People v. Jameson

• Decision Date: 19 September 1944
• Docket Number: No. 27986.,27986.
• Citation: People v. Jameson, 387 Ill. 367, 56 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1944)
• Parties: PEOPLE v. JAMESON.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

387 Ill. 367

56 N.E.2d 790

PEOPLE

v.JAMESON.

No. 27986.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 19, 1944.

Error to Circuit Court, Jackson County; Loyd M. Bradley, Judge.

William Harold Jameson pleaded guilty to the crime of murder and was sentenced to death, and he brings error.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.Fletcher Lewis, of Murphysboro, for plaintiff in error.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and Glenn O. Brown, State's Atty., of Carbondale (Orwin H. Pugh, of Carbondale, of counsel), for defendant in error.

FULTON, Chief Justice.

This writ of error is brought to review the judgment of conviction and sentence to death entered against the plaintiff in error by the circuit court of Jackson county upon a plea of guilty to the crime of murder as charged in the indictment.

On January 10, 1944, the regular grand jury for the January term of the circuit court of Jackson county convened, was impaneled and made its report to the court.Four days after the report of the regular grand jury, Harry Bidwell, a DuQuoin taxi driver was shot and killed by the plaintiff in error.Plaintiff in error was arrested, and on January 21 an order was entered by the presiding judge of the circuit court that ‘the Public Interests require the ordering of a special Grand Jury for action on certain alleged criminal offenses coming up since the regular Grand Jury has completed its work and been discharged * * *.’Thereupon a special grand jury was impaneled on January 22, and an indictment returned against the plaintiff in error charging him with murder.On the morning of the same day, after the return of the indictment, the plaintiff in error was arraigned in open court and, as appears from the docket sheet and common-law record, was furnished with a copy of the indictment, a list of the People's witnesses and the jurors at the then term of court.From these records it appears that the court then asked the plaintiff in error if he had an attorney or wanted one, to which the plaintiff in error replied that he did not, and for his plea said he was guilty of the charge laid in the indictment; that thereupon the court explained the plaintiff in error's rights to a trial by jury and to be represented by counsel, whereupon Judge W. F. Ellis, an attorney, was appointed to advise with and represent the plaintiff in error and to aid the court in presenting any and all evidence in mitigation and to advise the court fully of the facts of the crime so as to fix a just and proper punishment; that plaintiff in error was thereupon admonished of the consequences of his plea and the penalties thereupon were explained, but plaintiff in error persisted in his plea; that the cause was then continued for hearing and investigation of the facts and circumstances of the crime, and for fixing the penalty, to January 29, 1944, at which time same was continued to February 5, 1944; that on February 4, 1944, through attorney Fletcher Lewis, the plaintiff in error filed a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty; that on February 14, a hearing on the motion was had wherein attorney Lewis appeared for the plaintiff in error, and the motion was denied by the court.Thereupon another motion to expunge from the records the docket entries that the plaintiff in error had been furnished with a copy of the indictment and a list of the People's witnesses was filed and denied by the court after argument.The hearing then proceeded on mitigation.

The motion of the plaintiff in error to withdraw his plea of guilty to the indictment set forth that the plaintiff in error was not guilty of the murder but had a good defense worthy of consideration by a jury; that the ends of justice would be best served by his case being submitted to a jury; that after consulting with his attorney there is a reasonable doubt of his guilt; that the plea of guilty was entered through a misapprehension of the law; that the plaintiff in error was of the age of twenty-two years, unfamiliar with court procedure, went only as far as the fourth grade in the Kentucky country school and was among strangers; that at the time of the plea he knew nothing about the law of self-defense and did not know that if he believed, as a reasonable person, at the time of the killing in question that he was about to lose his life or suffer great bodily harm at the hands of another and that if, acting under such belief, he fired the shots which killed the deceased, such killing would be justifiable self-defense; that this was first pointed out to him by Judge Ellis who visited the defendant in the county jail after the plea of guilty had been entered; that he was told by Judge Ellis at said time that Judge Ellis had been appointed by the court as a representative of the court and not to represent the defendant; that defendant had no opportunity and did not consult with any attorney until after his plea of guilty had been entered and he had been returned to the county jail; that if the law had been explained to him he would not have entered a plea of guilty; that the only other attorney he consulted with was attorney Lewis, whom he first saw on the day of the filing of the motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and who was employed by his father and sister; that when Judge Ellis first talked to him he asked him why he had pleaded guilty and that he answered that he had, in fact, killed the deceased and that he thought he was pleading guilty to such killing and did not understand any of his rights as to defenses; that at no time was he ever furnished with a copy of the indictment nor with a list of the witnesses.The motion and affidavit then continued with a statement of the facts setting forth the claim on the part of the plaintiff in error that the killing was committed in self-defense, and concluded with an affidavit.

In support of the motion and affidavit Judge Ellis testified that the court had called him before the plea of guilty was entered and had indicated to him that if accused did not have counsel, the court would appoint him; that he was appointed by the court to look into the question of the defendant's guilt and that he was appointed at the time of the arraignment; that about an hour and a half after the appointment he went to see the defendant for the first time, whereupon he asked the defendant why he had entered a plea of guilty, to which the defendant replied that he had killed the man and was guilty thereof but did not know he had a right to kill him; that he explained to the plaintiff in error that he was not representing him but was appointed by the court to inquire to see if there were any mitigating or extenuating circumstances.

On February 14 and 15, a hearing was held on mitigation, and the defendant was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death in the electric chair, March 15, 1944, being fixed as the date for execution.On February 25, after a motion in arrest of judgment had been filed, the date of execution was changed to March 23, 1944, same being ten days after the first day of the next Supreme Court term as provided by law.Orders were thereupon entered on application of the plaintiff in error suspending the warrant and allowing prosecution of the writ of error as a poor person to this court.

It is conceded that the sentence of death is erroneous for the reason that the date set for execution was less than fifty days from the time judgment was pronounced.This would only necessitate, however, the reversal and remandment of the case for proper sentence.People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596, 44 N.E.2d 569.

In the view we take of this case, it will only be necessary to review two of the errors assigned.First, it is contended by the plaintiff in error that the order of the circuit court calling a special grand jury was void.Section 19 of the Jurors Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, chap. 78, par. 19, provides: ‘The judge of any court of record of competent jurisdiction may order a special venire to be issued for a grand jury at any time when he shall be of opinion that public justice requires it.’

It is urged in this court for the first time that the order calling the special grand jury was a void order since it recited that ‘public interests' required the calling of the special grand jury and not ‘public justice’ as provided by the statute.The question arises, therefore, as to whether or not the call of the grand jury by the circuit court as required by ‘public interests' is sufficient to create a legally constituted grand jury.

The rule in regard to objections to the organization of a grand jury was announced in People v. Gray, 261 Ill. 140, 103 N.E. 552, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 1215, where it was held that irregularities in constitutio...