People v. Hunt

Citation234 Ill.2d 49,914 N.E.2d 477
Decision Date04 June 2009
Docket NumberNo. 106686.,106686.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Tavares HUNT, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Richard A. Devine and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorneys, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Susan R. Schierl Sullivan, Ashley A. Romito, Alan J. Spellberg, Annette N. Collins and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Jack P. Rimland and Joshua B. Kutnick, Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Defendant initially filed a pretrial motion to suppress all "tape recordings, statements, and conversations" with an informant during two court-ordered consensual "overhears," arguing they violated his rights to counsel and to remain silent under People v. McCauley, 163 Ill.2d 414, 206 Ill.Dec. 671, 645 N.E.2d 923 (1994). Defendant later filed a pretrial motion to suppress audiotape recordings of those same conversations, claiming that the recordings were inaudible. The circuit court of Cook County ultimately granted both motions, suppressing defendant's statements and the recordings. On interlocutory appeal, the appellate court affirmed the suppression order, but on grounds not raised by the parties. 381 Ill.App.3d 790, 809, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409. The State appeals from the appellate court's judgment, arguing that the court: (1) exceeded its scope of review on interlocutory appeal when it suppressed statements not suppressed by the trial court; (2) misconstrued the County Jail Act (Act) (730 ILCS 125/1 et seq. (West 2002)); and (3) erred when it affirmed the trial court's suppression of the recordings. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

When law enforcement officials began investigating the murder of Shakir Beckley in May 2002, defendant was a pretrial detainee at the Cook County jail on an unrelated offense. During the course of the Beckley investigation, defendant became a suspect, but he was not charged. Instead, on two separate occasions, July 31, 2002, and August 6, 2002, Chicago police officers signed defendant out of the county jail, transported him to a Chicago police station, and put him in an interview room with informant Mycal Davis. Davis, also a pretrial detainee on an unrelated offense, had previously agreed to participate in the investigation and was wearing a concealed wire in accordance with a court order. On each occasion, detectives recorded Davis' conversations with defendant. During each recorded conversation, defendant allegedly implicated himself in the Beckley murder. Defendant was later charged with that murder.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence of his conversations with Davis. In that motion, defendant argued the evidence was obtained in violation of his fifth amendment right to counsel (U.S. Const., amend. V) and his rights to counsel and due process under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, §§ 2, 10), as articulated by this court in McCauley. At the hearing on that motion, defendant presented evidence that his attorney on the unrelated offense arrived at the police station and asked to speak with defendant during the July 31 overhear. Defendant asserted that he was not allowed to meet with counsel until the completion of the recorded session. After meeting with counsel, defendant exercised his right to remain silent. It was undisputed that defendant's attorney was not present on August 6.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the August 6 statements, but suppressed the portion of the July 31 statements made after defendant's attorney arrived at the police station, relying on McCauley. The trial court later vacated its suppression order sua sponte and instructed the parties to provide additional arguments about the impact of the attorney's arrival on July 31. Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to suppress the tape recordings, arguing they were substantially inaudible.

The trial judge and the parties listened to the recordings before holding two combined hearings on defendant's motion to suppress statements and recordings. Defendant argued the recordings should be suppressed because they were inaudible. The State responded the recordings were sufficiently audible to hear defendant make a number of incriminating statements, including an identification of the type of gun used in the murder and the names of other people at the crime scene.

In his other challenge, defendant reasserted his earlier position that all evidence of the statements should be suppressed for violating his fifth amendment rights and his constitutional rights under McCauley because his attorney arrived during the July 31 session. While the State acknowledged conflicting evidence on when defendant's attorney arrived, it maintained that all statements should be admitted because they were obtained pursuant to the court order and did not violate defendant's constitutional rights.

Following the hearings, the trial court entered an oral ruling suppressing defendant's statements and the recordings. The court found that defendant's attorney arrived at 3:14 p.m. on July 31 and that the July 31 and August 6 recordings were inaudible and "worthless."

The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment with its interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1)) from the suppression order. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the suppression order but on grounds the court raised sua sponte and unlike those argued by the parties. 381 Ill.App.3d at 809, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409. The appellate court first considered the propriety of transferring defendant from the jail to the police station on July 31 and August 6. Construing section 19.5 of the Act (730 ILCS 125/19.5 (West 2002)), the court held that a judicial order is required to transfer custody of a pretrial detainee from the sheriff to the police investigating an unrelated criminal matter. 381 Ill.App.3d at 805, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409.

Relying on its construction of the Act and interpretation of People v. Campa, 217 Ill.2d 243, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157 (2005), the court found that defendant was illegally arrested when he was removed from the county jail on July 31 and August 6 without a court order. 381 Ill. App.3d at 806, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409. The appellate court then determined that defendant's statements were properly suppressed under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule because they were not sufficiently attenuated from his illegal arrests. 381 Ill.App.3d at 807, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409.

Applying the same logic, the appellate court further determined that the recordings were also properly suppressed as the fruits of defendant's illegal arrests. 381 Ill.App.3d at 808, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409. Alternatively, the appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by suppressing the recordings because they were inaudible. 381 Ill.App.3d at 808, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409. Lastly, the appellate court concluded, in light of its fourth amendment analysis, that the State's substantive arguments on the constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination were rendered moot. 381 Ill.App.3d at 809, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409.

We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal to this court, the State contends the appellate court: (1) exceeded its scope of review on interlocutory appeal by suppressing statements not included in the trial court's order; (2) misconstrued the Act; and (3) erred when it affirmed the suppression of the recordings as inaudible.

As a preliminary matter, we recognize the State also argues the appellate court erred when it sua sponte raised statutory construction and fourth amendment issues not argued or briefed by either party in the trial court. It is established that "the theory under which a case is tried in the trial court cannot be changed on review." In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill.2d 152, 172, 291 Ill.Dec. 601, 824 N.E.2d 177 (2005). This limitation is applicable to both the parties and the reviewing court. Blanchard v. Lewis, 414 Ill. 515, 521, 112 N.E.2d 167 (1953); see also Geaslen v. Berkson, Gorov & Levin, Ltd., 155 Ill.2d 223, 230, 184 Ill.Dec. 385, 613 N.E.2d 702 (1993) (admonishing appellate court not to consider different theories or new questions when those issues could have been refuted in the trial court). Accordingly, we agree with the State that the appellate court's sua sponte consideration of issues not considered by the trial court and never argued by the parties constituted error in this case. Nonetheless, we will examine the additional issues because the parties have fully briefed those issues and urge our consideration. See In re Leona W., 228 Ill.2d 439, 320 Ill.Dec. 855, 888 N.E.2d 72 (2008) (where this court considered issues raised sua sponte by the appellate court); In re Mark W., 228 Ill.2d 365, 320 Ill.Dec. 798, 888 N.E.2d 15 (2008) (same). We now turn to the merits of the issues raised by the parties on appeal.

A. Scope of Review on Interlocutory Appeal

The State first argues the appellate court exceeded its scope of review on interlocutory appeal by extending the suppression order to statements not originally suppressed by the trial court. Specifically, the State maintains the trial court suppressed only a portion of the July 31 statements and none of the August 6 statements and the appellate court erred by suppressing all of the statements. Defendant does not contest the State's representation of the trial court's ruling. Nonetheless, the record does not support the State's position.

It is undisputed the trial court originally entered an order partially suppressing the July 31 statements and admitting all of the August 6 statements based on M...

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