People v. Jackson

Citation46 Misc.2d 742,260 N.Y.S.2d 756
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Nathan JACKSON, Defendant.
Decision Date07 June 1965
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (New York)

Aaron E. Koota, Dist. Atty., Kings County, for the People; Albert V. De Meo, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel.

Edward H. Levine, Daniel G. Collins, New York City, for defendant.

DAVID L. MALBIN, Justice.

The defendant, Nathan Jackson, was indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree on June 23, 1960, for the killing of a police officer in the County of Kings while in the commission of a robbery.

On November 27, 1960, he was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death by a judge of the then County Court of Kings County, which since reorganization has become a part of the Supreme Court by an act of the Legislature effective September 1, 1962.

Appeals were taken to the various courts which ultimately resulted in a reversal of the judgment of conviction by the Supreme Court which pronounced its 'landmark' decision in the case of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, decided June, 1964. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice White in effect declared the confession admitted in evidence against the accused, violated the constitutional guarantee of due process of law and mandated that the defendant was entitled to an adequate, reliable and independent determination of the voluntariness of the alleged confession, and that the hearing must be before the judge alone, and that there must be a determination at the evidentiary hearing that said confession was established to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before it can be submitted to the jury for their consideration.

The method heretofore followed in the New York State court where the voluntariness of a confession was attacked, the trial court submitted that issue with the others to the jury. As indicated in the Jackson opinion and reviewing the procedure employed in the New York State courts, the trial judge made a preliminary determination of the voluntariness of a confession and excluded it if in no other circumstances could the confession be deemed voluntary. If the evidence presented a fair question as to its voluntariness, as where certain facts bearing on the issue were in dispute or where reasonable men could differ over the inferences to be drawn from the undisputed facts, the judge admitted the confession and left to the jury under proper instructions the determination of its voluntary character and also of its truthfulness. In Jackson (supra) the court held that it is a deprivation of due process of law to base a conviction, in whole or in part, on a coerced confession, regardless of its truth, and even though there may be sufficient other evidence to support the conviction (p. 376, 84 S.Ct. p. 1780); even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction (Malinski v. People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029; Stroble v. State of California, 343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872; Payne v. State of Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975). The United States Supreme Court in the Jackson case left the choice to the prosecutor to either provide the defendant a full independent hearing before the court or proceed with a full trial de novo. In any event, the court stated:

'It is both practical and desirable that in cases to be tried hereafter a proper determination of voluntariness be made prior to the admission of the confession to the jury which is adjudicating guilt or innocence. But as to Jackson, who has already been convicted and now seeks collateral relief, we cannot say that the Constitution requires a new trial if in a soundly conducted collateral proceeding, the confession which was admitted at the trial is fairly determined to be voluntary.' (Jackson v. Denno, supra, 378 U.S. p. 395, 396, 84 S.Ct. p. 1791)

Following the Jackson case, the New York State Court of Appeals in People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179, adopted a set of rules to meet with the new requirement of a separate hearing as to the voluntariness of confessions. As to criminal trials to be held in the future, Chief Judge Desmond of the Court of Appeals in People v. Huntley, supra, at p. 78, 255 N.Y.S.2d at p. 843, 204 N.E.2d p. 183, stated the following:

'We adopt for New York State the so-called Massachusetts procedure described in the Jackson v. Denno opinion at pages 378-379 of 378 United States Reports, at pages 1781-1782 of 84 S.Ct. 'under which the jury passes on voluntariness only after the judge has fully and independently resolved the issue against the accused' and has made express findings upon the disputed fact question of voluntariness. We favor the Massachusetts rule for several reasons, the first being that our State Constitution (art. I, § 2) mandates a jury trial of the issue of voluntariness. Another consideration supporting this choice is that the Massachusetts rule not only meets the demand of Jackson-Denno that 'a proper determination of voluntariness be made prior to the admission of the confession to the jury which is adjudicating guilt or innocence.' (378 U.S. at p. 395, 84 S.Ct. at p. 1791) but also provides a defendant with opportunity before the jury itself to challenge the confession.'

The Huntley case (supra) further mandated that 'the judge must find voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt before the confession can be submitted to the trial jury. The burden of proof as to voluntariness is on the People. The prosecutor must, within a reasonable time before trial, notify the defense as to whether any alleged confession or admission will be offered in evidence at the trial. If such notice be given by the People the defense, if it intends to attack the confession or admission as involuntary, must, in turn, notify the prosecutor of a desire by the defense of a preliminary hearing on such issue (cf. Code Cirm. Proc. § 813-c).'

Pursuant to the directives and the rules prescribed by the Court of Appeals in the Huntley case, the District Attorney gave proper notice concerning the proposed offer of any confession or admission in evidence at the trial and in turn the defense properly notified the prosecutor of its desire to have a preliminary hearing on such issue. Thereafter a preliminary hearing (before the panel of jurors was assembled) was conducted before the trial judge. The prosecution in support of its contention that the alleged confession was not secured in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights or by coercion, physically or mentally, or in any manner contrary to law, sought to establish the confession to be offered against the defendant was voluntary and freely made by the defendant. In that connection four witnesses were called. [Evidence offered at hearing omitted for publication.]

The above was a brief summary of a hearing that consisted of about 350 pages and upon which the court is required to make its findings of fact and conclusions as to the voluntariness of the alleged confessions.

Defense objection during the pre-trial hearing to the admissibility of the alleged inculpatory statements was predicated on the following grounds:

(1) That the defendant was a principal accused.

(2) Failure to warn him of his right to remain silent, or to have tha aid of counsel.

(3) The circumstances under which the statements were made and the physical condition of the defendant at the time impaired the defendant's ability to resist interrogation and comprehend circumstances.

It was the contention of the People that when the defendant was first under arrest he was not accused of a crime but that he had been arrested for the possession of a revolver. The People further contend that there is no requirement in the law of the State of New York that the defendant should be advised of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and Article IV, of the State Constitution.

The precise claim of the inadmissibility of the alleged confessions in the case at bar may be narrowed to two propositions:

(1) Did the physical and mental condition of the defendant so impair his power to resist interrogation by his questioner; and did the possible subjective pain and suffering so weaken him physically that it prevented a clear understanding of the inquiry to which he was exposed?

(2) Did the failure to advise him of his constitutional rights, more definitely, the failure of the police to advise the accused that he had a right to have an attorney (even though he had not requested one) and that he was not required to answer any question, and if he did, the statements made by him may be used against him and, in short, that he may refuse to answer any questions propounded to him or make any statements during this period.

The issue presented by failure to warn an accused has brought many conflicting views. There is no obligatory requirement of New York State law to warn an accused of his right to counsel and privilege to refrain from making a statement after his arrest. (People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E. 112, 116.) Unquestionably under certain circumstances many occasions arise when a defendant must be advised of his right to the aid of counsel (Amendment 6, U.S. Constitution); and a flat refusal to answer a request of an accused would deprive him of his constitutional right against being compelled to give evidence against himself. (see, People v. Noble, 9 N.Y.2d 571, 216 N.Y.S.2d 79, 175 N.E.2d 451.) In the Noble case, it was stated 'when a person under suspicion of crime is being questioned, there is a vast difference between a mere failure to warn and a flat refusal to answer a proper inquiry as to his rights, * * *. It offends against our concept of fairness. The defendant was entitled to an answer * * *. We regard the statement thus procured as an invasion of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.'...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • People v. Ortiz
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New York)
    • 25 Mayo 1966
    ......Green, 23 A.D.2d 500, 255 N.Y.S.2d 942; People v. Agar, 44 Misc.2d 396, 253 N.Y.S.2d 761; People v. Langert, 44 Misc.2d 399, 254 N.Y.S.2d 17; People v. Hocking, 15 N.Y.2d 973, 259 N.Y.S.2d 859, 207 N.E.2d 529; People v. Livingston, 15 N.Y.2d 977, 259 N.Y.S.2d 861, 207 N.E.2d 530; People v. Jackson, 46 Misc.2d 742, 751--754, 262 N.Y.S.2d 907, 915--919.).         A transcript of the minutes of the trial and of all the proceedings, including the taking of the plea refutes any assertions made by the defendant-petitioner. The documentary proof irrefutably indicates that the defendant is ......
  • Williams, In re
    • United States
    • New York Family Court
    • 9 Febrero 1966
    ...statements' thereby obtained (People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 233, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 929, 205 N.E.2d 852, 855; People v. Jackson, 46 Misc.2d 742, 753, 262 N.Y.S.2d 907, 917) nevertheless, if the respondent did in fact make a request for counsel and his request was refused there is no doubt......
  • People v. Augello
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New York)
    • 20 Diciembre 1965
    ...N.Y.S.2d 197, 179 N.E.2d 339 (1961); People v. Vitagliano, 15 N.Y.2d 360, 258 N.Y.S.2d 839, 206 N.E.2d 864 (1965); Peopel v. Jackson, 46 Misc.2d 742, 262 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1965); People v. Santo Blando, 23 A.D.2d 761, 258 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1965); Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 134......
  • People v. Jones
    • United States
    • New York City Court
    • 10 Julio 1973
    ...confronting him. Likewise, the Court is cognizant of the fact that counsel cannot be foisted upon a defendant. People v. Jackson, 46 Misc.2d 742, 262 N.Y.S.2d 907 (S.C. Kings County 1965). Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the need may arise where the defendant, acting as his ow......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT