People v. Hunter

Decision Date09 May 1963
Docket NumberNo. 45,45
Citation121 N.W.2d 442,370 Mich. 262
PartiesPEOPLE ov the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph Ray HUNTER et al., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Grossman, Hyman & Grossman, Detroit, for defendant and appellant.

Carl Levin, Detroit, on the brief.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Eugene Krasicky, Sol. Gen., Samuel H. Olsen, Pros. Atty., Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Detroit, for the People.

Fay A. O'Hare, Detroit, for American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, amicus curiae.

Before the Entire Bench.

SOURIS, Justice.

Defendant appeals from his jury conviction of murder in the first degree. His principal claim of reversible error is that the trial judge's charge to the jury improperly deprived him of jury consideration of his defense of self-defense.

Defendant Hunter was tried together with a male co-defendant, Sacchetti, and defendant Evelyn Lari, Hunter's girl friend, for the murder of Elmer Jones. Hunter claimed at the trial that he killed Jones in self-defense when Jones aimed a revolver at him during the course of an altercation while he and Miss Lari were visiting Jones in his home. Miss Lari, although a codefendant, testified at the trial that defendant Sacchetti was also present at the time of Jones' murder. The pertinent details of the testimonial record made at the trial are fairly summarized in that portion of the trial judge's charge to the jury in which he sets forth Hunter's theory of the case '* * * defendant Hunter, upon going to the room, found that the defendant Lari had not checked out, * * * that she said she would be good, that she asked why couldn't they be like they used to be and have the same parties like they used to have; that he weakened and told her very well, they would have one more night, spend one more night together and then she would leave and go out of his life forever; that he was going to go to a nearby drinking establishment, but she said she wanted to go to the East Side to talk to a friend; that they drove out to Ashland Avenue to the home of Mr. Jones around 12 o'clock; that Jones came to the door in his night clothing, saw who they were, returned to his bedroom, put on trousers and hugged and greeted Evelyn; that Jones and Evelyn Lari had some conversation, that defendant Lari then introduced him under his right name, that he tried to be friendly with Jones and started to shake hands, but Jones suddenly became unfriendly, repulsed him, and stated, 'You are the man who is taking my little girl from me,' or words to that effect; that defendant Hunter said he did not want her, that he was bringing her back and suggested they be friendly; that Jones and the defendant Lari went into his bedroom; that he would have left except defendant Lari said she wished to return with him and told him to wait a minute; that after waiting a few minutes he told them to hurry up; that after a lapse of several minutes he heard defendant Lari say the words, 'not now', or in substance, that he entered the bedroom and found the deceased Jones committing an act of perversion upon the defendant Lari, that he became incensed and grabbed Jones and tossed him in the corner; that the room was dimly lit, but that Jones came after him again and a fight ensued; then, for the first time he noticed the deceased Jones had a Luger pistol in his hand; that he attempted to pacify him; that Jones stated that he took his girl once and would never take her again; that he would not leave the room alive, or words to that effect; that he warned the defendant Lari not to disturb Jones, and told him not to shoot, that he told him that he could have the girl; and that realizing then he was going to be killed, that his life was in danger, that he attempted to grab the gun from Jones; that a struggle ensued, that Jones was strong and put up great resistance, that he had to bang his head against the bulkhead, or wall; and finally succeeded in breaking Jones' grip upon the gun after he had shifted from the right to the left hand; that he picked [the] gun up, took the clip out, and later Jones attacked him again and grabbed him by his privates; that it then became necessary for him to take the gun and strike Jones over the head and then to choke him into unconsciousness; that he subsequently tied him up with neckties and after he was tied up noticed the ring on Jones' finger, and because he was mad at Jones or 'as a gesture', as he put it, he took the ring and he also kept the gun; that [he] attempted to wash the blood stains from his clothing and because of the blood on his trousers and shirt he removed them and put on the trousers and clothing belonging to Jones; that he and Evelyn then left and walked to Jefferson Avenue, took a cab back to the hotel; * * * that Jones was hostile to him because of Hunter's having taken his girl; that Jones assaulted him; that the only recourse left to him was to strike Jones and protect himself; that he was fearful of death or great bodily harm; that all his acts were in self-defense; and therefore he is not guilty of the charge.

'That is the theory of the defendant Hunter, as I understand it. I have gone over it fast * * * but I think all [the details] have been mentioned. * * *'

Having fairly stated defendant Hunter's theory of the case, as well as the theories of his co-defendants and the prosecution, the trial judge then properly instructed the jury on the legal requirements of the defense of self-defense. At the conclusion of what may be described as an excellent formal charge to the jury, the judge then undertook to read to the jury certain of the requests to charge made by the parties, many of which were repetitous, and otherwise thoroughly covered in the court's formal charge. Included among the charges requested by the prosecution which the trial judge unfortunately gave to the jury is the following:

'The Prosecuting Attorney has given me some requests to charge, members of the jury.

'I charge you that self-defense is defensive and not an offensive act, and must not exceed bounds of mere defense and prevention. Acts constituting self-defense by accused, depend primarily on his own conduct and secondarily upon decedent's conduct.

'I will give you Request No. 1, members of the jury: In justification of the offense here charged against him, the respondent Hunter has interposed a plea of self-defense and under certain circumstances that is a good defense. In order to give any consideration to Hunter's plea of self-defense it will first be necessary for you to conclude that Sacchetti was not at the scene on the fatal night of the assault upon Jones, because if you disbelieve Hunter's and Sacchetti's testimony that Sacchetti was not in the home of the deceased at the time Hunter assaulted Jones, then Hunter's plea of self-defense fails and you have no right to consider it. Hunter's plea of self-defense is based upon the theory that Mrs. Lari alone visited Mr. Jones on the fatal evening. That Jones first assaulted Hunter and that the affray was between Jones and Hunter only, and that Sacchetti was not there. The defense is based upon Sacchetti's absence from the scene. So, if you give credence to Mrs. Lari's testimony that Sacchetti was with Hunter and her and that all three were at the home of of the deceased on that fatal evening, then you must totally disregard Hunter's plea of self-defense. On the other hand, if you disbelieve Mrs. Lari's testimony and believe Hunter's and Sacchetti's testimony on this point, then you are entitled to give Hunter's plea of self-defense consideration. To recapitulate, if you believe Hunter's and Sacchetti's testimony on the point of Sacchetti's absence from the home of Jones on the fatal night, then you may consider Hunter's plea of self-defense. On the other hand, if you disbelieve Hunter's and Sacchetti's testimony on this point and believe Mrs. Lari's testimony that Sacchetti was there on that fatal evening, you are hereby instructed to totally disregard Hunter's plea of self-defense.'

We cannot read the immediately preceding charge requested by the prosecution as other than prejudicially erroneous.* In that single instruction, given to the jury immediately before it retired to deliberate upon its verdict, the jury was told that if it believed defendant Lari's testimony that Sacchetti was present at the time of the murder, the jury could not give any consideration to defendant Hunter's defense of self-defense,--not that it need not find, under such circumstances, that Hunter acted in self-defense, but that it could not properly find that his actions were in his own self-defense. Contrary to the trial judge's belief, as expressed by him in his opinion denying motion for new trial, Sacchetti's presence or absence was not of pivotal importance to Hunter's plea of self-defense. According to Hunter's theory of the case, even as stated to the jury be the trial judge himself, Hunter was placed in mortal fear for his life when Jones attacked Hunter with a Luger pistol in his hand. Even had Sacchetti been present at that time, we are not prepared to say that as a matter of law the jury could not have found that Hunter acted in self-defense. It was for the jury to determine to what extent...

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22 cases
  • People v. Broyles
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • November 27, 1970
    ...instructions as having emanated other than from the court. Reetz v. Rigg (1962), 367 Mich. 35, 116 N.W.2d 323; People v. Hunter (1963), 370 Mich. 262, 121 N.W.2d 442. To determine whether there has been reversible error, we consider the facts surrounding the error committed. When it involve......
  • People v. Carter, 7
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • May 4, 1972
    ...Again, we regard the statement by the judge as an inadvertent aside which will not be repeated. As was said in People v. Hunter, 370 Mich. 262, 267, 121 N.W.2d 442, 445 (footnote) 'We note, in passing, the trial judge's labeling of the requested instructions given to the jury as emanating f......
  • Hunt v. Methodist Hosp.
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1992
    ...Realty Company v. Metcalfe, 482 S.W.2d 750 (Ky.App.1972); City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church, supra; People v. Hunter, 370 Mich. 262, 121 N.W.2d 442 (1963). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued the seminal opinion which has served as a guide for other jurisdict......
  • People v. Miller
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • January 17, 1979
    ...testify to what she overheard. The court refused, and ordered the jury to begin deliberations. The Supreme Court in People v. Hunter, 370 Mich. 262, 121 N.W.2d 442 (1963), held that it was reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury that they could discuss the testimony during......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Let Jurors Talk: Authorizing Pre-Deliberation Discussion of the Evidence During Trial
    • United States
    • Military Law Review No. 174, December 2002
    • December 1, 2002
    ...People v. Blondia, 245 N.W.2d 130 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Wilson v. State, 242 A.2d 194 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968); People v. Hunter, 121 N.W.2d 442 (Mich. 26. 147 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1945). 27. Id. at 327. 28. Id. at 329. 29. Id. at 328. 30. Id. at 329. 31. Id. at 330. 32. Id. 33. Id. The dis......

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