People v. Jahner

• Decision Date: 27 September 1989
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 82867,83123 and 83124,82868
• Citation: 446 N.W.2d 151,433 Mich. 490
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Monica JAHNER, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricky Leon JONES, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George DUDGEON, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jimmie Ralph TIPSWORD, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 151

446 N.W.2d 151

433 Mich. 490

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Monica JAHNER, Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricky Leon JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George DUDGEON, Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jimmie Ralph TIPSWORD, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 82867, 82868, 83123 and 83124.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 5, 1989.

Decided Sept. 27, 1989.

David L. Morse, Pros. Atty., Livingston County by Daniel J. Garber, Jr., Chief Asst. Prosecutor, Howell, Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Counsel of Record, Lansing, Judy H. Hughes, Pros. Atty., William E. Molner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, L. Brooks Patterson, Pros. Atty., Oakland County, Robert C. Williams, Chief, Appellate Div. by Thomas S. Richards, Asst. Pros. Atty., Pontiac, for the People.

James Sterling Lawrence, Detroit, for defendants-appellees, George Dudgeon and Jimmie Ralph Tipsword.

State Appellate Defender Office by Fred E. Bell, and Susan Meinberg Thomas, Asst. Defenders, Lansing, for Monica Jahner.

State Appellate Defender Office by F. Michael Schuck, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for Ricky Leon Jones.

OPINION

GRIFFIN, Justice.

In each of the four cases before us, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548. We have consolidated these cases on appeal to decide the limited issue whether a person sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is eligible for parole consideration under M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304(4) and the proper retroactive effect of such a decision. We conclude that the existing statutory scheme governing conspiracy and its punishment does not preclude parole consideration for defendants convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Our decision has retroactive application.

I

Defendants Tipsword and Dudgeon were convicted by a jury in 1975 of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendants and two others conspired, for pay, to kill an Oak Park resident because of a "family problem." The planned murder was foiled when, on the night in question, the mother of the intended victim refused to answer a suspicious late night knock on the door of her residence and instead called the police. Defendants fled the scene and were apprehended shortly thereafter. In a consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendants' convictions and, upon remand ordered by this Court for the purpose of deciding the present issue, held that defendants were eligible for parole consideration.

Defendant Jones was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiring to kill two business partners. The plan was thwarted when the assassin selected by the defendant turned out to be a state trooper. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions and subsequently held upon remand that defendant's sentence was nonparolable. 167 Mich.App. 424, 423 N.W.2d 590 (1988).

Defendant Jahner was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and assault with intent to murder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction and ten to twenty years imprisonment for the assault. Defendant conspired with another person to kill her stepmother. The victim was injured in the murder attempt, but recovered and testified at trial. Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder was ultimately held by order of the Court of Appeals to be a nonparolable offense.

Upon application for leave to appeal in this Court, these four cases were consolidated for consideration of the parole eligibility issue.

II

The present question involves the interplay of three statutes. The conspiracy statute was enacted as 1966 P.A. 296. It reads, in relevant part:

"Any person who conspires together with 1 or more persons to commit an offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty of the crime of conspiracy punishable as proven herein:

"(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) if commission of the offense prohibited by law is punishable by imprisonment for 1 year or more, the person convicted under this section shall be punished by a penalty equal to that which could be imposed if he had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit and in the discretion of the court an additional penalty of a fine of $10,000.00 may be imposed." M.C.L. Sec. 750.157a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.354(1).

Thus, the penalty for conspiracy is vicarious and depends upon the target offense penalty where the target offense is punishable by imprisonment for one year or more. The defendants in the instant cases were charged with and convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548, the first-degree murder statute, reads:

"Murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or other wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate arson, criminal sexual conduct in the first or third degree, robbery, breaking and entering of a dwelling, larceny of any kind, extortion, or kidnapping, is murder of the first degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for life."

Finally, the so-called "lifer law" provides that those convicted of the substantive crime of first-degree murder are not eligible for parole consideration:

"A prisoner under sentence for life or for a term of years, other than prisoners sentenced for life for murder in the first degree and prisoners sentenced for life or for a minimum term of imprisonment for a major controlled substance offense, who has served 10 calendar years of the sentence is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board and may be released on parole by the parole board...." M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304(4). ¹ (Emphasis added.)

Although a statute may appear to be unambiguous on its face, "it can be rendered ambiguous by its interaction with and its relation to other statutes." 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Sec. 46.04, pp 86-87. Such is the case here. The question of parole eligibility for defendants convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder cannot be answered by reference to the conspiracy statute alone, since that statute, by its terms, does not address the parole issue. Similarly, although the first-degree murder statute provides for mandatory life imprisonment, it too is silent with respect to parole implications. What makes first-degree murder a nonparolable offense is the "lifer law," which specifically excludes persons convicted of first-degree murder from the jurisdiction of the Parole Board after serving ten calendar years of the sentence. However, the "lifer law" does not similarly exclude defendants convicted of the crime of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder from the scope of its coverage. This is the heart of the present controversy over which the Court of Appeals panels have split evenly in the present cases. Should the express exclusion of first-degree murder from parole eligibility be extended by implication to the crime of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder? ² We are constrained to respond in the negative.

III

In each of the cases before us, the crime which was the object of the conspiracy did not come to fruition. None of the intended victims was killed. That the intended murders in these cases never occurred does not detract from the seriousness of the offenses, see People v. Fernandez, 427 Mich. 321, 336, 398 N.W.2d 311 (1986); however, it does underscore an important distinction between the crime of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and the crime of first-degree murder itself:

"It is a settled principle of black-letter law that conspiracy is a crime that is separate and distinct from the substantive crime that is its object. LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, Sec. 62, p 494; People v. Tinskey, 394 Mich 108; 228 NW2d 782 (1975); People v. Chambers, 279 Mich 73; 271 NW 556 (1937). The guilt or innocence of a conspirator does not depend upon the accomplishment of the goals of the conspiracy." People v. Carter, 415 Mich 558, 569; 330 NW2d 314 (1982).

While defendants in these cases were found guilty of an extremely heinous offense, it cannot be said that they were convicted of first-degree murder. Accordingly, the parole prohibition in the "lifer law" which expressly applies to first-degree murder does not apply to the separate and distinct crime of conspiracy to commit that offense.

Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed:

"It is a fundamental rule of construction of criminal statutes that they cannot be extended to cases not included within the clear and obvious import of their language. And if there is doubt as to whether the act charged is embraced in the prohibition, that doubt is to be resolved in favor of the defendant. In other words, nothing is to be added by intendment." People v. Ellis, 204 Mich. 157, 161, 169 N.W. 930 (1918).

This rule is most commonly applied in defining those actions that come within the scope of a statutory prohibition. As explained in People v. Willie Johnson, 75 Mich.App. 221, 225, 255 N.W.2d 207 (1977), aff'd 406 Mich. 320, 279 N.W.2d 534 (1979):

"The principle requires that doubtful conduct be found not criminal. In large part, the principle in those cases is based on the idea of notice, but this rule of strict construction of penal or criminal statutes also reflects the idea that it is the job of the Legislature to define criminal offenses and punishment. Restraint by the courts in interpreting criminal statutes works to avoid judicial...