People v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 25 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 117594.,117594.
• Citation: 465 Mich. 390,633 N.W.2d 825
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael T. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

633 N.W.2d 825

465 Mich. 390

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael T. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 117594.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

September 25, 2001.

Rehearing Denied and Opinion Modified November 8, 2001.

Michael T. Jackson, defendant, in propria persona.

PER CURIAM.

In 1985 the defendant was found guilty following a bench trial of first-degree murder, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. In 1998, he filed a motion for relief from judgment under MCR subchapter 6.500. Relief was denied by the circuit court, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Defendant has filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court. In addition to arguing the substantive issues, he maintains that the limitations on relief provided by MCR 6.508(D) should not apply to him because his conviction predated the effective date of the rule. He claims that it would constitute a due process violation to apply the rule retroactively to his case.

We conclude that the subchapter 6.500 procedures do apply to convictions before the effective date of the rule and that there is no constitutional impediment to doing so. On the facts of this case, the defendant has not established entitlement to relief as required by MCR 6.508(D), and the order of the circuit court denying relief is affirmed.

I

On December 13, 1983, a fourteen-yearold girl was beaten to death in her Saginaw County home. Attention focused on the defendant when it was learned that he had been there that day. Defendant was then sixteen years old, and thus proceedings began in the probate court. After several days of waiver hearings, the juvenile division of the probate court waived jurisdiction on August 20, 1984, and the defendant was bound over on a charge of first-degree (premeditated) murder.

Defendant waived a jury and presented an insanity defense, making no effort to dispute that he killed the victim. The circuit judge found him guilty as charged on April 18, 1985, and imposed the mandatory life sentence on May 31, 1985. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied in an opinion issued November 21, 1986.

Defendant appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed on September 7, 1988.¹ We denied leave to appeal on April 25, 1989.² In his direct appeal, among other issues, the defendant raised claims regarding the waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile division of the probate court and the admissibility of his confession.

In July 1998, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment in the Saginaw Circuit Court, once again challenging the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and the admissibility of his confession. He also argued that MCR 6.508(D) should not be applied retroactively to his case.

The circuit court's consideration of the motion took place in several stages. First, on August 12, 1998, the court³ issued an opinion and order dealing with the issues regarding admissibility of the defendant's statement.

The court noted that the voluntariness of the defendant's statement had been tested in both the juvenile court and the circuit court with evidentiary hearings under People v. Walker, 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965), and resolved against the defendant. Further, on his initial appeal, the defendant raised for the first time the question of police compliance with former Juvenile Court Rule 3.3. The Court of Appeals held that no miscarriage of justice would result from failure to review the objections, but went on to say that despite the police failure to carry out their duties under JCR 3.3, defendant's statement was properly admitted under the totality of the circumstances.

Finally, the circuit court addressed the defendant's new claim that the confession was inadmissible as the product of an illegal arrest. The court discussed the issue at length, finding no error. It said:

While it is true that only a short time elapsed between defendant's seizure and statement, he was, during that period, twice advised of his Miranda⁴ rights. Nor does the Court find the police conduct in this case particularly flagrant or of such character as to justify the remedy sought. It is undeniable the police lacked probable cause to arrest defendant at his residence. They did, however, clearly have a right and need to question him about his presence at the victim's home and any knowledge he may have had of the killing. In this regard, the entire purpose of taking him into custody was not to place him under arrest, but to hold him until he could properly be questioned in the presence of his father. Although there apparently was a failure to comply with all appropriate procedures governing questioning of a minor, the officers were at least aware that different procedures and rules applied and did their best to comply with them. There is nothing in this case to suggest that their actions were part of some illegal plan or scheme or product of improper motivation. As noted above, no attempt was made to question defendant until his father was present. Mr. Jackson was contacted as soon as possible, arriving at the post a short time after his son. Both of them were given Miranda warnings and the defendant made his statement. As noted by the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the father was not fully able to exercise his free will and protect the rights and interests of his son. Under the circumstances, the Court finds that any taint of initial police misconduct was sufficiently purged and the statement admissible under the Fourth Amendment. It follows that any neglect of trial or appellate counsel in failing to raise this issue was of no consequence. For the same reasons, it also follows that any consent obtained from the defendant and his father to search the premises in question was voluntary and otherwise proper, and that any evidence seized as the result of that consensual search was properly admitted at trial.

The court then turned to the other issue raised in the motion regarding the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction. The circuit court said that from the motion and supporting brief it could not say that the issue raised was without merit and that defendant was plainly not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the court ordered the prosecutor to respond to the motion.

Following the response, the court issued a second opinion and order on May 28, 1999, rejecting the defendant's claim. After reviewing the testimony, as well as the applicable legal principles, the court concluded:

Having reviewed the testimony presented, this Court is not left with any firm and definite conviction defendant was improperly waived to the adult system. Although there was sufficient indication that Michael was amenable to treatment and that the juvenile system could provide the type of treatment required, the evidence and testimony clearly supports the conclusion that there simply was not enough time to sufficiently resolve the underlying psychological problems that helped trigger this tragic event before Michael reached nineteen and juvenile jurisdiction ended, and that he would likely remain a danger to the public if released at that time. Nor does the Court find, as suggested by defendant, that the Probate Judge ignored key testimony or otherwise misinterpreted the evidence. In this regard, the Court notes that while Michael could have been placed in Yorkwood and then transferred to the adult unit at Ypsilanti State Hospital at age eighteen, there would be no way to ensure continued treatment after age nineteen except through a petition for involuntary commitment and hospitalization. Although Judge Barber made no mention of Yorkwood in his opinion, he apparently found, and this Court agrees, that the scenario envisioned by defendant was neither likely [n]or viable. In summary, the Court finds the decision to waive jurisdiction to be supported by substantial and credible evidence on the record.

It follows that any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must also fall.

Defendant filed a delayed application for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the application, "for failure to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508."⁵

II

Subchapter 6.500 of the Michigan Court Rules, containing the procedure for motions for relief from judgment, was added by order of March 30, 1989, and was effective October 1, 1989. It was part of an overall revision of the rules governing criminal procedure. The amendments adopted at that time included several related provisions applicable to criminal appeals, including the addition of MCR 7.205(F)(2), limiting a criminal defendant to a single appeal by right or leave from a conviction, and the amendment of MCR 7.205(F)(3) to make the eighteen-month limit⁶ on granting delayed application for leave to appeal applicable to criminal cases.

The rules themselves, and the order adopting them, did not say anything about the applicability of the rules to cases that had already been commenced or cases involving crimes committed before the effective date of the amendments. The general provision of the Michigan Court Rules regarding the application of the rules to pending actions is MCR 1.102, which provides:

These rules take effect on March 1, 1985. They govern all proceedings in actions brought on or after that date, and all further proceedings in actions then pending. A court may permit a pending action to proceed under the former rules if it finds that the application of these rules to that action would not be feasible or would work injustice.

Those principles have been applied not only to the initial adoption of the rules, but also to later adopted or amended rules. See Reitmeyer v. Schultz Equipment & Parts Co., 237 Mich.App. 332, 337, 602 N.W.2d 596 (1999). Subchapter 6.500 has been consistently applied in cases involving convictions and appeals concluded before October 1, 1989, by both this Court and the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., People v....