People v. Jaffray

• Decision Date: 07 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 95144,95144
• Citation: 445 Mich. 287,519 N.W.2d 108
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas JAFFRAY, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 108

519 N.W.2d 108

445 Mich. 287

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas JAFFRAY, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95144.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Oct. 7, 1993.

Decided June 7, 1994.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training and Appeals, and Don W. Atkins and Karen D. Woodside, Asst. Attys. Gen., Detroit, for people

Suzanne Carol Schuelke, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Justice.

Following a bench trial, this defendant was found guilty of kidnapping by secret confinement. ¹ Because third parties became aware of the victim's detention, the Court of Appeals determined that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We disagree and reverse.

I

Defendant Thomas Jaffray, Jr., and two codefendants, brothers Ronald and Martin Normandin, were charged and tried jointly for kidnapping ² as a result of acts committed before the fatal beating of Bruce Williams on August 13, 1987, in the basement of a house that Williams, the victim, shared with the codefendants. ³ Another resident of the home, Francis Hamilton, was accused of beating the victim with a nail-studded baseball bat, which resulted in Williams' death. Hamilton was tried separately for first-degree murder. ⁴

At the bench trial of Jaffray and his two codefendants, the prosecution called six witnesses and presented three statements that had been given to the police, one by each of the three codefendants. References in each statement to either of the other two codefendants were blocked out, ⁵ and the three redacted statements were placed in evidence by stipulation. None of the codefendants testified and they called no witnesses.

The record reflects little dispute concerning the sequence of events that preceded the killing of Williams. On August 13, 1987, Ronald Normandin arrived home at about 3:30 a.m. and noticed that his dog, a pit bull terrier, was missing. Later that morning in the living room of the home, codefendants Ronald and Jaffray confronted and accused Williams of taking the dog. Initially, Williams claimed the dog had been stolen. However, after Jaffray threatened him with the nail-studded bat, Williams admitted that he had sold the dog for $20 to buy crack cocaine.

Upon further questioning, Williams indicated that the dog could be located at a house on Puritan Street several blocks away. After securing this information, handcuffs were placed on Williams' wrists, which were shackled behind his back. Jaffray then tied Williams' feet with rope and attached the rope to the handcuffs. ⁶

Williams offered to participate in an initial search for the dog, but Jaffray refused. Instead, Jaffray stayed behind to guard Williams while one of the other codefendants set out in Jaffray's car to locate and retrieve the pit bull. ⁷ However, the codefendant soon returned after an unsuccessful search. Williams then provided additional information concerning the dog's location. Again, Jaffray refused to allow Williams to help search for the dog. This time, Jaffray and a codefendant departed while, at Jaffray's suggestion, the other codefendant stayed behind to guard the victim for the duration of the search, which lasted approximately fifteen minutes. ⁸

Although the specific time frame of this episode is unclear from the record, it is fixed in part by the testimony of Curtis Kennedy, a friend of Williams who lived across the street. Kennedy testified that, when he attempted to visit Williams between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., ⁹ he met Ronald Normandin outside the Normandin home, where Ronald indicated that Williams was "dog-tied" upstairs because he had sold the pit bull for crack cocaine. Kennedy further testified that he heard Williams' cries for help coming from the upstairs portion of the house. ¹⁰ Kennedy then ran home and informed his mother, Minnie Collins, of his discovery.

After this disclosure, Mrs. Lois Normandin, mother of the Normandin brothers, warned the codefendants that Williams had been "making a lot of noise" while they were out searching for the dog. ¹¹ Unbeknown to anyone outside the home, Jaffray and a codefendant then took Williams to the basement, ¹² where Jaffray placed a "gag" in Williams' mouth and tied him to a pole with an extension cord. ¹³ Later, while Williams remained confined in the basement, ¹⁴ Hamilton allegedly bludgeoned Williams to death with the nail-studded bat. ¹⁵

Minnie Collins called the police at approximately 10:20 a.m. When the officers arrived at 11:25 a.m., Collins told them that Williams was in the Normandin house "bound and gagged." The police then attempted to search the Normandin home, but were denied entrance for approximately twenty minutes. ¹⁶ They eventually entered the home, but did not find Williams after a brief inspection.

Thereafter, at approximately 12:55 p.m., the police were again summoned to the Normandin home. After talking with the victim's mother, Ruth McClinton, the officers attempted to reenter the home, but again met resistance. Eventually, the officers gained access to the home and found Williams' plastic-wrapped body in the basement.

Following a bench trial, the trial judge acquitted Martin Normandin, but found Jaffray and Ronald Normandin guilty of kidnapping as charged. With respect to Jaffray and Ronald, the court specifically found "beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim Bruce Williams was forcibly confined or imprisoned ... that during the course of said confinement the Defendants [Jaffray and Ronald Normandin] kept the location of the victim secret ... [and] that the two Defendants ... intended the confinement to be secret."

In his appeal in the Court of Appeals, defendant Jaffray argued, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of secret confinement kidnapping. The panel agreed and reversed his conviction. We then granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal. 442 Mich. 935, 503 N.W.2d 910 (1995).

II

In determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, an appellate court is required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hampton, 407 Mich. 354, 368, 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979), cert. den. 449 U.S. 885, 101 S.Ct. 239, 66 L.Ed.2d 110 (1980). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and People v. Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 515, 489 N.W.2d 748 (1992).

The elements of the offense of "kidnapping" are not easily set forth in a short, simple statement. As Justice Boyle, writing for this Court, explained in People v. Wesley, 421 Mich. 375, 365 N.W.2d 692 (1984), Michigan's kidnapping statute ¹⁷ encompasses six forms of conduct, each of which constitutes the crime of kidnapping. There the Court said,

"[A] person can be convicted of kidnapping if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she wilfully, maliciously, and without lawful authority,

"(a) forcibly or secretly confined or imprisoned any other person within this state against his will, or

"(b) forcibly carried or sent such person out of this state, or

"(c) forcibly seized or confined, or inveigled or kidnapped any other person

"(1) with intent to extort money or other valuable thing thereby, or

"(2) with intent either

"(A) to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this state against his will, or

"(B) [to cause such person to be] in any way held to service against his will." Wesley, supra, p. 383, 365 N.W.2d 692.

Although this articulation may appear to enumerate only five forms of kidnapping, the Court further explained:

"The portion of the statute contained in (a) above actually contains two separate descriptions of punishable conduct: forcible confinement or imprisonment and secret confinement or imprisonment." Id., p. 384, 365 N.W.2d 692.

At issue in Wesley was whether the specific intent portion of the statute "applies to all of the forms of conduct which precede it or applies only to the form of conduct which immediately precedes it, i.e., 'forcibly seize or confine, ... or inveigle or kidnap.' " Id., p. 383, 365 N.W.2d 692 (emphasis in original). The Wesley Court concluded that "the 'intent section' of the statute applies only to the form of conduct which immediately precedes it," ¹⁸ and, therefore, does not apply to that portion of the statute which prohibits any person from "forcibly or secretly confin[ing] or imprison[ing] any other person within this state against his will...." ¹⁹ In other words, three of the six formulations of kidnapping within the Michigan statute do not require a showing of specific intent:

(1) forcible confinement or imprisonment of another within this state;

(2) secret confinement or imprisonment of another within this state; or

(3) forcible carrying or sending of another out of this state.

This important distinction in the statutory framework comports with the judicial purpose of deterring prosecutorial overcharging in connection with the kidnapping statute. People v. Otis Adams, 34 Mich.App. 546, 192 N.W.2d 19 (1971) (opinion of Levin, J.). Although "asportation" is not mentioned in the statute, asportation of the victim is a judicially required element of the crime of "kidnapping by forcible confinement or imprisonment," having been read into the statute to sustain its constitutionality by distinguishing true kidnapping from common-law false imprisonment and other lesser crimes. People v. Adams, 389 Mich. 222, 205 N.W.2d 415 (1973). ²⁰

However, a showing of asportation is not required where the accused is charged with either secret confinement of the victim or forcible confinement with intent to secretly confine the victim. As this Court explained in Wesley, "no movement is required...