People v. Ingram

• Decision Date: 13 August 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-1920
• Citation: 297 N.W.2d 684,99 Mich.App. 410
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roscoe INGRAM, Defendant-Appellee. 99 Mich.App. 410, 297 N.W.2d 684
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 684

297 N.W.2d 684

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.Roscoe INGRAM, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 78-1920.

99 Mich.App. 410, 297 N.W.2d 684

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Aug. 13, 1980.

Released for Publication Nov. 5, 1980.

[99 MICHAPP 412]Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol.Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros.Atty., E. Reilly Wilson, Appellate Chief Asst. Pros.Atty., Robert J. Sheiko, Asst. Pros.Atty., for plaintiff-appellant.

Angela R. Sims, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before T. M. BURNS, P. J., and MAHER and CLEMENTS, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, M.C.L. § 750.227;M.S.A. § 28.424.Defendant was bound over for trial by an examining magistrate on October 25, 1977.On December 1, 1977, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge.A hearing was held on December 9, 1977, before a judge of the Detroit Recorder's Court, who treated it as a motion to suppress the evidence of the gun.The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress and dismissed the case upon the prosecutor's indication that he could [99 MICHAPP 413] not proceed without evidence of the gun.From this dismissal, the People appeal as of right.

The facts of this case are not in dispute.Officer Wood of the Detroit Police Department testified at the preliminary examination that on October 17, 1977, he observed a vehicle double parked in front of 3551 Second Street in Detroit.The car was unoccupied.As his partner began to write a citation for the traffic violation, Officer Wood observed the defendant walk up to the vehicle, unlock it, and begin to get inside.Officer Wood approached the defendant and asked him whether it was his car.Defendant responded in the affirmative.The officer then asked to see defendant's driver's license.As the defendant reached for the wallet which was in his back pocket, the officer observed a large bulge underneath the front of his waist area.Officer Wood asked the defendant if he had a gun, and the defendant answered, "Yes".Officer Wood asked the defendant whether he had a permit to carry the gun, and the defendant answered, "No."At that time, the officer seized the gun and placed the defendant under arrest.Defendant had not been informed of his Miranda ¹ rights prior to his arrest.

The first issue to be resolved in this appeal involves the interpretation of the exemption contained in M.C.L. § 750.227;M.S.A. § 28.424 with respect to persons who carry a weapon on land in which they have a possessory interest.The Concealed Weapons Statute provides in pertinent part:

"Sec. 227.A person who shall carry a dagger, dirk, stiletto, or other dangerous weapon except hunting knives adapted and carried as such, concealed on or about his person, or whether concealed or otherwise in [99 MICHAPP 414] any vehicle operated or occupied by him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him ; * * *."(Emphasis added.)

The defendant contends that he had a possessory interest in the street abutting his property, and he, therefore, comes within the exception enumerated above.The trial court agreed with defendant's argument in its ruling on suppression of the weapon.As there is no previous case law in Michigan on this precise point, we treat the issue as a matter of first impression.

We begin our analysis by noting that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.Melia v. Employment Security Comm., 346 Mich. 544, 562, 78 N.W.2d 273(1956);Kizer v. Livingston County Board of Comm'rs, 38 Mich.App. 239, 246, 195 N.W.2d 884(1972).

Various cases, which have discussed the exemptions to the Concealed Weapons Statute, have stated the legislative purpose in its enactment.In People v. Clark, 21 Mich.App. 712, 715-716, 176 N.W.2d 427(1970), this Court said:

"It is hornbook law that statutes must be read so as to facilitate the intent of the legislature.People v. Bailey(1968), 10 Mich.App. 636, 160 N.W.2d 380.'The purpose of the concealed weapons statute was to prevent men in sudden quarrel * * * from drawing concealed weapons and using them without prior notice to their victims that they were armed.'People v. Jones, supra, 12 Mich.App. at (p.) 295, 162 N.W.2d at 848.And in People v. Bailey, supra, 210 Mich.App. beginning at (p.) 639, 160 N.W.2d at 382, we stated: 'the basic intent of the legislature as indicated in the concealed weapons statute was that weapons should not be carried where they might be used to take lives.'

"It is within the light of this legislative intent that we read the statutory exemptions for 'his dwelling house or place of business or other lands possessed by [99 MICHAPP 415] him.'The purpose of the exemptions was to allow persons to defend those areas in which they have a possessory interest.This is the clear import of the phrase 'possessed by him' which modifies the three areas set forth in the statute.United States v. Waters(D.D.C.1947), 73 F.Supp. 72."

In Clark, the Court held that the defendant, an employee of a corporation, did not have a sufficient possessory interest in his place of employment to bring him within the scope of the statutory exemption.

In People v. Gatt, 77 Mich.App. 310, 258 N.W.2d 212(1977), the police raided a "blind pig" being conducted on premises leased by the defendant.The defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon on these premises.This Court reversed, finding that defendant's valid possessory interest in the property brought him within the ambit of the exception, despite the fact that the property was being used for an illegal purpose.

In People v. John Alexander, 82 Mich.App. 486, 266 N.W.2d 489(1978), the Court found that the exception to the concealed weapons statute was inapplicable to an inmate who was arrested at Jackson State Prison.The Court held that a prison inmate does not have a possessory interest in any area of a prison which he has the right to defend with a weapon.The final Michigan case which interprets the exception to the concealed weapons statute is People v. Brooks, 87 Mich.App. 515, 275 N.W.2d 26(1978), where the Court strictly construed the statute and held that a taxi driver who carries a concealed weapon in his taxi does not come within the exception, because the words "or on other land possessed by him" modified "place of business", and a taxicab is not "land".

Defendant relies on property law in arguing that [99 MICHAPP 416]he was on "other land possessed by him" at the time of his arrest.Defendant alleges that an owner of property retains actual title to the middle of the street which abuts his property, and the public only has an easement in that land.

In Gunn v. Delhi Twp., 8 Mich.App. 278, 282, 154 N.W.2d 598(1967), this Court summarized the effect of public dedication of land on the title to that land as follows:

"Generically, a dedication is 'an appropriation of land to some public use, accepted for such use by or in behalf of the public.'Clark v. City of Grand Rapids(1952), 334 Mich. 646, 656, 657, 55 N.W.2d 137.Two types of dedications have been specifically recognized in this State, statutory dedication and common-law dedication; the distinction was explicitly approved by the Supreme Court prior to the turn of the century.Alton v. Meeuwenberg(1896), 108 Mich. 629, 66 N.W. 571.Statutory dedication may result from compliance with the plat act of 1929, CL 1948, §§ 560.1-560.80, as amended(Stat.Ann.1953 Rev. and Stat.Ann.1965 Cum.Supp. §§ 26.431-26.511).The definition of common-law dedication was given in Alton v. Meeuwenberg, supra, at p. 636, and has been incorporated without substantial change into CL 1948, § 221.20, supra, * * *.

"The distinction must be stated because of the difference in result hinging on the type of dedication.The traditional position was stated in Village of Grandville v. Jenison(1890), 84 Mich. 54, 65, 47 N.W. 600, 603:

" 'The effect of a dedication under the statute has been to vest the fee in the county, in trust for the municipality intended to be benefited, whereas, at common law, the act of dedication created only an easement in the public.' "

We note that M.C.L. § 221.20;M.S.A. § 9.21 states generally that all streets which are used as public streets for more than 10 years shall be deemed public highways.See also, M.C.L. § 560.253;M.S.A. § 26.430(253), which provides that land dedicated for [99 MICHAPP 417] public streets conveys fee title to the municipality to hold in trust for this use.

The record does not indicate whether the defendant's street was dedicated to the public under common law or under statutory law.However, we do not deem the distinction...