People v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 22 September 2011
• Docket Number: 110702.,Nos. 110615,s. 110615
• Citation: 353 Ill.Dec. 353,2011 IL 110615,955 N.E.2d 1164
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,v.Michael JACKSON, Appellant.The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee,v.Felton Lee, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2011 IL 110615

955 N.E.2d 1164

353 Ill.Dec. 353

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Michael JACKSON, Appellant.The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Felton Lee, Appellant.

Nos. 110615

110702.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 22, 2011.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, and David T. Harris and Todd T. McHenry, Assistant Appellate Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellants.Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Annette Collins and Margaret M. Smith, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following separate convictions, the circuit court of Cook County charged each defendant, Michael Jackson and Felton Lee, $10 for the “Arrestee's Medical Costs Fund” (medical cost assessment). 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006). The appellate court upheld the assessment in each case. People v. Jackson, No. 1–08–3464 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23); People v. Lee, No. 1–09–0347 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed each defendant's petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)), and consolidated the cases for review. In Jackson's case, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court; in Lee's case, we dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Jackson and Lee were each convicted of possessing less than 15 grams of a controlled substance. 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2008). The circuit court sentenced Jackson to five years' imprisonment and one year of parole, and sentenced Lee to four years' imprisonment. According to a form in each of their records, the court also imposed against Jackson and Lee various fees, costs, and fines, including $10 for the “Arrestee's Medical Costs Fund” pursuant to section 17 of the County Jail Act (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)). Section 17 was amended effective August 2008, which was subsequent to defendants committing their offenses, but prior to their sentencing. Pub. Act 95–842 (eff. Aug. 15, 2008) (amending 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)).¹

¶ 4 On appeal, Jackson contended, inter alia, that the circuit court erroneously imposed the medical cost assessment because there was no evidence that he received any medical treatment following his arrest. Jackson relied on the preamended version of the statute. The appellate court rejected Jackson's argument. People v. Jackson, No. 1–08–3464, at 11–13 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Jackson now appeals to this court (No. 110615).

¶ 5 Before the appellate court, Lee agreed with the State that amended section 17 applied in his case, but nevertheless challenged the imposition of the medical cost assessment because he did not require or receive any medical services while in custody. People v. Lee, No. 1–09–0347, at 2 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court upheld the imposition of the medical cost assessment. Id. at 6–8. Lee now appeals to this court (No. 110702).

¶ 6 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 7 Defendants contend that the circuit court should not have imposed the medical cost assessment because they did not receive any medical services while in custody. Section 17 of the County Jail Act authorizes the medical cost assessment. Subsequent to defendants committing their offenses, but prior to their sentencing, the legislature amended section 17. Pub. Act 95–842 (eff. Aug. 15, 2008) (amending 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)). Before this court, defendants present the narrow issue of whether preamended section 17 (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006)) applied only to those arrestees on whose behalf the county incurred medical expenses. Defendants expressly concede that the medical cost assessment in their cases is permissible under amended section 17, even though they did not receive any medical services while in custody. However, defendants now contend that amended section 17 cannot apply to them based on the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws (U.S. Const., art. I, §§ 9, 10; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 16).

¶ 8 The State contends that the medical cost assessment functions as a health insurance fund, which benefits defendants while they are in custody regardless of whether they actually receive medical services. We agree with the State's contention, and reject defendants' argument for the following reasons.

¶ 9 A. Jackson

¶ 10 Jackson contends that the circuit court erroneously imposed the medical cost assessment because there was no evidence that he received any medical treatment following his arrest. We observe that at the sentencing hearing, Jackson failed to object to any aspect of his sentence. He also did not file a postsentencing motion raising this issue. Under different circumstances, we would deem this issue procedurally forfeited. See, e.g., People v. Reed, 177 Ill.2d 389, 394, 226 Ill.Dec. 801, 686 N.E.2d 584 (1997); People v. Lykins, 77 Ill.2d 35, 38, 31 Ill.Dec. 805, 394 N.E.2d 1182 (1979). However, Jackson contends that the imposition of the medical cost assessment did not conform to the requirements of preamended section 17. It is quite established that a sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement is void ( People v. Arna, 168 Ill.2d 107, 113, 212 Ill.Dec. 963, 658 N.E.2d 445 (1995)), and a void order may be attacked at any time or in any court ( People v. Thompson, 209 Ill.2d 19, 25, 282 Ill.Dec. 183, 805 N.E.2d 1200 (2004)). “A challenge to an alleged void order is not subject to forfeiture.” People v. Marshall, 242 Ill.2d 285, 302, 351 Ill.Dec. 172, 950 N.E.2d 668 (2011). Although this contention is not procedurally forfeited, it remains nonmeritorious.

¶ 11 The circuit court ordered Jackson to pay $10 to the “Arrestee's Medical Costs Fund” pursuant to preamended section 17 of the County Jail Act, which was in effect when Jackson committed his offense. Section 17 read in pertinent part as follows:

“The county shall be entitled to a $10 fee for each conviction or order of supervision for a criminal violation, other than a petty offense or business offense. The fee shall be taxed as costs to be collected from the defendant, if possible, upon conviction or entry of an order of supervision. The fee shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine.

All such fees collected shall be deposited by the county in a fund to be established and known as the Arrestee's Medical Costs Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be used solely for reimbursement of costs for medical expenses relating to the arrestee while he or she is in the custody of the sheriff and administration of the Fund.

For the purposes of this Section * * * ‘medical expenses relating to the arrestee’ means only those expenses incurred for medical care or treatment provided to an arrestee on account of an injury suffered by the arrestee during the course of his or her arrest unless such injury is self-inflicted; the term does not include any expenses incurred for medical care or treatment provided to an arrestee on account of a health condition of the arrestee which existed prior to the time of his or her arrest.” 730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2006).

Relying on preamended section 17 of the County Jail Act, Jackson argues that “the statute limits the use of each arrestee's money in a way that must limit the fee only to those on whose behalf the county incurred medical expenses.”

¶ 12 This is a matter of statutory interpretation. The construction of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Garcia, 241 Ill.2d 416, 421, 349 Ill.Dec. 929, 948 N.E.2d 32 (2011); County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill.2d 593, 603–04, 326 Ill.Dec. 848, 900 N.E.2d 1095 (2008); People v. Jones, 223 Ill.2d 569, 580–81, 308 Ill.Dec. 402, 861 N.E.2d 967 (2006). A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill.2d 480, 487, 281 Ill.Dec. 524, 804 N.E.2d 489 (2004); Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill.2d 225, 232, 258 Ill.Dec. 548, 756 N.E.2d 822 (2001). The court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Garcia, 241 Ill.2d at 421, 349 Ill.Dec. 929, 948 N.E.2d 32; County of Du Page, 231 Ill.2d at 604, 326 Ill.Dec. 848, 900 N.E.2d 1095. Also, a court presumes that the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Garcia, 241 Ill.2d at 421, 349 Ill.Dec. 929, 948 N.E.2d 32; People v. Christopherson, 231 Ill.2d 449, 454, 326 Ill.Dec. 40, 899 N.E.2d 257 (2008).

¶ 13 Jackson argues that the statutory references “to a specific, singular ‘arrestee’ ” indicate that the medical cost assessment does not generally “cover costs for any or all arrestees' injuries, but rather * * * is directed at individual arrests that result in injuries to individual arrestees.” We disagree. Jackson's argument confuses the first above-quoted paragraph, which pertains to the collection of the assessment, with the second paragraph, which describes how the fund proceeds are to be used. See People v. Evangelista, 393 Ill.App.3d 395, 400, 332 Ill.Dec. 356, 912 N.E.2d 1242 (2009). The first paragraph unequivocally mandates that the county is entitled to the medical cost assessment for each conviction. This broad language does not...