [d]efendant arguably has waived any claim of improper consideration, however, the court will not invoke waiver to preclude further consideration of this issue."

The second claim the court determined warranted further consideration concerned defendant's assertion that the mittimus issued upon his resentencing improperly failed to credit him for time he spent in prison between his original sentencing and the date he was resentenced. The court appointed attorney Richard Kash to represent defendant during postconviction proceedings. The record reflects Kash also represented defendant during his trial and original sentencing.

¶ 9 In January 2010, the State filed a motion to amend the mittimus issued after defendant's resentencing, conceding defendant's postconviction claim that his mittimus did not

4

reflect the proper amount of credit to which he was entitled. The same month, it filed a motion to dismiss the paragraph of defendant's postconviction petition alleging DeSelms's ineffective assistance. The State argued defendant's claim that DeSelms failed to investigate issues for his new sentencing hearing was not legally sufficient to show a violation of his constitutional rights. Further, it asserted he forfeited his claim that DeSelms was ineffective for failing to challenge the sentencing court's consideration of an improper aggravating factor since the issue was not raised on direct appeal.

¶ 10 Defendant's postconviction proceedings were thereafter continued on January 25 and March 1, 2010. At a hearing on April 26, 2010, Kash advised the trial court that he recently received "some new allegations" from defendant and asked for more time to "modify the petition." The record reflects the matter was continued without objection to June 14, 2010. At a hearing on that date, Kash requested more time to communicate with defendant regarding an amended petition, and the matter was continued generally. The record next shows that on April 4, 2011, pro se correspondence from defendant was filed, asserting defendant had not heard from Kash since June 2, 2010, and requesting information regarding the "status" of his postconviction petition along with "dockets from December 14, 2009[, ] to the current date." A docket entry of the same date states "docket sheets" were mailed to defendant.

¶ 11 On October 1, 2018, defendant pro se filed a motion for leave to withdraw his postconviction petition. On July 10, 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing at which both the State and Kash appeared. Kash represented that he had communicated with defendant and confirmed that defendant wanted his petition withdrawn. The court granted defendant's motion.

¶ 12 On July 6, 2020, defendant filed a "Motion to Refile and Reinstate" postconviction proceedings, attaching an amended pro se postconviction petition to his filing. He asserted Kash

5

was appointed to represent him in connection with his postconviction petition and thereafter...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT