People v. Jackson, Docket No. 88782
| Decision Date | 19 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 88782 |
| Citation | 421 N.W.2d 697,167 Mich.App. 388 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry JACKSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. 167 Mich.App. 388, 421 N.W.2d 697 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[167 MICHAPP 389] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of the Criminal Div., Research, Training and Appeals, and Kim D. Johnson, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
Alvin C. Sallen, Southfield, for defendant-appellant on appeal.
Before DANHOF, C.J., and WEAVER and BATZER, * JJ.
A Detroit Recorder's Court jury convicted defendant of manslaughter, M.C.L. Sec. 750.321; M.S.A. Sec. 28.553, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). Defendant received consecutive sentences of two years' imprisonment on the felony-firearm conviction and five to fifteen years' imprisonment on the manslaughter conviction. Defendant appeals as of right.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the definition of reasonable doubt. We believe it did.
Defendant's conviction arose out of the stabbing death of "Lucky" Barton. John Holloway, the prosecution's chief witness, testified that on the morning of November 22, 1984, he was present in an after-hours bar in Detroit. Defendant and Barton also were present. According to Holloway, defendant and Barton began to argue. During this argument, defendant pulled a pistol on Barton. Holloway also observed a knife lying on a nearby pool table.
[167 MICHAPP 390] As the argument intensified, Holloway secreted himself in the bar's restroom. While in hiding, he heard defendant order Barton to drop to his knees and apologize. He then heard two gunshots. Unable to escape by way of a restroom window, Holloway reentered the main bar where he observed defendant and Barton fighting. Barton was bleeding from both legs. Holloway fled. As he exited from the bar, he observed Barton holding a chair as a shield and defendant holding a knife. The two were moving towards the bar's kitchen.
While Holloway was next door summoning an ambulance, he observed defendant leave the bar with the knife. He returned to the bar moments later and found Barton lying in a pool of blood on the kitchen floor. He then left the bar a second time and again summoned an ambulance. On his return, he discovered Barton lying outside, in the rear of the bar, bleeding profusely from multiple wounds.
An autopsy revealed that Barton died as a result of a stab wound to the right chest which penetrated the liver, causing massive blood loss. It further revealed that Barton had suffered gunshot wounds in each leg above the knee and multiple stab wounds about the body. Defendant admitted shooting Barton, but denied any involvement in the stabbings.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court's instruction to the jury defining reasonable doubt was fatally flawed because it failed to incorporate the "moral certainty" language of CJI 3:1:04 and CJI 3:1:05. 1 The failure to incorporate such language in an instruction defining reasonable[167 MICHAPP 391] doubt does not, by itself, constitute an error warranting reversal. To pass scrutiny the instruction, when read in its entirety, must leave no doubt in the mind of the reviewing court that the jury understood the burden which was placed upon the prosecution and what constituted a reasonable doubt. People v. Powers, 203 Mich. 40, 45, 168 N.W. 938 (1918).
An instruction defining reasonable doubt may not shift the burden of proof by requiring the jurors to have a reason to doubt the defendant's guilt. Rather, the instruction must convey to the jurors that a reasonable doubt is an honest doubt based upon reason. People v. Nickson, 120 Mich.App. 681, 688, 327 N.W.2d 333 (1982). It is a state of mind that would cause the jurors to hesitate when acting in the graver and more important affairs of life. People v. Bradford, 10 Mich.App. 696, 708, 160 N.W.2d 373 (1968), lv. den. 381 Mich. 778 (1968), cert. den. 394 U.S. 1022, 89 S.Ct. 1638, 23 L.Ed.2d 48 (1969); Nickson, supra.
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...that the jury understood the burden that was placed upon the prosecutor and what constituted a reasonable doubt. People v. Jackson, 167 Mich.App. 388, 391, 421 N.W.2d 697 (1988). We review de novo a claim of instructional error. See, e.g., People v. Sammons, 191 Mich.App. 351, 372, 478 N.W.......
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