People v. James
| Decision Date | 30 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1-18-0509 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George JAMES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Alison L.S. Shah, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Brian K. Hodes, and Craig Taczy, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant George James was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the drug evidence seized. In addition, defendant contends that the State's closing argument was unduly prejudicial, inflammatory, and not based on the trial evidence. We affirm.
¶ 3 Defendant was arrested and then charged with the above-stated drug offense after police observed him around noon on October 9, 2015, making three drug deals from a garage in Chicago's North Lawndale neighborhood. Trial evidence established the following.
¶ 4 Chicago police detective Jose Duran testified that on the day in question, he was then an officer conducting narcotics surveillance on the 1600 block of South Hamlin Avenue, a residential area. At that time, he also maintained radio contact with his team of enforcement officers, some of whom were in a car. Using a monocular (defined as one-half of binoculars) and with an unobstructed daytime view, Officer Duran set up surveillance in front of two houses on the Hamlin Avenue side of the street. From there, he spotted defendant through the monocular riding his bike up and down in the alley near Ridgeway Avenue. Meanwhile, Officer Duran saw another person working on a car in the nearby vacant lot.
¶ 5 Defendant alighted from his bike and gestured for a male Hispanic, who was walking northbound in the alley, to come over. The two spoke briefly, and defendant pocketed the man's money. Defendant then walked into an open garage1 two houses north of 18th Street, where he stood next to a waist-high blue container, which appeared to be a 50-gallon drum. The drum was open and exposed on the top. Defendant reached inside and picked up a cloth material, which he manipulated, then pulled out a plastic bag containing several items bearing some sheen to them. Defendant removed an item, pushed the bag back inside the cloth, and placed the cloth back inside the drum. Defendant returned to the man and presented the item so as to complete what Officer Duran, in his experience, believed was a hand-to-hand drug transaction. The man then left the alleyway, while defendant remained. Defendant essentially repeated this same hand-to-hand transaction with two other individuals.
¶ 6 Following the third drug deal, Officer Duran saw defendant return to the garage, grab the cloth, and remove the bag from it, obtaining an item. He then put the bag and cloth back. Defendant placed the item in his left pocket as he exited the garage. Defendant began biking northbound in the alley towards 16th Street, and Officer Duran subsequently followed defendant via car, detaining him just over a block away. On encountering Officer Duran, defendant said, Officers then obtained the tinfoil packet containing suspect heroin from defendant's left pants pocket and arrested him.
¶ 7 Meanwhile, via radio, Officer Duran had directed Officers Honda and John Sandoval to proceed to the garage and check inside the blue drum. Officer Sandoval (now a sergeant) testified that the drum had no lid and was filled with plastic. Inside, on top of the plastic, officers discovered a dirty cloth glove containing a plastic bag with 18 folded tinfoil packets of suspect heroin. Defendant was ultimately found with headphones, a cellphone, its case, a charger, and $64. At trial, testimony from a forensic scientist confirmed the packets contained heroin.
¶ 8 Following this evidence, the State rested, and the defense moved for a directed verdict. The defense argued that the State failed to meet its burden because Officer Duran's testimony was incredible and his procedures questionable. For example, Officer Duran did not demonstrate that he had obtained consent before sending enforcement officers into the garage to search the bin, and police had not ascertained who owned the garage. The trial court denied the motion, noting that such issues should have been raised in an earlier motion.
¶ 9 For his theory of defense, defendant denied the drug deals. Defendant's lifelong friend, Darryl Moore, who had himself previously pled guilty to a felony drug offense, testified on defendant's behalf that around noon on the day in question, they were both working together inside the garage at 1650 Ridgeway Avenue, fixing a car. While there, Moore did not see defendant go into any containers, nor did he see defendant approach anyone in the alley or give or receive anything from anyone. Instead, defendant merely left the garage to go to the store, but Moore did not then see defendant speak with anyone. While Moore saw the police, he did not speak with them. Moore saw the police later enter the same garage that he and defendant had been working inside.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, Moore acknowledged he did not know what time they arrived at the garage that day, but defendant was there for several hours. Similarly, he noted that defendant never returned from the store that day or showed up thereafter, and Moore did not have defendant's number. Moore later learned he had been arrested. Moore never spoke to the Chicago police or state's attorney's office about the matter.
¶ 11 After the defense rested, the State argued in closing that, on the day in question, defendant got up, "went to work," and, like most of the public, went into "his office." However, his job happened to be one of a "drug dealer," his office was a garage, and heroin was his product. The prosecutor then contrasted that with the police officers’ "job," which was to work "the streets of Chicago" and "keep the community safe." Later, the prosecutor again noted that, on the day in question, defendant "went to do his job" of selling drugs, with only one problem—"his job is a crime." The prosecutor then urged the jury to do its "job" and noted, "Your job [is] to take the evidence that was presented in this case through the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits and apply the facts of this case to the law that you're going to receive." The prosecutor noted when the jury did that, it would find defendant guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
¶ 12 In response, defense counsel noted that the State was "right about one thing"—defendant "did go [to] his office that morning," which was the garage. "His job was to work on cars." The defense then went on to attack Officer Duran's credibility and argued that the evidence was uncorroborated.
¶ 13 In rebuttal, the State sought to establish the evidence and testimony as credible, reasonable, and supported. The prosecutor asserted that on the day in question, the officers sought to "rid that neighborhood of someone plaguing it with narcotics sales" and "did their job." The prosecutor urged the jury members to use their common sense, "[l]ook at everything," and "come out head held high with" a guilty verdict, since that is what the evidence and justice demanded. Other points were argued in closing and rebuttal, which shall be discussed further below.
¶ 14 Following evidence and argument, the jury found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.2 The trial court sentenced defendant, based on his prior record as a Class X offender, to 10 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed.
¶ 16 Defendant first contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the drug evidence. Under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v. Dupree , 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 44, 429 Ill.Dec. 398, 124 N.E.3d 908. As to a suppression motion, the decision whether to file it is generally " ‘a matter of trial strategy, which is entitled to great deference.’ " People v. Gayden , 2020 IL 123505, ¶ 28, 443 Ill.Dec. 259, 161 N.E.3d 911 (quoting People v. White , 221 Ill. 2d 21 (2006)). To establish prejudice resulting from failure to file such a motion, a defendant must show that the unargued suppression motion is "meritorious"—i.e. , that it would have succeeded—and that a reasonable probability exists that the trial outcome would have been different without the challenged evidence. People v. Henderson , 2013 IL 114040, ¶¶ 12, 15, 370 Ill.Dec. 804, 989 N.E.2d 192. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the result at trial, and actual prejudice must be shown rather than mere speculation as to prejudice. People v. Bew , 228 Ill. 2d 122, 135, 319 Ill.Dec. 878, 886 N.E.2d 1002 (2008) ; People v. Graham , 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476, 276 Ill.Dec. 878, 795 N.E.2d 231 (2003).
¶ 17 On appeal, defendant contends that police violated his fourth amendment right to privacy in his "effects" and therefore defense counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress constituted ineffective assistance, as the motion would have been meritorious and changed the trial...
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