People v. Jaramillo
| Citation | 183 P.3d 665 |
| Decision Date | 10 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 06CA0312.,06CA0312. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary JARAMILLO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Corina Gerety, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Leslie A. Goldstein, Attorney at Law, L.L.C., Steamboat Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge LOEB.
Defendant, Gary Jaramillo, appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree assault-serious bodily injury. We affirm.
Defendant pushed his wife (the victim) onto a television stand and struck her face several times following a verbal altercation. The victim was ultimately taken to the hospital and was treated for injuries to her face. At trial, a nurse practitioner, who treated the victim at the hospital, testified that the victim suffered fractured cartilage in her nose.
The verbal altercation began with defendant and the victim arguing about what defendant claimed to have seen in family pictures. Defendant insisted that several family pictures contained threats, and the victim told him that she could not see what he saw. Also, according to her, defendant had falsely accused her of infidelity that morning and had been doing so for some time.
Defendant was charged with second degree assault. He admitted hitting the victim, but argued at trial that he did not intend to cause bodily injury and that she did not actually suffer serious bodily injury. After a trial to a jury, defendant was convicted of second degree assault. This appeal followed.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by not granting his motion for a mistrial following his objection to the introduction of prior bad act evidence. We disagree.
A mistrial is a drastic remedy and is warranted only when prejudice to the accused is so substantial that its effect on the jury cannot be remedied by other means. People v. Perea, 126 P.3d 241, 246 (Colo.App. 2005). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial. Id.
At trial, the prosecutor asked the victim on direct examination to explain the circumstances surrounding the argument that led to the assault. As pertinent here, she testified that the argument had "been building," and that defendant had been accusing her of infidelity and was "always very angry and very accusative" of her during their marriage.
Defendant objected, arguing that this testimony was unresponsive. The court asked the prosecutor to narrow the scope of the question. The prosecutor then asked the victim to explain what she meant by "building up." The victim answered: "[T]he jealousy, the extreme jealousy, and the extreme possessiveness of me." Defendant objected again, this time arguing that the victim's testimony was "going to a prior bad" act for which defendant had not been given prior notice. On this basis, defendant requested a mistrial. The prosecutor briefly responded that the victim's testimony was relevant to defendant's intent rather than a prior act and that the prosecution was entitled to explore "what was going on during the marriage."
The trial court overruled defendant's objection and denied his request for a mistrial. The court concluded the victim's testimony was admissible because it went to defendant's intent. The court further found that the victim had not referred to any specific prior bad acts, and it warned the prosecution not to inquire about specific prior acts or arguments between defendant and the victim. The prosecution then moved on to the details of the argument that led to the assault.
On appeal, defendant does not contend that the challenged testimony was irrelevant or inadmissible under CRE 404(b) as evidence of other acts. Rather, he only contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a mistrial because the admission of the victim's testimony regarding defendant's accusations of infidelity violated CRE 403. We are not persuaded.
Evidence of other acts that are part of the criminal episode or transaction with which the defendant is charged is res gestae evidence that is admissible to provide the fact finder with a full and complete understanding of the events surrounding the crime and the context in which the charged crime occurred. People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Colo.1994); Perea, 126 P.3d at 246.
Conversely, evidence of other acts that are independent from the charged offense is generally "not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity" with the evidence of other acts. CRE 404(b); see also Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1373 n. 12.
Regardless of whether evidence of other acts is admissible as res gestae or for a permissible purpose under CRE 404(b), evidence of other acts may be excluded if it is irrelevant, CRE 402, or "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." CRE 403; see Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1374 (); People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1320-21 (Colo.1990) (). CRE 403 strongly favors the admission of material evidence, and a trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. People v. District Court, 869 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Colo.1994).
On review, we give the evidence the maximum probative value attributable by a reasonable fact finder and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably expected. People v. Gibbens, 905 P.2d 604, 607 (Colo. 1995); People v. Kenny, 30 P.3d 734, 740 (Colo.App.2000). We will not disturb the trial court's evidentiary rulings on review absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1374; District Court, 869 P.2d at 1285.
We agree with the People's contention on appeal that, because the challenged testimony is part and parcel of the criminal episode for which defendant is charged, the evidence of defendant's jealousy and accusatory behavior was admissible as res gestae evidence. See Quintana, 882 P.2d at 1373 & n. 11 ().
The issue is thus whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence in violation of CRE 403. The evidence challenged here was pertinent to the res gestae of the crime charged and was probative of defendant's intent. Nothing in the record indicates the jury relied on an improper basis for its decision. Giving the evidence the maximum probative value and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably expected, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony. See District Court, 869 P.2d at 1285; Kenny, 30 P.3d at 740.
Accordingly, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. See Perea, 126 P.3d at 246.
Defendant next contends the trial court erred by admitting the victim's hearsay statements through the testimony of the nurse practitioner. We discern no reversible error.
"Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" are not excluded as hearsay. CRE 803(4). The rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule is that statements made to a physician are presumptively reliable because of a patient's belief that the effectiveness of the treatment he or she receives may depend largely upon the accuracy of the information provided to the physician. People v. Galloway, 726 P.2d 249, 252 (Colo.App.1986).
To ensure that evidence admitted under CRE 803(4) meets the rule's rationale, the court must determine (1) whether the declarant's motive is consistent with the purpose of the rule, and (2) whether it is reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment. People v. Stiles, 692 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Colo.App.1984), overruled in part by King v. People, 785 P.2d 596, 599 n. 3 (Colo.1990).
Here, the prosecution called a nurse practitioner who treated the victim to testify about her injuries. As she began to testify that the victim stated that she had been involved in a domestic dispute, defendant objected on hearsay grounds. The trial court overruled the objection, apparently relying on the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule. The witness then completed her answer, testifying that the victim "stated she had been involved in a domestic dispute with her significant other."
Defendant contends the type of dispute and the identity of the victim's assailant were irrelevant to both the victim's treatment and diagnosis and, therefore, the trial court erred by admitting the nurse practitioner's testimony under CRE 803(4).
We conclude the record does not indicate that the type of dispute or identity of the assailant was necessary for or pertinent to the nurse practitioner's diagnosis or treatment. Under these circumstances, we agree with defendant that the challenged statements were inadmissible hearsay. See People v. Allee, 77 P.3d 831, 835 (Colo.App.2003); Galloway, 726 P.2d at 253.
However, the record also shows the challenged statements were cumulative of testimony by the victim and an investigating officer. Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of this other testimony, nor did he do so at trial. Indeed, defendant never argued at trial that he was not the person who assaulted the victim or that the fight was not a result of a domestic dispute. We thus...
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