People v. Isaacs

• Decision Date: 29 March 1967
• Docket Number: No. 39797,39797
• Citation: 226 N.E.2d 38,37 Ill.2d 205
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Theodore J. ISAACS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 38

226 N.E.2d 38

37 Ill.2d 205

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v.Theodore J. ISAACS et al., Appellees.

No. 39797.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 29, 1967.

Rehearing Denied May 16, 1967.

Raymond L. Terrell, State's Atty., Springfield (Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for appellant.

Harry J. Busch and Jacob Shamberg, Chicago, and Hugh J. Graham, Jr., Springfield, for appelleeTheodore J. Isaacs.

George J. Cotsirilos, Chicago, for appelleeJohn J. Lang.

KLINGBIEL, Justice.

This is an appeal by the State of Illinois from an order of the circuit court of Sangamon County quashing and dismissing thirty-four counts of a thirty-five-count indictment charging defendantsTheodore J. Isaacs and John J. Lang with various offenses.Cook Envelope and Lithographing, Inc., an Illinois corporation, is charged with offenses as a co-defendant in some of the counts and is charged alone in court III.However, since no appearance on its behalf has ever been made, the circuit court did not act upon the indictment with regard thereto, and insofar as the counts under consideration here affect the corporation, they are not in issue on this appeal.Thirty-three counts are made the basis of the appeal, the People having confessed error as to count XXI.Constutional questions relating to the sufficiency of several counts bring the cause directly to this court.Ill.Const., art. VI, sec. 5, S.H.A.;Rule 28--1,Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, c. 110, § 101.28--1.

Counts I, IV, VIII and IX, which the parties have denominated the 'less detailed Section 75 counts', charge defendant Isaacs with knowingly and unlawfully acquiring, obtaining and holding a direct pecuniary interest in certain specifically described contracts entered into by the State of Illinois and Cook Envelope and Lithographing, Inc., an Illinois corporation, pursuant to which the latter was to furnish and supply the former with envelopes, printing and paper.It is alleged in all of these counts that Isaacs occupied, during the times of the commission of the offenses sought to be charged therein, a position as an officer and employee of the State of Illinois, to-wit: Director of the Department of Revenue.It is further averred in each count that the payments for the materials to be furnished under the contracts were to be satisfied from funds appropriated by the General Assembly.Defendant Lang is charged in counts I and IV as having aided and abetted defendant Isaacs in the planning and commission of the offenses charged therein while an employe of the State of Illinois, to-wit: Superitendent of Printing in the Department of Finance.

The first paragraph of section 12 of the act relating to State contracts (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 127, par. 75), pursuant to which these counts are brought, provides: 'Except as herein otherwise provided, it shall be unlawful for any person holding any elective state office in this state or a seat in the General Assembly or any person employed in any of the offices of the state government or the wife, husband or minor child of any such person to have, acquire, obtain or hold any contract, whether for stationery, printing, paper or for any services, materials or supplies, which will be wholly or partly satisfied by the payment of funds appropriated by the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, nor shall any such person have, acquire, obtain or hold any direct pecuniary interest in any such contract provided, however, that payments made in behalf of a public aid recipient shall not be deemed payments pursuant to a contract with the state.'

It is apparent that the counts now under consideration are brought pursuant to the second clause of the first paragraph of section 12, for nowhere else in the paragraph is language employed proscribing the acquisition of a 'direct pecuniary interest' in a State contract.

The defendants maintain that these counts are constitutionally insufficient under section 9 of article II of the Illinois constitution, requiring that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, in order that he will have such specific designation of the offense charged as to enable him to prepare his defense and to plead a judgment of acquittal or conviction thereon in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.People v. Brown, 336 Ill. 257, 168 N.E. 289;People v. Flynn, 375 Ill. 366, 31 N.E.2d 591.

Consistent with this constitutional requirement, it has long been a rule of law in this State that where the language of the statute defining an offense so far particularizes such offense that by its use alone the accused is notified with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he is charged, an indictment drawn substantially in the language of the statute is constitutionally sufficient.(People v. Blanchett, 33 Ill.2d 527, 212 N.E.2d 97;People v. Sims, 393 Ill. 238, 66 N.E.2d 86.)However, it is equally well settled that '(w)here the statute creating the offense does not describe the act or acts which compose it, they must be specifically averred in the indictment or information.'(People v. Brown, 336 Ill. 257, 258--259, 168 N.E.2d 289, 290.)Here, it may fairly be said that these counts, as to the interest alleged to have been obtained, are drawn substantially in the language of the above statute, for it is alleged in each count that defendant Isaacs 'did knowingly and unlawfully have, acquire, obtain and hold a direct pecuniary interest' in the State contracts therein specified.The question to be determined by this court is, therefore, whether such language sufficiently particularizes the nature of the offense sought to be charged so as to bring these counts within the rule authorizing charges couched in substantially statutory terminology.If so, defendants' constitutional contention is without merit.If not, the cases adhering to the rule in Brown are controlling, and the trial court's order was correct.If the constitutional requisite is met in this case, section 111--3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963(Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 38, par. 111--3) which was enacted to satisfy the mandate that an accused be adequately notified of the offense with which he is charged, is also sufficiently complied with.

The People in contending these counts are not defective as vague and uncertain rely principally on People v. Adduci, 412 Ill. 621, 108 N.E.2d 1, where this court dealt with the predecessor of present section 12 of the act relating to State contracts.The pertinent section then provided, Inter alia, that State officers and employees were precluded from becoming 'directly or indirectly' interested in certain State contracts.(Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 127, par. 75.)After upholding the constitutionality of this statutory language against a contention of vagueness and uncertainty, the court upheld an indictment brought pursuant thereto.That indictment, however, charged the defendant with an offense not only in the language of the statute, but also specifically alleged the type of interest in the contract that defendant was charged with having obtained, I.e., that he was paid a large amount of money as a commission in connection with the contract.The counts under consideration here charge only the acquisition of a 'direct pecuniary interest', and although the People urge that such distinction is of no consequence, we believe it manifest that the interest alleged in Adduci was measurably more specific than the interest alleged here.In our opinion, therefore, that case is not controlling.

Defendants rely upon cases such as People v. Peters, 10 Ill.2d 577, 141 N.E.2d 9, where this court held that an information alleging that the accused on a certain day in a certain county, as a resident of the State of Illinois not authorized to practice law 'did then and there unlawfully, knowlingly and wilfully represent himself as authorized to practice law' was constitutionally insufficient to state an offense.The statute pursuant to which the information was brought provided: 'That any person residing in this State not being regularly licensed to practice law in the courts of this state, who shall in any manner hold himself out as an attorney at law or solicitor in chancery or represent himself either verbally or in writing, directly or indirectly, as authorized to practice law, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor'.Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 38, par. 298.)The court held that since the statute did not define or descfribe the acts constituting the offense created thereby, a charge couched substantially in the statutory language should have been dismissed.Similar cases are People v. Chiafreddo, 381 Ill. 214, 44 N.E.2d 888;People v. Green, 368 Ill. 242, 13 N.E.2d 278, 115 A.L.R. 348;People v. Flynn, 375 Ill. 366, 31 N.E.2d 591;People v. Barnes, 314 Ill. 140, 145 N.E. 391.

After a thorough consideration of the foregoing authorities, we believe that the statute pursuant to which these counts are brought, proscribing a certain class of individuals from acquiring a 'direct pecuniary interest' in certain State contracts, does not by that language sufficiently define or describe the acts composing the offense so that an indictment couched substantially in the language thereof is constitutionally sufficient.While the People argue that 'direct pecuniary interest' is reasonably specific, it cannot be denied that there are many types of such interests that the statutorily included class might acquire in State contracts.Without more specific particularization of the 'direct pecuniary interest' alleged to have been obtained by an accused, he has no way of knowing with what he is charged.It may well be that the particular interest considered by the grand jury is not a 'direct pecuniary interest' as envisaged by section 12, and an indictment charging the acquisition of such interest would be...