People v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 10 July 2019
• Docket Number: B292795
• Citation: People v. Jackson, B292795 (Cal. App. Jul 10, 2019)
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEVEN JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEVEN JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.

B292795

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN

July 10, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LA075502)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael V. Jesic and Gregory A. Dohi, Judges. Affirmed.

Stanley Dale Radtke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Steven Jackson appeals from a judgment of conviction for corporal injury to a cohabitant and dissuading a witness entered following our remand in People v. Jackson (Apr. 24, 2018, B264585 (nonpub. opn.) (Jackson I). On appeal Jackson only challenges the trial court's resentencing on remand to a greater term on the corporal injury count than the court previously imposed, although the aggregate sentence was less than the original sentence.

In Jackson I, we concluded the trial court violated Jackson's constitutional right to self-representation by revoking his in propria persona status without considering whether Jackson's conduct affected the integrity of the trial and whether alternative sanctions were appropriate. We agreed Jackson was entitled to a hearing to determine whether his Faretta¹ rights were properly terminated. We also concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding Jackson used a deadly or dangerous weapon (a broom) in the commission of the corporal injury.

We conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded to the trial court for a hearing on whether Jackson's in propria persona status was properly terminated. We stated further, "If the court determines that Jackson is not entitled to represent himself in a new trial, the judgment should be reinstated, but the one-year weapon use enhancement and the five-year enhancement under [Penal Code] section 667, subdivision (a)(1),must be stricken, and Jackson is to be resentenced."² (Jackson I, supra, B264585.)

On remand Jackson abandoned his request to represent himself, and the trial court held a resentencing hearing. The court followed our instruction to strike the one-year enhancement for use of a deadly or dangerous weapon and the five-year enhancement for Jackson having suffered a prior serious felony conviction. However, the court also determined the appropriate sentence on the corporal injury count was the upper term of four years, doubled under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), although the court at trial had previously sentenced Jackson to the middle term of three years, doubled. The trial court sentenced Jackson to an aggregate term of eight years eight months, in contrast to the original sentence of 12 years eight months.

Jackson contends on appeal the trial court, by resentencing him to a higher term on the corporal injury count, exceeded its authority on remand and violated the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. However, interpreting the dispositional language in conjunction with the opinion as a whole, the trial court reasonably understood it had the authority on remand to resentence Jackson. Because the aggregate sentence imposed by the trial court did not exceed the original sentence imposed following trial, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Evidence at Trial³

In 2013 Jackson lived with his girlfriend Laurence Yhuello. On October 6, 2013 they got into an argument that escalated into a physical altercation. During the incident, Jackson wrestled Yhuello to the floor, physically restrained her, and put his hand over her mouth and squeezed her jaw to stop her from screaming. Yhuello went into the bedroom, where Jackson hit her lower back, buttocks, and legs with a small "house" broom with a plastic stick. She sustained noticeable bruises on her buttocks, chin, and arm. (Jackson I, supra, B264585.)

In 2013 Yhuello reported to the police Jackson had strangled her until she could not breathe, pushed her against a wall, slapped the back of her head, and pulled her hair. Photographs from the incident showed she had a black eye, bruised chin, and red marks on her neck. On a prior occasion in 2012 Jackson used a PVC pipe to pin Yhuello to the wall, resulting in red marks on Yhuello's left shoulder area. In a 2009 incident Jackson was in the car with a former girlfriend and tried to grab the steering wheel to pull the car over to the side of the road. Once they were off the highway, Jackson hit her with both fists 10 or 15 times in her jaw, arm, side, and hip. (Jackson I, supra, B264585.)

During the period from October 14 to November 20, 2013 Jackson called Yhuello 42 times from jail. In the recorded calls, Jackson repeatedly told Yhuello not to show up to court and notto mention she saw him with a broom in his hands. (Jackson I, supra, B264585.)

B. The Verdict and Sentencing

The jury found Jackson guilty of corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 1) and dissuading a witness from testifying (§ 136.1, subd. (a); count 3).⁴ The jury also found true the allegation Jackson personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, a broom (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), in the commission of the corporal injury. Jackson admitted he suffered a prior serious felony conviction, constituting a strike within the meaning of the three strikes law and a serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

The trial court sentenced Jackson to an aggregate term of 12 years eight months in state prison. On count 1 the court imposed the middle term of three years, doubled under the three strikes law, plus one year for the weapon use enhancement and five years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. The court imposed a consecutive term of eight months (one-third the middle term) on count 3.⁵

C. Jackson's First Appeal

In Jackson's first appeal, he contended the trial court violated his constitutional right to self-representation byrevoking his in propria persona status without adequate cause. He raised other challenges, including to the trial court's imposition of a sentence enhancement for his use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. We agreed Jackson was entitled to a hearing to determine whether his Faretta rights were properly terminated. (Jackson I, supra, B264585.) We also concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding the broom was a deadly or dangerous weapon. We conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded to the trial court for a hearing on whether Jackson's in propria persona status was properly terminated.

We stated further, "If the court determines that Jackson is not entitled to represent himself in a new trial, the judgment should be reinstated, but the one-year weapon use enhancement and the five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), must be stricken, and Jackson is to be resentenced." (Jackson I, supra, B264585.) We stated in the disposition, "If the trial court finds Jackson's Faretta rights were properly terminated, the court should reinstate the judgment, but strike the one-year enhancement for use of a deadly or dangerous weapon and the five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1)." (Ibid.)

D. Proceedings on Remand

On remand Jackson abandoned his request to represent himself at trial. The trial court,⁶ although acknowledging Jackson was no longer seeking to represent himself, found it had properly terminated Jackson's Faretta rights. The courtexplained that Jackson was using his in propria persona privileges to make phone calls to Yhuello from the jail and would not have followed the court's orders not to have contact with her, affecting the integrity of the trial. During the hearing the trial court noted if Jackson were resentenced at that point to six years eight months in prison (assuming the trial court only struck the one- and five-year enhancements), Jackson would likely be released. The court transferred the matter to the trial court that presided over the trial.

After the transfer, the trial court⁷ initially stated it was "inclined" again to impose the middle term on count 1 for inflicting corporal injury, but requested the parties address whether it should instead impose the lower or upper term. Defense counsel stated her belief the trial court was limited to imposition of the middle or lower term in light of the remand from this court. The prosecutor stated his understanding the trial court could consider imposing the upper term in light of "the manner in which the beatings of the victim did occur." The trial court agreed, and it stated it "would be inclined to impose the high term. Here's why: the vulnerability of the victim and the seriousness of the offense. I can recall the photographs taken of the victim showing significant bruising." The court continued the sentencing hearing for the parties to address whether the court had the discretion to impose the upper term and, if so, whether the upper term was appropriate.

At the continued hearing, the trial court considered the case law cited by the parties and concluded it had the authority to impose the upper term. After hearing argument from counsel,the trial court imposed the upper term on count 2 of four years, doubled under the three strikes law. The court discussed the aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421, that supported the sentence, including "the...