People v. Jackson
| Docket Number | SC 165253,COA 362496 |
| Decision Date | 27 October 2023 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL JAY JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Kent CC: 05-009369-FC
Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra David F Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M Welch Kyra H. Bolden, Justices
By order of May 2, 2023, the prosecuting attorney was directed to answer the application for leave to appeal the November 29, 2022 order of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.
Under MCR 6.428, defendant argues that he was improperly denied the appointment of appellate counsel after he was first convicted over 15 years ago. I take no position at this time on the underlying merits of that claim. Instead, because defendant has raised this exact claim several times, at different stages of litigation and using a variety of procedural vehicles, I would hold that defendant's instant appeal is procedurally foreclosed. The trial court was within its authority to deny defendant's motion, a motion which used revised language under MCR 6.428 to try to reopen a repeatedly litigated issue that was previously addressed in Michigan's court system and for all intents and purposes, appeared to be fully resolved. Therefore, I would deny leave to appeal.
In June 2006, defendant was convicted by jury of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion, first-degree home invasion, four counts of armed robbery, and five counts of carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. After being sentenced, defendant filed a request for appointment of appellate counsel, which was denied based on certain facts the trial court found relating to defendant's income. Specifically, the trial court noted that defendant stated to his presentence investigator that he expected to receive between $4,000 to $8,000 per month as "residuals" from the sale of certain compact discs. Defendant did not appeal the trial court's decision.[1]
In October 2016, over 10 years after his initial conviction, defendant moved for reissuance of the judgment under MCR 6.428. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in 2006 when it denied his request for appointment of appellate counsel. At the time of the motion, MCR 6.428 permitted trial courts to reissue criminal judgments in cases where appellate counsel inexcusably fails to perfect a timely appeal on a defendant's behalf:
If the defendant did not appeal within the time allowed by MCR 7.204(A)(2) and demonstrates that the attorney or attorneys retained or appointed to represent the defendant on direct appeal from the judgment either disregarded the defendant's instruction to perfect a timely appeal of right, or otherwise failed to provide effective assistance, and, but for counsel's deficient performance, the defendant would have perfected a timely appeal of right, the trial court shall issue an order restarting the time in which to file an appeal of right.[2]
This standard was aligned with established constitutional law that, "when counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal."[3] However, the rule did not apply to denial of appointment of appellate counsel, as opposed to ineffective performance of appellate counsel in filing an appeal. Therefore, the trial court and Court of Appeals rejected defendant's arguments and denied relief, and this Court denied leave to appeal.
In early 2020, defendant moved for relief from judgment under MCR 6.502. Defendant again argued that the trial court erred in 2006 when it denied defendant appointment of appellate counsel at state expense. The trial court rejected that claim, refuting arguments made by defendant that his counsel was ineffective in filing the prior motion under MCR 6.428. Reviewing defendant's arguments under MCR 6.502, the trial court concluded that defendant's claims for appointment of counsel were at that stage "meritless." The Court of Appeals denied leave because defendant "failed to establish that the trial court erred." Again, this Court denied leave to appeal.
In 2021, this Court expanded MCR 6.428. Of note in this case, the Court allowed trial courts to "restore" the time to file an appeal if the appointment of appellate counsel was denied as the result of "errors by . . . the court":
If the defendant, whether convicted by plea or at trial, was denied the right to appellate review or the appointment of appellate counsel due to errors by the defendant's prior attorney or the court, or other factors outside the defendant's control, the trial court shall issue an order restarting the time in which to file an appeal or request counsel.[4]
In early 2022, over 15 years after his initial conviction, defendant has moved for relief under the revised MCR 6.428. Yet again, he claimed that he was improperly denied appellate counsel at state expense in 2006. The trial court denied defendant's request for reinstatement of his time to appeal, noting the numerous times defendant had sought and been denied relief for the same alleged error. The Court of Appeals denied leave for lack of merit on the grounds presented.
Prior to 2021, defendant had two methods by which he could challenge the trial court's denial of appointment of appellate counsel: (1) he could have appealed that decision (or the denials of his numerous reconsideration motions filed after that decision); or (2) he could have filed a motion for relief from judgment. It is basic law in Michigan that defendants can raise constitutional claims in motions for relief from judgment.[5] It is equally well established that denial of a right to appellate counsel for an indigent individual violates the United States Constitution.[6] However, defendant cannot bring a motion for relief from judgment if he "alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under [another motion for relief from judgment]."[7] Yet this procedural bar does not apply if defendant has "good cause" for failing the raise the issue on direct appeal and was "prejudiced" as a result.[8] Looking to federal law governing the writ of habeas corpus, Michigan courts have interpreted "good cause" to include the effective denial of counsel as well as other "factor[s] external to the defense."[9] Both these categories of good cause are satisfied when a defendant is improperly denied the assistance of counsel as an indigent.[10] Furthermore, prejudice is "presumed" when the accused is left "without the assistance of counsel on appeal[.]"[11]
Therefore, if defendant was in fact indigent in 2006 and the trial court wrongfully denied appointment of appellate counsel, defendant could have argued that a failure to challenge that decision on direct review did not bar a motion for relief from judgment. If defendant had been improperly denied appointment of appellate counsel, he would have been entitled to relief through a motion for relief from judgment, likely in the form of a reopened deadline to appeal with appointment of counsel.[12]
First, defendant did not file an appeal of the trial court's decision in 2006. In 2016, he appealed the same claim using a procedurally improper motion under MCR 6.428. And in 2020, his motion for relief from judgment alleged that same claim. Defendant's arguments were presented, considered, and denied at all levels of Michigan's court system. Now in 2023, defendant has had a full and complete opportunity to litigate his argument against the trial court's 2006 decision. He has repeatedly taken the opportunity to file motions for relief and has been repeatedly unsuccessful.
It is fundamental to the effective and efficient adjudication of disputes that courts deny relief to parties who seek to relitigate claims that have either failed in prior proceedings or could have been raised in those prior proceedings but were not. At the heart of this principle is the importance of finality of court judgments and decisions. The "principle of finality," especially after a dispute has been reduced to judgment, is "essential to the operation of our criminal justice system."[13] By the time a conviction is entered and affirmed, the state and the public whom it represents have made a substantial investment in the protection, value, and proper adjudication of a defendant's guilt. Challenging revising, or vacating a conviction, potentially years after the initial disposition, undermines this value and the integrity of judicial decision-making, which is fundamental to the interests of justice. "Society's resources have been concentrated at that time and place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens," and "the passage of time only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications."[14] Further, permitting repeat litigation of previously settled issues can serve to undermine public respect for the judicial system. Laypeople can interpret a party's serially requesting relief, and eventually obtaining relief, as a successful attempt to get "before a different judge in multijudge courts."[15] Central to public deference to the law is the understanding that the judiciary defines "what is the law," not what a judge thinks...
To continue reading
Request your trial