People v. Hunt

• Decision Date: 20 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. C007356,C007356
• Citation: 225 Cal.App.3d 498,275 Cal.Rptr. 367
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Bruce HUNT, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 367

275 Cal.Rptr. 367

225 Cal.App.3d 498

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Bruce HUNT, Defendant and Appellant.

No. C007356.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Nov. 20, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1990.

Review Denied Feb. 27, 1991.

Certified for Partial Publication.

B. Kay Shafer, Chatsworth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald E. Niver, Gloria F. DeHart and Stan Cross, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

In this case we decide, among other things, that a passenger in a car is properly citable for not wearing a seatbelt, a violation of Vehicle Code section 27315 (hereafter section 27315), when a police officer lawfully stops the car for a traffic violation and sees the passenger is not wearing a seatbelt. We also decide that where a police officer arrests the occupant of a car, places him in the backseat of a patrol car, and immediately conducts a search of the passenger compartment of the occupant's car, the search is lawful under New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768.

Defendant Bruce Hunt appeals following his conviction by jury of various felony offenses related to defendant's manufacture and sale of rock cocaine.

In an unpublished portion of the opinion, ¹ we reject defendant's contention his convictions are not supported by substantial evidence. Here, we consider and reject defendant's argument the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence. (Pen.Code, § 1538.5.)

I Evidence Adduced Upon the Motion to Suppress

At the motion to suppress, the trial court heard the following testimony of arresting officer Keith Jensen:

At about 11:25 p.m. on April 1, 1989, patrol officer Jensen and his partner Officer Joyce, in a marked patrol car, stopped a 1988 Toyota Camry four-door sedan after observing it make an illegal left turn without signaling. Officer Jensen intended to cite the driver and approached the Toyota, which was occupied by four men. As he reached the left rear of the car, the driver and front passenger both raised their hands over their head in a "surrendering type motion," which the officer considered unusual. He noticed that the backseat passengers were not wearing seatbelts; they were sitting against the retractable shoulder-seat combination belts, and he had not seen any movement to indicate the belts were removed after the car was stopped. He therefore intended to cite the backseat passengers for not wearing seatbelts in violation of section 27315.

At the officer's request, the driver produced a license identifying him as David Lee. Front seat passenger Dwight Greathouse presented his own driver's license and a rental agreement for the vehicle. Backseat passenger Carl White showed his social security card. Defendant, seated in the right rear seat, provided no identification other than verbally identifying himself as Paul Hunt. The officer asked for defendant's I.D. in order to cite him for the seatbelt violation.

The officer returned to the police car and conducted record and driver's license checks on defendant and the other three men.

The information received from DMV indicated a physical description for Paul Hunt markedly different from the officer's observations of defendant. Whereas DMV records indicated Paul Hunt was 5'7", defendant was obviously taller than that. The officer asked defendant to step out of the car and confirmed his initial impression; defendant was about 6'2". Defendant was arrested for giving false information to a police officer (Pen.Code, § 148.9) and was placed in the police car.

The officer then had the other occupants get out of the car in order to search it for any identification of defendant. As White began to get out of the car, the officer saw him stuff a white paper napkin in the space between the back seat and the seat bottom. The officer touched the napkin and felt hard chunks he believed were rock cocaine. The officer then found a wadded piece of brown paper containing two pieces of rock cocaine next to the driver's seat. In the glove compartment he found live ammunition. In the trunk of the car he found loaded revolvers and large quantities of rock cocaine. All four men were arrested.

The trial court denied the suppression motion.

II The Motion to Suppress Was Properly Denied

A. Standard of review.

Our task is to determine whether exclusion of the challenged evidence is compelled by exclusionary rules necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879, 210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744; People v. Rogers (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1001, 1006, 232 Cal.Rptr. 294.)

"An appellate court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.]

"In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] 'The [trial] court's resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.' [Citations.]

"The court's resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law, viz., the reasonableness of the challenged police conduct, is also subject to independent review. [Citations.] The reason is plain: 'it is "the ultimate responsibility of the appellate court to measure the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness." ' [Citation.]" (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221.)

B. Defendant's detention was lawful.

Defendant concedes the legality of the initial stop of the car for making an illegal turn.

Defendant contends the officer had no authority to cite him for a seatbelt violation under section 27315, so his detention and the subsequent search of the car were unlawful. ² Defendant implicitly admits a passenger in a vehicle is citable under certain circumstances for violation of subdivision (e) of section 27315, which provides: "No person 16 years of age or over shall be a passenger in a private passenger motor vehicle on a highway unless that person is restrained by a safety belt." ³ However, he argues a passenger is not citable for a seatbelt violation unless the passenger has committed some offense other than the seatbelt violation. Defendant's argument is premised on subdivision (k) of section 27315, which provides: "Notwithstanding Section 40300 [procedure on arrest] or any other provision of law, a peace officer shall not stop or seize a person for a violation of subdivision (d), (e), or (f), nor arrest or issue a notice to appear or notice to correct for a violation of those subdivisions if the officer has no other cause to stop or seize the person other than a violation of subdivision (d), (e), or (f)." (Emphasis added.)

However, defendant's construction of the statute is at odds with its plain meaning. Subdivision (k) prohibits a seatbelt citation only where "the officer has no other cause to stop ... the person...." The statute does not say "cause to arrest " or "cite" the person. "If a statute's language is clear, then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. [Citation.]" (Kizer v. Hanna (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1, 8, 255 Cal.Rptr. 412, 767 P.2d 679.)

We are aware, of course, of the rule that a defendant is entitled to the benefit of every realistic doubt in the construction of language used in a penal statute. (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1145, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) However, that rule of construction is premised on first locating ambiguity in the statute. (See People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 599, 250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165.) Here, we perceive no ambiguity.

Moreover, even assuming subdivision (k) of section 27315 is ambiguous, "The rule of statutory interpretation that ambiguous penal statutes are construed in favor of defendants is inapplicable unless two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise, i.e., that resolution of the statute's ambiguities in a convincing manner is impracticable." (Jones, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 599, 250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165.) Here, defendant's proferred interpretation is unreasonable. The Legislature's intent in enacting section 27315, as expressed in subdivision (a) of the statute, is to "contribute to reducing highway deaths and injuries by encouraging greater usage of existing manual seatbelts, ..." In light of this serious purpose, we cannot believe the Legislature intended that police officers who lawfully stop vehicles for other traffic violations must shield their eyes to seatbelt violations committed by passengers. Rather, the evident intent of subdivision (k) of section 27315 is to prevent citizens' freedom of travel from being interrupted solely as a consequence of a seatbelt violation. Thus, where police officers lawfully stop a vehicle, they may cite a passenger for a seatbelt violation even though the passenger has committed no other offense.

Because the vehicle in which defendant was riding was lawfully stopped defendant was lawfully stopped. (See, e.g., People v. Grant (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1451, 1460, 266 Cal.Rptr. 587 [questioning of passenger does not necessarily constitute a separate detention requiring justification beyond that...