People v. Jackson

Decision Date17 April 1989
Docket NumberNo. 3-88-0545,3-88-0545
Citation537 N.E.2d 1054,181 Ill.App.3d 1048,130 Ill.Dec. 725
Parties, 130 Ill.Dec. 725 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul L. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Verlin R. Meinz, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Michael Brandt, Ottawa, for Paul L. Jackson.

Judith Z. Kelly, States' Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, John A. Barra, State's Atty. of Peoria County, Peoria, for the People.

Justice SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury found the defendant, Paul L. Jackson, guilty of residential burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 19-3(a)). The trial court sentenced him to the minimum four-year term of imprisonment required by law. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(4).) He appeals, asking this court to reduce the degree of his offense.

The evidence showed that on the evening of June 2, 1986, Gail Scholl discovered that five to six dollars in change, some cans of soup, and some candy bars were missing from her kitchen cabinet. Upon discovering that the items were missing, she called the police. Crime scene technician Gary Siebenthal responded to the call. Siebenthal was able to lift from the change jar a fingerprint matching the defendant's right ring finger.

The evidence also showed that the defendant lived in an apartment adjacent to the victim's apartment. The defendant testified at trial that he worked for the landlord and had keys to all of the apartments. He claimed that he was working for the landlord on the day in question and entered the Scholl apartment to complete some work on her toilet. He admitted that while he was in her apartment he took money from a jar.

Gail Scholl testified that her landlord had explained to her that the defendant was his handyman. She noted that the defendant had a key to her apartment and stated that approximately one or two weeks before the items were stolen she had asked the defendant to come into her apartment to fix her toilet. Scholl testified that the defendant did not have permission to be in her apartment at any other time.

Detective John Mingus of the Peoria Police Department testified that he spoke with the defendant on March 4, 1988, almost a year and a half after the incident. Mingus stated that he asked the defendant about the time he entered the Scholl apartment without permission. Detective Mingus recalled that the defendant told him that he was doing some odd jobs at the apartment complex on the day in question. Mingus stated that the defendant further told him that he became hungry, entered the Scholl apartment, took five or six dollars in change from a jar in the apartment, and went to a convenience store to buy food.

Following closing arguments, jury instructions were given on the offense of residential burglary, but not on any lesser included offenses of that crime. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, a hearing was held on the defendant's post-trial motion. One of the defendant's allegations in the motion was that he had not understood the concept of lesser included offenses. The defendant's motion was denied.

At the defendant's sentencing hearing, the court noted that the mandatory minimum sentence for residential burglary was four years (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(4)), and that under the laws of Illinois neither a period of probation, nor a term of periodic imprisonment, nor a conditional discharge was an appropriate disposition for the offense (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3(c)(2)(G)). The judge then stated that "the court has no choice in pronouncing a sentence in this case other than the penitentiary, and no less than four years. If the law were otherwise, the court would seriously consider some sentence less than that which is required."

On appeal, the defendant asks this court to mitigate his unduly harsh sentence by reducing the degree of his offense from residential burglary to theft. In support of his argument, the defendant contends that the evidence was weak on the element of whether he intended to commit a felony when he entered the apartment. He also notes that the trial court reluctantly imposed the mandatory sentence.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3) (107 Ill.2d R. 615(b)(3)) authorizes a reviewing court to reduce the degree of an appellant's offense. The power granted by Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3) should be exercised with caution and circumspection, but the fact that such powers have been granted to a reviewing court is indicative of the fact that situations arise where an appellate court must in the interest of the fair and uniform administration of justice exercise the powers granted by the rule; among the relevant factors in assessing whether a reduction of an offense is warranted are whether an evidentiary weakness exists and whether the trial judge expressed dissatisfaction with imposing the mandatory sentence. (People v. Coleman (1979), 78 Ill.App.3d 989, 34 Ill.Dec. 510, 398 N.E.2d 185.) However, an expression of dissatisfaction by the trial judge regarding the sentence to be imposed will not by itself mandate that the degree of the offense be reduced; and we will not reduce the degree of the offense solely out of merciful benevolence since there must be some evidentiary weakness before a reviewing court will act. People v. Meadows (1981), 92 Ill.App.3d 1028, 48 Ill.Dec. 373, 416 N.E.2d 404. An analysis of the evidence in the instant case discloses evidentiary weaknesses regarding whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent. In order to sustain a residential burglary conviction, the State must prove that the defendant possessed the intent to commit a theft at the time of his unauthorized entry into the victim's dwelling. (People v. Morrison (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 828, 70 Ill.Dec. 512, 449 N.E.2d 859.) In the instant case the evidence revealed that...

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14 cases
  • People v. Hernandez
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 29 Mayo 1992
    ...because of the "evidentiary weakness of the State's [case] or the basic unfairness of the result." (See People v. Jackson (1989), 181 Ill.App.3d 1048, 130 Ill.Dec. 725, 537 N.E.2d 1054.) The power to reduce the degree of an appellant's offense should be exercised with caution and circumspec......
  • People v. Godfrey
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 23 Mayo 2008
    ...sentence that is unsatisfactorily harsh, and (3) a conviction for a lesser-included offense. People v. Jackson, 181 Ill.App.3d 1048, 1051-52, 130 Ill.Dec. 725, 537 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (1989). "Evidentiary weakness" means something that causes the appellate court to have grave concern about th......
  • People v. Hamilton, 4-94-0961
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 25 Septiembre 1996
    ...the intent to commit a theft at the time of his unauthorized entry into the victim's dwelling." People v. Jackson, 181 Ill.App.3d 1048, 1051, 130 Ill.Dec. 725, 728, 537 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (1989). In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to permit the inference of intent, the relevan......
  • People v. Clauson, 87-0806
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 17 Abril 1989
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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