People v. Jackson

Decision Date28 September 2018
Docket NumberNo. 1-17-1773,1-17-1773
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

PRESIDING JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant Kevin Jackson was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, convictions this court affirmed on direct appeal. The State's case rested on the prior inconsistent statements of three eyewitnesses. By the time of trial, each of those witnesses had recanted, telling the jury that their previous statements identifying Mr. Jackson as the shooter were the result of police coercion. Mr. Jackson now appeals from the denial of his motion seeking leave to file a successive postconviction petition, which is supported by documents he contends establish a pattern and practice of misconduct by the group of detectives responsible for the investigation that led to his trial and conviction. Mr. Jackson argues that the circuit court incorrectly determined that this new evidence of a pattern and practice of police misconduct was insufficient to establish either a freestanding claim of actual innocence or to make the threshold showing of cause and prejudice otherwise necessary to file a successive petition. He asks us to reverse the circuit court's order and to remand this matter either for a second-stage hearing, to determine if there is a substantial basis for his claimed constitutional violations, or for a third-stage evidentiary hearing, on the basis that he has already made such a showing.

¶ 2 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court's order denying Mr. Jackson leave to file his successive petition. The new evidence that Mr. Jackson presents does not support a freestanding claim of actual innocence. And although we are mindful of the difficulties faced by defendants seeking to uncover and document police misconduct, we are unable to conclude that Mr. Jackson has met the high bar here of showing both cause and prejudice. The documentation offered in support of his motion—which we have scrutinized with care—fails to draw sufficient connections between the specific acts of police coercion alleged in this case and a pattern and practice of similar misconduct by the same officers.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 At approximately 1:30 a.m. on May 6, 2001, Ernest Jenkins drove his car to a Citgo gas station on the corner of Damen Avenue and 55th Street in Chicago. The car's passengers—Michael Watson and Michael's nephew, Stanley "Meechie" Watson—exited the vehicle to pump and pay for gas. Shots rang out, and Michael and Mr. Jenkins were both struck. Michael survived, but Mr. Jenkins died of his injuries later that same day. Following a police investigation, Mr. Jackson was arrested on June 19, 2001. In July 2001 he was indicted by a grand jury on multiple counts, including first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm.

¶ 5 The evidence presented at trial was summarized in this court's order affirming Mr. Jackson's convictions on direct appeal (People v. Jackson , 364 Ill. App. 3d 1050 (2006) (table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 ), and that summary has been largely adopted by both the circuit court in its postconviction orders and the State in this appeal. However, we have restated many of the facts here because we believe that some of the details that are omitted from that Rule 23 order are relevant to showing how close the evidence was at trial.

¶ 6 A. Evidence Presented at Trial

¶ 7 At trial, the State's theory of the case was that the shooting was a turf dispute involving members of rival gangs. According to the State, Mr. Jackson, known in the neighborhood as "Googie" or "Googy," was a Vice Lord who shot at Meechie Watson, a Gangster Disciple, because the gas station Meechie stopped at was in Vice Lord territory and because, while at the gas station, Meechie talked to Mr. Jackson's girlfriend, Quiana (sometimes referred to as Quina) Davis. Although Meechie escaped unharmed, Michael Watson and Ernest Jenkins, finding themselves between Mr. Jackson and his target, were both shot, and Mr. Jenkins was killed.

¶ 8 To support its theory, the State relied on the signed statements of four eyewitnesses—Brandy Butler (also known as Brandy Grant or Brandi Grant), Vernon Clay, Manuel "Manny" Stewart, and Shemika Mason—which were admitted into evidence pursuant to section 115-0.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) ( 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2000) ). That section of the Code provides that prior inconsistent statements are substantively admissible if the witness is subject to cross-examination at trial and the statements were made from personal knowledge and were written or signed by the witness. In their statements, each of these witnesses identified Mr. Jackson as the shooter and indicated that he or she was treated well by the police and not promised anything in exchange for signing a statement. Three of the witnesses—Ms. Butler, Mr. Clay, and Mr. Stewart—also testified before a grand jury, where they confirmed the accuracy and truthfulness of their signed statements.

¶ 9 At trial, however, none of these witnesses identified Mr. Jackson as the shooter. They instead each testified that they had been threatened and coerced by detectives into signing the statements and giving the grand jury testimony implicating Mr. Jackson. No forensic evidence connected Mr. Jackson to the crime, and Michael Watson, the surviving victim and the only other eyewitness to the shooting who testified at trial, stated unequivocally that Mr. Jackson looked nothing like the man who shot him.

¶ 10 These prior statements, refuted on the stand by the witnesses who gave them, were the evidence of Mr. Jackson's guilt that was presented at trial. The trial testimony of each of the witnesses, and how it differed from their pretrial statements, is discussed below.

¶ 11 1. The Recanting Witnesses
¶ 12 a. Brandy Butler

¶ 13 In her signed pretrial statement given to the police and Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Colleen Daly and in her grand jury testimony, Ms. Butler stated that on May 6, 2001, Manny Stewart drove her, Mr. Jackson, Quiana Davis, and Mario Brown to the Citgo gas station in a car Mr. Stewart and Mr. Jackson owned together. As Ms. Butler exited the vehicle, she saw Meechie Watson, who called out to her and Ms. Davis. Ms. Butler continued into the gas station to make a purchase and, while inside, heard four or five gunshots, looked out the window, and saw Mr. Jackson, a member of the Vice Lords, firing a gun in the direction of Meechie, a Gangster Disciple. Ms. Butler said she then got down on the floor and did not see where anyone went.

¶ 14 At trial, however, Ms. Butler denied that Mr. Jackson was the shooter. She testified instead that she had known Mr. Jackson for "[a] long time," that they had grown up in the same neighborhood, and that he was "nowhere around" at the time of the shooting. Ms. Butler testified that she arrived at the gas station with Mr. Stewart, Ms. Davis, and Mr. Brown and, as she was standing in line inside the gas station, she heard "ten or more" gunshots and "hit the ground."

¶ 15 Ms. Butler gave the following explanation for how she came to sign her statement identifying Mr. Jackson as the shooter:

"I just was ready to go because I was harassed. I was everything. I was three months pregnant. I was going through a lot. I'm stressed out still right now to this day 'cause I lied on him. They had me to lie on him. They told—they coerced me, Judge, I promise you. They made this story up. They kept saying Googie did it. He did not do it. He was nowhere around. And I'm not saying that for the simple fact, you know, that I'm scared of anybody. He didn't do it. He was nowhere around. He was not in the car with us. * * * The detectives would not listen to me. They was not trying to hear anything. They told us that if we did not say who did that, that it would be crimes on us 'cause we was there that night at the gas station. And I was just ready to go. And I'm sorry for what I did and I just signed the statement on you because I was ready to go and they said we was gonna beat that case and I just did it because I have kids. I was there that night. I wish I wasn't there. It was a nightmare.
* * *
A. And I'm suffering now for what I did.
(Witness crying.)
THE COURT: Do you want some water, Miss?
A. No. Thank you, ma'am."

¶ 16 b. Vernon Clay

¶ 17 According to his signed pretrial statement given to Detective Brian Forberg and ASA Lisa Hennelly, Vernon Clay was also at the gas station at the time of the shooting and had walked, not driven, there with Ms. Butler and Ms. Mason. When they arrived, Mr. Clay said they saw Ms. Davis "jumping out of [Mr. Jackson's] car." He explained that Mr. Jackson and Ms. Davis were "fooling around but [we]re not boyfriend and girlfriend." Mr. Clay told police that he and Mr. Jackson were members of the Vice Lords, and at the gas station that night they saw Meechie, a Gangster Disciple, who "started talking to [Ms. Davis] about messing around." Mr. Clay said that he, Ms. Butler, Ms. Mason, Ms. Davis, and Meechie all went into the gas station, while Mr. Jackson and Mr. Stewart remained in their car. Meechie and Ms. Davis were still talking together when the group exited the gas station. It was then that Mr. Clay heard gunshots. He looked up and saw Mr. Jackson fire about eight shots into a parked car and Meechie running away. Mr. Jackson then ran from the scene.

¶ 18 Mr. Clay recounted a similar version of events in his grand jury testimony. Instead of saying that Ms. Davis was getting out of Mr. Jackson's car when Mr. Clay, Ms. Butler, and Ms. Mason arrived, however, he said that Ms. Davis had walked to the gas station with them. Mr. Stewart also said that Meechie loudly sexually...

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3 cases
  • People v. Wilson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 4. Februar 2022
    ...knowledge of evidence that could help the defendant convince a jury of this fact. We explained this in People v. Jackson , 2018 IL App (1st) 171773, 436 Ill.Dec. 506, 143 N.E.3d 1, stating:"We *** reject the notion, *** that we should focus on whether the information [the averring witness] ......
  • People v. Martinez
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 29. Juni 2021
    ...504 said, both Hobley and the case before us involve the second stage. Compare People v. Jackson , 2018 IL App (1st) 171773, ¶ 71, 436 Ill.Dec. 506, 143 N.E.3d 1, aff'd on other grounds , 2021 IL 124818, 450 Ill.Dec. 782, 182 N.E.3d 594 (following Hobley ), with Jackson , 2018 IL App (1st) ......
  • People v. Jackson
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 19. Februar 2021
    ...court denied petitioner leave to file the successive postconviction petition, and the appellate court affirmed. 2018 IL App (1st) 171773, 436 Ill.Dec. 506, 143 N.E.3d 1. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.¶ 3 BACKGROUND¶ 4 Petitioner was tried before ......

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