People v. Jackson, Docket No. 1756

• Decision Date: 01 December 1967
• Docket Number: No. 3,Docket No. 1756,3
• Citation: 8 Mich.App. 643,155 N.W.2d 272
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles JACKSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 272

155 N.W.2d 272

8 Mich.App. 643

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles JACKSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 1756.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 3.

Dec. 1, 1967.

Released for Publication Jan. 15, 1968.

Leave to Appeal Denied May 14, 1968.

John R. Weber, DeFant & Bridges, Negaunee, for appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Edward A. Quinnell, Rpos. Atty., Marquette County, Marquette, for appellee.

Before FITZGERALD, P.J., and BURNS and HOLBROOK, JJ.

HOLBROOK, Judge.

Defendant-appellant was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury and sentenced to a term of 10 to 15 years. Aided by court appointed counsel, defendant, Charles Jackson, Jr., appeals to this Court asking two questions with reference to his preliminary examination: (1) Was the magistrate's finding of probable cause on the charge of second-degree murder defective? (2) Was there sufficient evidence adduced at the preliminary examination to sustain a finding of probable cause that the defendant was guilty of second-degree murder?

The relevant facts as adduced at the preliminary examination are as follows: Defendant, an inmate of Marquette prison, kept a radio in his locker for another inmate, Ronald Eley. The radio had been purchased by Eley from inmate Robert Larson. On January 8, 1965, inmate Larson 'sold' the radio again to inmate Herbert Douglas. That same day, accompanied by Douglas, Larson went to Jackson and obtained the radio from him by representing that Eley knew and approved of the transaction. Later that day, Jackson discovered Larson's deception when Eley denied knowledge and approval of the sale. Around 3 P.M., Douglas, Eley, and Larson became engaged in a heated argument over Larson's deception. A subsequent argument led to a fight in the officer's dining room between defendant Jackson and Larson. Forks and broken chinaware were used. Exactly who initiated this particular fight is unclear: inmate Edward Loney testified that Jackson began to fight, while inmate Melvin Coffey testified that Larson began the fight. Loney also participated in the fight; first by removing several forks from Jackson's hand and then by landing a punch on Jackson's jaw.

When the fighting ceased, Larson and Loney went to the main dining room. Within the space of 3 to 5 minutes after the fight, Jackson went to the kitchen, checked out a butcher knife, entered the main dining room, and stabbed Loney in the back. Seconds later, he also stabbed Larson, inflicting knife wounds in the chest and groin areas. Larson died a couple of days thereafter.

Inmate Jackson was charged with first-degree murder. At the close of the preliminary examination, defendant's counsel moved that the complaint and warrant be quashed because of insufficient evidence as to a homicide charge and, in the alternative, that the complaint and warrant be quashed as to any charge greater than manslaughter. The prosecutor then requested that the charge of second-degree murder be substituted for that of first-degree murder. The examining magistrate granted this request, denied defendant's counsel's motions and bound defendant over to circuit court on a charge of second-degree murder.

In circuit court, defense counsel filed a motion to quash and dismiss the information asserting that the evidence introduced at the preliminary examination was insufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause as to defendant committing the crime of second-degree murder. The motion was denied in a written opinion. Thereafter, defendant stood mute on arraignment, was tried by a jury and found guilty of manslaughter.

1. Was the magistrate's finding of probable cause on the charge of second-degree murder defective?

Defendant's position here is that the examining magistrate misunderstood the concept of 'probable cause' in that his concept of 'probable cause' was not in keeping with the judicially accepted definition found in the landmark case of People v. Dellabonda (1933), 265 Mich. 486, 490, 251 N.W. 594, 595:

'To authorize the examining magistrate to bind appellant over for trial there must have been good reason to believe appellant guilty of the crime charged. Some cases hold a Prima facie case against the accused must be made out. This court has not defined what constitutes probable cause, leaving each case to be determined upon its facts. Bouvier defines probable cause as, 'A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that a person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.' (3) Bouvier's Law Dict. (Rawle's 3d Ed.) p. 2728.' Also, see People v. Karcher (1948), 322 Mich. 158, 33 N.W.2d 744.

At the conclusion of the preliminary examination, the examining magistrate stated orally:

'The court finds that there is probable cause to bind this defendant over to the circuit court on the charge of murder in the second degree. I think there was sufficient breaking in the original fight, the defendant did have the chance to get into the kitchen, he decided to get a knife and appeared normal enough to the officer in charge that he was able to get the knife, and he voluntarily walked back into the room where the two men were, one standing and one seated. I think that is a jury question rather than a question for this court on a preliminary examination. I feel that it is reasonable to believe that the defendant might be guilty of this charge of murder in the second-degree and I think this case should be sent over to the circuit court on this ground and I make that ruling and will send the case over and he is remanded to the warden's custody.'

It appears that defendant's position rests on a technicality--i.e., claiming that the use of the word 'might' by the examining magistrate evidences a misunderstanding on his part of the concept of 'probable cause.' We find a similar question to have been put before this Court in People v. Wolfe (1967), 5 Mich.App. 543, 147 N.W.2d 447. A consideration of the above oral statement of the examining magistrate In its entire context leads us to dispose of the present question in the words of Judge Fitzgerald in People v. Wolfe, supra, appearing at p. 553, 147 N.W.2d at p. 453:

'Niceties in terminology should not thwart the law enforcement process and we...