People v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 08 March 1984
• Docket Number: Cr. 43810
• Citation: People v. Jackson, 199 Cal.Rptr. 848, 152 Cal.App.3d 961 (Cal. App. 1984)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur Richard JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 848

199 Cal.Rptr. 848

152 Cal.App.3d 961

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.Arthur Richard JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 43810.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

March 8, 1984.

Certified for Partial Publication.

Hearing Denied May 31, 1984.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Ralph H. Goldsen and Thomas Stanley, Deputy State Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., William R. Weisman and Frederick Grab, Deputy Attys.Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

LUI, Associate Justice.

The major question in this appeal requires us to determine whether the legislative provisions set forth in Penal Code sections 28and29, which limit the scope of psychiatric testimony and abolish the defense of diminished capacity, ¹ deprived appellant of a fair trial.We hold that these provisions are constitutional.We modify and affirm the judgment of conviction and remand the matter for resentencing for the reasons indicated below.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The circumstances of the crime are not in dispute.On January 26, 1981, appellantArthur Richard Jackson saw the film "Defiance," in which actress Theresa Saldana appeared.Two days later, he began to think about killing her.

Nearly a year later, Jackson came to the United States from England and engaged a private investigator to find Saldana's home address.

On the morning of March 15, 1982, he went to her home.A neighbor saw Jackson walking a half block from Saldana's home, carrying a black satchel.Thirty minutes later the neighbor "saw the same gentleman go by again and I thought it was a little different than the ordinary person going back and forth."Jackson walked back and forth three or four times in the next hour.

At 10 a.m., Saldana left her home.As she was about to enter her car she"suddenly heard someone" over her left shoulder.She turned and Jackson "said very slowly, 'Are you Theresa Saldana?' "Saldana immediately attempted to run but Jackson held and stabbed her repeatedly.

Saldana was severely wounded in the chest and thigh.The attack finally ended when a passerby, Jeff Fenn, restrained Jackson until the police arrived.Several nerve tendons in one of her hands were severed as she attempted to wrestle the knife from appellant.She was taken to the hospital "virtually moribund."

While waiting for the police, a witness asked Jackson why he had stabbed Saldana.Jackson replied that it would all be explained by the contents of his black satchel which lay in the street.

The satchel contained a document entitled "Death Sentence Petition" and a diary inscribed with Jackson's name, "Care of the office of Michael, the archangel and vice-president of heaven."

Although the defendant elected not to enter an insanity plea, the defense consisted solely of the expert testimony of two forensic psychiatrists.Through psychiatric testimony, the defense attempted to establish that Jackson had a mental defect which precluded him from having the specific intent, malice aforethought and premeditation necessary to sustain a conviction for attempted murder as charged.²

Prior to the testimony of the psychiatrists, the trial court stated that Penal Code sections 28and29 required that psychiatric testimony be limited to their "opinion as to the mental state of the defendant" at the time of the crime, and barred psychiatric testimony on the ultimate conclusion of law stating that such a conclusion "is for the trier of fact."

The extensive testimony of the defense psychiatrists can be summarized briefly.Jackson was categorized as a chronic paranoid schizophrenic who, since 1952, suffered from an obsessive thought pattern which resulted in compulsive behavior, i.e., "behavior that one pursues without the thought of consequence."As one of the defense psychiatrist testified in plain terms, "the man is crazy."

In the present incident, Jackson believed himself to be acting on behalf of the "Order of the Knights of St. Michael" and the "Kingdom of Heaven."He believed that he was on a divine "mission" to kill Saldana and take her "with [him] to the hearafter [sic ], the better life, God's kingdom."

Jackson himself intended to be executed by the State"with music over the public address system" and "light refreshment for the observers."

Jackson was aware that he had no right to kill Saldana, but "felt that the laws under which he was acting were of a greater force."

Both psychiatrists directly related their diagnosis to Jackson's mental condition at the time of the crime.Dr. Markman testified that Jackson's conduct was "absolutely" a product of his mental disease.

Dr. Stalberg concurred, stating that Jackson's "act was the product of a psychotic compulsion as a result of his chronic paranoid schizophrenia."He defined compulsion as "an act that an individual is driven or forced to carry out by inner psychological mechanisms and an act over which that individual has little or no control, [a] nearly involuntary act."

Dr. Markman testified that a paranoid schizophrenic like Jackson "can look and function in a controlled manner to the point where most other people wouldn't take notice."

The People presented testimony of Dr. Jay Ziskin, Ph.D., a psychologist, as a rebuttal witness who testified that it was his opinion that psychiatrists were "worthless" in reconstructing previous mental states.

Following the issuance of several instructions to the jury over defense objections, the matter was submitted to the jury for its decision.The jury apparently rejected the evidence regarding Jackson's mental state and returned a verdict of attempted murder in the first degree (§§ 187,664) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)).The jury further found that Jackson had used a deadly weapon within the meaning of sections 12022, subdivision (b), and1203.075, and that he had inflicted great bodily injury on Saldana within the meaning of sections 12022.7and1203.075.

The court imposed the high base term of nine years for the attempted murder and imposed an additional three year enhancement on the finding of great bodily injury.The sentence imposed on the assault charge was stayed.

CONTENTIONS.

Appellant contends on appeal that:

1.Sections 28and29 were impliedly repealed by the Truth in Evidence Provisions of Proposition 8.

2.Sections 28and29 are an unconstitutional limit on the due process right to present evidence.

3.The trial court erred in failing to give an instruction relating appellant's psychiatric defense to the mental state issues of malice and premeditation.

4.The trial court erred in instructing the jury on attempted first degree murder by lying in wait, as there was no evidence of concealment.

5.The trial court erred in imposing the aggravated term.

Respondent controverts these contentions.

DISCUSSION

IProposition 8 Is Inapplicable to the Present Case

In his opening brief, Jackson contends that sections 28and29 were impliedly repealed by the Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8.(Cal. Const., art. I, § 28.)However, it is now settled that Proposition 8 is inapplicable where, as here, the crime occurred prior to its enactment.(People v. Smith(1983)34 Cal.3d 251, 193 Cal.Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149.)

IIPenal Code Sections 28and29 Do Not Impose an Unconstitutional Limit on the Due Process Right To Present a Defense

The theory of Jackson's defense at trial was that he did not have the mental state necessary to constitute attempted murder in the first degree.His primary contention on appeal is that the evidentiary restrictions imposed by the Legislature in sections 28and29 are so severe that he was deprived of his due process right to present this defense.

We disagree.For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the restrictions are a legitimate legislative determination on the admissibility of a class of evidence and, in the present case, did not deprive the defendant of his right to present a defense.

A.Penal Code Section 28

Penal Code section 28 precluded Jackson from introducing evidence that he lacked the capacity to formulate malice aforethought and to premeditate.Section 28 limits the admissibility of evidence of mental defect to the issue of "whether the criminal defendant actually formed" the mental state.(Emphasis added.)

Jackson urges that this prohibition deprived him of the right to present a defense as it "deprived appellant of credible evidence from which a reasonable doubt could have arisen."

All "relevant" evidence, of course, is not admissible.Evidence Code section 351 provides: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible."(Emphasis added.)The Legislature has carved out several exceptions where potentially relevant evidence is excluded on grounds of unreliability or public policy.(See, e.g., Evid.Code, § 900, et seq.(privilege) and § 1200, et seq.(hearsay).)

The restrictions of Penal Code section 28 are nothing more than a legislative determination that for reasons of reliability or public policy, "capacity" evidence is inadmissible.

In evaluating the constitutionality of the section, the question is whether the exclusion of capacity evidence prevented Jackson from disproving the mental state necessary to the charge.In other words, whether the restriction deprived Jackson of his constitutional right to require the People to prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.(In re Winship(1970)397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368.)We hold that such exclusion is not of constitutional dimensions.

Admittedly, the question whether mental disease actually prevented Jackson from forming the requisite mental state may be a more difficult question than whether persons suffering from mental disease might have difficulty in general in forming such a mental state.

Jackson, however, has no...