People v. Illinois State Toll Highway Commission

Decision Date24 May 1954
Docket NumberNo. 33186,33186
Citation3 Ill.2d 218,120 N.E.2d 35
PartiesPEOPLE v. ILLINOIS STATE TOLL HIGHWAY COMMISSION et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

George P. Coutrakon, State's Atty., and Thomas W. Hoopes, Springfield, for appellant.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., and John L. Davidson, Jr., Springfield, and Werner W. Schroeder, Chicago, for appellees.

MAXWELL, Justice.

This is an appeal from the circuit court of Sangamon County involving the State Toll Highway Commission Act of this State. Through the State's Attorney of said county quo warranto and injunction actions were simultaneously instituted against the Illinois State Toll Highway Commission and its members, in substance challenging the validity of the statute which became effective upon the Governor's approval July 13, 1953. The issues being the same the trial court entered an order consolidating the causes. Respondents filed motions to strike the two actions and the trial court granted said motions. Upon the plaintiff electing to stand on the initial pleadings the trial court held the act constitutional and entered a decree and judgment of dismissal in the two actions.

1. Plaintiff contends the act violates section 5 of article V of our State constitution, S.H.A., in that section 3 of the act makes the Governor an ex-officio member of the commission and section 11 of the act requires approval by the Governor of plans and location of highways before bonds are issued.

2. Plaintiff contends the act violates section 26 of article IV of the State constitution in that section 27 of the act gives consent of the State of suits against the commission and section 14 of the act authorizes bondholders to sue the commission.

3. Plaintiff contends the act violates section 18 of article IV of the State constitution in that bonds may be issued by the commission without a referendum, subject to approval of preliminary plans and location of roads by the Governor under section 11.

4. Plaintiff contends the act violates section 17 of article IV of the State constitution in that section 20 of the act provides no appropriation shall be necessary to withdraw funds from the treasury and such funds shall be considered always appropriated for the purpose of disbursement.

5. Plaintiff contends the act violates section 20 of article IV of the State constitution in that section 9(d) of the act gives the commission power to construct grade separations for railroads at its own cost. Plaintiff further objects to appropriations made by the Sixty-eighth General Assembly for payment of salaries and preliminary expenses of the commission.

6. Plaintiff contends the act violates section 22 of article IV of the State constitution in that section 17 of the act provides that toll roads do not become part of the State highway system until all bonds are paid and only the commission has authority to establish tolls and operate toll roads.

7. Plaintiff contends the act violates section 12 of article IX of the State constitution concerning debt limitations.

8. Plaintiff contends the act violates due process of law and section 19 of article II of the State constitution. Plaintiff further contends the act violates article III of the State constitution in that section 28 of the act provides all determinations made by the commission with the approval of the Governor shall be conclusive and not subject to review by any court or administrative agency of the State, thereby granting to the commission judicial power as well as legislative authority.

9. Plaintiff contends the act violates section 26 of article IV of the State constitution in that section 7 of the act gives the commission power of eminent domain over public lands, highways, parkways, parks, playgrounds, all of which are held by the State or agency of the State.

10. Plaintiff contends the act violates section 1 of article V of the State constitution in that subsection 6(b), (d) and (e) of the act give the commission power to appoint assistant Attorneys General and retain special counsel to perform duties which can only legally be performed by the Attorney General or assistant appointed by him.

The act in question contains twenty-nine sections and is cited as paragraph 314a26 to 314a54, inclusive, chapter 121, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1953. The foregoing constitutional objections shall herein be dealt with in order.

The first objection deals with the fact that section 3 of the act makes the Governor an ex-officio member of the commission and that section 11 requires his approval of plans and location of highways before the issuance of bonds. We see no merit in the contention that there is a violation of section 5 of article V of the State constitution, which provides that neither the Governor nor any of the constitutional executive officers shall be eligible to any other office during the period for which he shall have been elected. On more than one occasion the legislature has seen fit to impose additional duties upon constitutional officials other than those expressly mentioned in the State constitution. We see in such legislation the creation of no other office but merely the imposition of additional duties. We have so declared in People ex rel. Graham v. Inglis, 161 Ill. 256, 43 N.E. 1103, and People ex rel. Gullett v. McCullough, 254 Ill. 9, 98 N.E. 156.

Section 14 and section 27(a) authorize suits against the commission by bondholders while section 27(b) authorizes any person to bring suit against the commission for the recovery of damages 'for injury to his person or property caused by any act of the Commission or by any act of any of its officers, agents or employees done under its direction.' These sections are said to violate article IV, section 26, of the Illinois constitution, which provides that the State of Illinois shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.

It is recognized by our decisions that this constitutional provision does not forbid actions against State officials in cases where the State would not be directly and adversely affected by the relief sought, and that such officials may under those circumstances be compelled to perform a duty required by the constitution or by statute, or restrained from acting beyond their authority or from acting under color of an invalid statute. See People ex rel. First National Bank of Blue Island v. Kingery, 369 Ill. 289, 16 N.E.2d 761; Burke v. Snively, 208 Ill. 328, 70 N.E. 327. This statute, however, purports to allow an action against the commission itself, and its validity in this respect therefore turns on whether the commission is to be regarded as a mere department of the State government or as an independent legal entity. It is clear that an action brought against an ordinary department of the State government is sometimes regarded as the equivalent of one in which the nominal defendant is the State of Illinois. See Monroe v. Collins, 393 Ill. 553, 66 N.E.2d 670; People ex rel. Greening v. Green, 382 Ill. 577, 47 N.E.2d 465; Posinski v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co., 376 Ill. 346, 33 N.E.2d 869; Schwing v. Miles, 367 Ill. 436, 11 N.E.2d 944, 113 A.L.R. 1504; Noorman v. Department of Public Works, 366 Ill. 216, 8 N.E.2d 637; but cf. Moline Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue, 410 Ill. 35, 101 N.E.2d 71. It is equally clear, however, that some public bodies, although closely related to the State government, have been regarded as subject to suit despite the constitutional provision. See Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. Bruner, 175 Ill. 307, 51 N.E. 687; People ex rel. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321, 46 N.E.2d 951; Loomis v. Keehn, 400 Ill. 337, 80 N.E.2d 368; cf. Minear v. State Board of Agriculture, 259 Ill. 549, 102 N.E. 1082. Which of these two classes a given public body falls into depends upon the degree of administrative and financial autonomy which it possesses.

The Toll Highway Commission is described in the act as 'an instrumentality and an administrative agency' of the State, and it is undeniable that in many respects it is intimately associated with the regular organs of government. Its functions are ones traditionally performed by the State. Two of its members are officers of the State government, while the others are appointed by the Governor, and may be removed by him. The commission's choice of sites for toll highways, as well as its preliminary estimates of costs, must be approved by the Governor. The Attorney General serves as its legal representative, and controls the selection and performance of the commission's legal staff. Furthermore, while the commission may acquire property in its own name, the toll highways which it constructs are to become a part of the regular State highway system whenever the indebtedness incident to their construction has been liquidated. We note also that the legislature has made initial appropriations of $64,000 for the salaries of the commissioners as well as $436,000 for the performance of the commission's duties. See Laws of 1953, p. 591.

On the other hand, the financial structure of the commission is otherwise largely independent of the regular State government. The funds which it obtains from the sale of bonds and from tolls are segregated and may be used only for toll highway purposes. Conversely, the State assumes no liability upon the bonds issued by the commission or upon any other contractual obligations which it incurs. Whatever effect a recovery of damages against the commission would have upon general, tax-derived revenues of the State is limited to the remote right which is given the State to receive any surplus remaining when the commission is ultimately dissolved.

Organizations having as close a relation to the State as this have been held by us to be subject to suit. The University of Illinois was regarded as suable despite the fact that its property was regarded as that of the State. See Board...

To continue reading

Request your trial
65 cases
  • People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Commission of Chicago
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 20 Marzo 1957
    ...People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 Ill. 77, 64 N.E.2d 4; Loomis v. Keehn, 400 Ill. 337, 80 N.E.2d 368; People v. Illinois Toll Highway Commission, 3 Ill.2d 218, 120 N.E.2d 35; People ex rel Coutrakon v. Lohr, 9 Ill.2d 539, 138 N.E.2d 471. From these authorities it is clear that the bo......
  • People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 1 Diciembre 1972
    ...(People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago Regional Port Dist. (1954), 4 Ill.2d 363, 377, 123 N.E.2d 92; People v. Iilinois Toll Highway Com. (1954), 3 Ill.2d 218, 228, 120 N.E.2d 35; People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago (1953), 414 Ill. 600, 619, 111 N.E.2d 626; Krause v. Peoria Housing A......
  • People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago R. R. Terminal Authority
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 20 Junio 1958
    ...ti contemplates the delegation of administrative duties, but in this we see no constitutional violation. People v. Illinois State Toll Highway Commission, 3 Ill.2d 218, 120 N.E.2d 35; People ex rel. Curren v. Schommer, 392 Ill. 17, 63 N.E.2d 744, 167 A.L.R. 1347; Department of Public Works ......
  • Scachitti v. Ubs Financial Services
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 3 Junio 2005
    ...under the control of the Attorney General and serves only at the Attorney General's pleasure. See People v. Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 Ill.2d 218, 236-38, 120 N.E.2d 35 (1954); Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600, 149 N.E. 526 (1925). Toll Highway Comm'n involved, inter alia, a challenge ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT