People v. Interest of R.J.

Citation451 P.3d 1232
Decision Date18 July 2019
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals No. 18CA1622
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, IN the INTEREST OF R.J., M.J., and A.J., children, and Concerning G.J.J. and M.S., Respondents-Appellants.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Colorado

J. Patrick Coleman, Mesa County Attorney, Jeremy Savage, Chief Deputy County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tammy Tallant, Guardian Ad Litem

Debra W. Dodd, Office of Respondent ParentsCounsel, Berthoud, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant G.J.J.

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent ParentsCounsel, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant M.S.

Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES

¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, G.J.J. (father) and M.S. (mother) appeal the district court’s judgment adjudicating R.J., M.J., and A.J. (children) dependent and neglected. Before addressing the merits of their appeal, however, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction. To answer this question, we must decide whether a parent may appeal an adjudicatory order to this court without first seeking district court review of a magistrate’s later dispositional order. We decide that a parent may. Having confirmed that we have jurisdiction over the appeal, we turn to the merits of the parents’ challenge to the adjudicatory order, reject that challenge, and therefore affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services (Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect alleging that the children lacked proper parental care and that their environment was injurious to their welfare. Both parents denied the allegations and requested an adjudicatory jury trial. After a three-day trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding the children dependent and neglected.

¶ 3 A magistrate later entered dispositional orders as to both father and mother that continued out-of-home placement for the children and adopted treatment plans for both parents. Father asked for more time to file a petition for review of the magistrate’s dispositional order with the district court. The district court granted that request; however, no petition for review appears in the record.

¶ 4 Father then filed a request with this court to file his notice of appeal out of time. Therein, he observes that while C.A.R. 3.4(b)(1) and section 19-1-109(2)(c), C.R.S. 2018, read in combination, require a party to file a notice of appeal of an adjudicatory order and designation of transcripts within twenty-one days after the entry of the dispositional order, C.R.M. 7(a)(11) requires a party to seek district court review of a magistrate’s dispositional order before seeking appellate review in this court. This, he says, creates uncertainty, and he asks us to decide whether this court has jurisdiction to review an adjudicatory order when a magistrate later enters the dispositional order but no one seeks district court review of that order.

¶ 5 We ordered the parties to address in their principal briefs the finality — that is, the appealability — of the adjudicatory order. Mother then filed a notice of appeal, asked that we accept it out of time, and also asked that she be allowed to join father’s briefs. We granted mother’s requests.

II. Finality of the Adjudicatory Order

¶ 6 Before we can decide the parents’ challenge to the adjudication of the children as dependent and neglected, we must decide whether their failure to first seek review of the magistrate’s dispositional order means that we lack jurisdiction over their appeal. See People in Interest of J.C. , 844 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Colo. 1993). We hold that it does not.

A. Standard of Review and Interpretive Principles

¶ 7 Whether determining the meaning of a statute or a rule — and in this case we do both — we review de novo. People in Interest of L.M. , 2018 CO 34, ¶ 13, 416 P.3d 875 (statute); In Interest of M.K.D.A.L. , 2014 COA 148, ¶ 5, 410 P.3d 559 (rule).

¶ 8 In interpreting a rule, we apply the same principles that we use when interpreting a statute. Willhite v. Rodriguez-Cera , 2012 CO 29, ¶ 9, 274 P.3d 1233. Chief among these principles is that we must give effect to the intent of the body that adopted the rule or statute and apply the construction that best effectuates that intent. People in Interest of H.T. , 2019 COA 72, ¶ 12 ; see People in Interest of J.D. , 2017 COA 156, ¶ 9 (cert. granted Sept. 17, 2018). To do so, we start by looking to the language of the rule or statute, giving the words and phrases used therein their plain and ordinary meanings. H.T. , ¶ 12 ; M.K.D.A.L. , ¶ 5. We should not add words or phrases to a rule or statute, and, relatedly, we should presume that the inclusion of certain terms in a rule or statute implies the exclusion of others. H.T. , ¶ 12 ; People in Interest of J.J.M. , 2013 COA 159, ¶ 7, 318 P.3d 559. And we must also presume that the adopting body intended a just and reasonable result; so we should avoid interpretations leading to absurd results. Leaffer v. Zarlengo , 44 P.3d 1072, 1078-79 (Colo. 2002) ; H.T. , ¶ 12 ; People in Interest of J.L.R. , 895 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Colo. App. 1995).

B. Statutory Framework
1. The Adjudication and Disposition

¶ 9 The Children’s Code provides for a bifurcated proceeding in dependency and neglect actions. E.O. v. People in Interest of C.O.A. , 854 P.2d 797, 800 (Colo. 1993). In the first phase, after a petition in dependency or neglect is filed, the court determines if there are grounds to adjudicate the child dependent or neglected. If a parent contests the allegations in the petition, that parent can request a bench or jury trial in which the petitioner (usually a local department of human services) must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. §§ 19-3-202, 19-3-505, C.R.S. 2018; People in Interest of A.M.D. , 648 P.2d 625, 641 (Colo. 1982). If the department fails to carry its burden, then the juvenile court should dismiss the case, vacate all orders regarding the child, and relinquish its jurisdiction. § 19-3-505(6). But if the department proves the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, the court should sustain the petition and adjudicate the child dependent or neglected. § 19-3-505(7).

¶ 10 If the court sustains the petition, the second phase — the dispositional phase — kicks in. The purpose of the dispositional hearing is to devise a proper dispositional order serving the interests of the child and the public. §§ 19-1-103(43), 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2018. In this phase, the court must address dispositional alternatives and adopt a treatment plan for the parent. § 19-3-507 ; see People in Interest of C.L.S. , 934 P.2d 851, 853 (Colo. App. 1996). A bit more specifically, the court must determine the child’s legal custody, decide whether an appropriate treatment plan can be devised to address the concerns that led to the department’s involvement, and, if so, approve an appropriate treatment plan.

2. Adjudicatory Appeals

¶ 11 C.A.R. 3.4(a), which governs appeals in dependency and neglect cases, provides that a party may appeal orders from dependency and neglect proceedings as permitted by section 19-1-109. In turn, section 19-1-109(1) says that "[a]n appeal as provided in the introductory portion to section 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. [2018], may be taken from any order, decree, or judgment." Subsection (2)(c) of the same statute provides that "[a]n order decreeing a child to be neglected or dependent shall be a final and appealable order after the entry of the disposition pursuant to section 19-3-508."

C. Analysis

¶ 12 The Department and the guardian ad litem (GAL) argue that we lack jurisdiction to review the adjudicatory order because neither parent filed a petition for review of the dispositional order with the district court in accordance with section 19-1-108(5.5), C.R.S. 2018. That section says that "[a] petition for review [of a magistrate’s order] is a prerequisite before an appeal may be filed with the Colorado court of appeals or Colorado supreme court." Id. But we conclude that this statute isn’t an impediment to an appeal of the adjudicatory order.

¶ 13 We begin by noting that the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in dependency and neglect proceedings. § 19-1-104(1)(b), C.R.S. 2018. Unless a party asks for a jury trial, a magistrate may hear any case or matter under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. §§ 13-5-201(3), 19-1-108(1), C.R.S. 2018.

¶ 14 Father and mother are only asking us to review the adjudicatory order; they don’t ask to review the dispositional order. As noted, the district court entered the adjudicatory order, whereas the magistrate entered the dispositional order. The plain language of section 19-1-109(2)(c) provides that an order decreeing a child to be dependent or neglected — that is, an adjudicatory order — "shall be a final and appealable order after the entry of the disposition." No language in the statute requires that the dispositional order also be final. Nor is there any language in the statute requiring district court review of a dispositional order before a parent may appeal the adjudicatory order. And section 19-1-108(5.5), on which the Department and the GAL rely, plainly applies to appeals of a magistrate’s order. To repeat, neither parent appeals the magistrate’s dispositional order.

¶ 15 True, an adjudicatory order isn’t final until the court enters a dispositional order. § 19-1-109(2)(c). But no statute or rule says that an adjudicatory order isn’t final until a district court reviews a magistrate’s dispositional order. And section 13-4-102(1) says the court of appeals has "initial jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments" in civil cases.

¶ 16 Further, requiring judicial review of a dispositional order that was entered by a magistrate, but that no one challenges, would lead to an absurd result. The purpose of district court review of a magistrate’s order is to give the district court "an opportunity to correct any error that may have been made by the...

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    ...discovery matters. Ruling on a motion to dismiss is not among the functions listed. See People in Interest of R.J. , 2019 COA 109, ¶ 8, 451 P.3d 1232 ("[W]e should presume that the inclusion of certain terms in a rule or statute implies the exclusion of others."); see also Heotis , ¶ 18 ("A......
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