People v. Hunter

Decision Date04 April 2013
Docket NumberDocket No. 114100.
Citation2013 IL 114100,369 Ill.Dec. 549,986 N.E.2d 1185
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Dewayne HUNTER, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, Tasha-Marie Kelly and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel). for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, and S. Amanda Ingram, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[369 Ill.Dec. 551]¶ 1 The circuit court of Cook County granted the motion of defendant, Dewayne Hunter, to dismiss several counts of his indictment for violating the compulsory joinder statute (720 ILCS 5/3–3(b) (West 2008)) and the speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103–5(b) (West 2008)). The appellate court affirmed the dismissal. 2012 IL App (1st) 092681, 359 Ill.Dec. 150, 966 N.E.2d 471. This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court, and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 For purposes of defendant's motion to dismiss, the parties do not dispute the underlying factual allegations. On October 5, 2008, Chicago police officers conducted a surveillance for narcotics activity around a building located at 4019 West Van Buren Street. The officers observed as follows. Defendant stood in the doorway of the building, while a codefendant stood on the sidewalk in front of the building. On two occasions, the codefendant accepted money from an unknown person and then nodded to defendant. In response, defendant retrieved an item from the vestibule behind him and handed it to the unknown person, who immediately walked away. The officers broke their surveillance and arrested defendant as he attempted to reenter the building's vestibule. An officer recovered 10.6 grams of cannabis and a handgun from the vestibule near defendant. Another officer recovered a second handgun from a staircase in the vestibule approximately five feet away from defendant.

¶ 4 The record contains the following procedural background. On October 6, 2008, defendant appeared before the circuit court on a charge of possession of cannabis. The State did not bring any charges relating to the handguns that had been recovered at the same time as the cannabis. The court found probable cause to detain and set bail. Defendant filed a written demand for trial.

¶ 5 On November 13, 2008, the State charged defendant by information with a single offense of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. The State still did not bring any charges relating to the guns. The court found probable cause. Defendant again demanded trial. The matter was placed on the trial call, and several continuances were granted with defendant's agreement.

¶ 6 On March 23, 2009, the State informed the court and defendant that the State would seek to indict defendant on additional charges. On March 30, 2009, 175 days following defendant's October 6, 2008, demand for trial, the grand jury returned a six-count indictment against defendant: one count of being an armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24–1 (West 2008)), four counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24–1.1(a) (West 2008)), and the original charge of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(c) (West 2008)).1

¶ 7 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the five new gun-related counts of the indictment. He contended that the compulsory joinder statute (720 ILCS 5/3–3(b) (West 2008)) required the State to charge the gun-related offenses with the original cannabis charge. Defendant, who was released on bail, observed that the speedy-trial statute required that he be tried within 160 days from the date he demanded trial (725 ILCS 5/103–5(b) (West 2008)). Therefore, according to defendant, the State's failure to comply with the compulsory joinder statute regarding the additional gun charges resulted in a violation of the speedy-trial statute. The circuit court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the five gun-related charges, and denied the State's motion to reconsider. The State appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) ( Ill. S.Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2006)). The appellate court affirmed the dismissal. 2012 IL App (1st) 092681, 359 Ill.Dec. 150, 966 N.E.2d 471. The State appeals to this court.

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 The State contends that the later-filed gun charges did not violate the speedy-trial statute. Criminal defendants possess both constitutional (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8) and statutory (725 ILCS 5/103–5 (West 2008)) rights to a speedy trial. While these provisions address similar concerns, the statutory right and the constitutional right are not coextensive. People v. Woodrum, 223 Ill.2d 286, 298, 307 Ill.Dec. 605, 860 N.E.2d 259 (2006); People v. Gooden, 189 Ill.2d 209, 216–17, 244 Ill.Dec. 361, 725 N.E.2d 1248 (2000). In the case at bar, defendant asserted solely a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial and did not raise a constitutional issue.

¶ 10 The speedy-trial statute provides, in pertinent part, that every defendant who was in custody for an alleged offense, and is subsequently released on bail, shall be tried within 160 days from the date the defendant files a written demand for trial. 725 ILCS 5/103–5(b) (West 2008). A defendant not tried within the statutory period must be released from his trial obligations and have the charges dismissed. 725 ILCS 5/103–5(d), 114–1(a)(1) (West 2008); Woodrum, 223 Ill.2d at 299, 307 Ill.Dec. 605, 860 N.E.2d 259. The compulsory joinder statute requires the State to prosecute all known offenses within the jurisdiction of a single court in a single criminal case “if they are based on the same act.” 720 ILCS 5/3–3(b) (West 2008). This court has described the interplay between the speedy-trial and compulsory joinder statutes:

“Compulsory joinder requires the State to bring multiple charges in a single prosecution. The charges are tried together unless the circuit court determines that a separate trial is required in the interest of justice. [Citation.] Once a speedy-trial demand is filed, the multiple charges are subject to the same speedy-trial period. If the charges are required to be brought in a single prosecution, the speedy-trial period begins to run when the speedy-trial demand is filed, even if the State brings some of the charges at a later date. ‘Where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges.’ People v. Williams, 94 Ill.App.3d 241, 248–49 [49 Ill.Dec. 820, 418 N.E.2d 840] (1981).” People v. Quigley, 183 Ill.2d 1, 13, 231 Ill.Dec. 950, 697 N.E.2d 735 (1998).

We have clarified that this rule applies only when the original and subsequent charges are subject to compulsory joinder. People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 1, 16–17, 249 Ill.Dec. 840, 737 N.E.2d 230 (2000); People v. Gooden, 189 Ill.2d 209, 217–19, 244 Ill.Dec. 361, 725 N.E.2d 1248 (2000).

¶ 11 In the case at bar, the parties agree that the speedy-trial period for defendant was 160 days, beginning on October 6, 2008. However, the parties dispute whether the subsequent gun-related charges were subject to compulsory joinder with the original charge of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. The appellate court held that the cannabis charge and the new gun-related charges were required to be prosecuted in a single prosecution because they were based on the same act of constructive possession of the cannabis and the handguns. Because defendant was charged with the new and additional gun-related offenses more than 160 days following his written demand for trial, the speedy-trial statute barred the prosecution of the gun-related charges. 2012 IL App (1st) 092681, ¶¶ 2, 35, 359 Ill.Dec. 150, 966 N.E.2d 471.

¶ 12 The State concedes that it knew of the gun-related offenses when it commenced the prosecution of the cannabis charge, and that all of the charges are within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Thus, the core issue before this court is whether defendant's alleged possession of the cannabis and possession of the handguns were “based on the same act” within the meaning of the compulsory joinder statute. This is a matter of statutory construction, which is a question of law reviewed de novo. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12, 355 Ill.Dec. 207, 959 N.E.2d 621;People v. Davis, 199 Ill.2d 130, 135, 262 Ill.Dec. 721, 766 N.E.2d 641 (2002).

¶ 13 The principles guiding our review are familiar. The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. The court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Also, a court presumes that the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12, 355 Ill.Dec. 207, 959 N.E.2d 621;People v. Jackson, 2011 IL 110615, ¶ 12, 353 Ill.Dec. 353...

To continue reading

Request your trial
39 cases
  • Boyar v. Dixon (In re Estate of Boyar)
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • April 4, 2013
  • People v. Minnis
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 20, 2016
    ...way or another. Also, a court presumes that the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 13, 369 Ill.Dec. 549, 986 N.E.2d 1185 (and cases cited therein).¶ 26 The Registration Act was enacted in 1986.4 All sex offenders......
  • People v. Wise
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 27, 2019
    ...to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. People v. Perez , 2014 IL 115927, ¶ 9, 385 Ill.Dec. 41, 18 N.E.3d 41 ; People v. Hunter , 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 13, 369 Ill.Dec. 549, 986 N.E.2d 1185. If possible, the court must not depart from the statute's plain language by reading into it e......
  • People v. Utley
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 29, 2019
    ...drug trade is a cash-and-carry business with a large profit margin and dealers frequently use guns for protection."); see also People v. Hunter , 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 27, 369 Ill.Dec. 549, 986 N.E.2d 1185 (simultaneous possession of drugs and guns, "discovered during the same search, at the sa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 provisions
  • IL Register Vol. 39 Issue 16. Issue 16 - April 17, 2015 - Pages 5,536-5,633
    • United States
    • Illinois Register
    • Invalid date
    ...thereby acquire an unfair advantage in the marketplace. As stated by the Illinois Supreme Court in the recent case of People v. Hunter, 986 N.E. 2d 1185, 1189, 369 Ill. Dec. 549, 553 The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislatu......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT