People v. Jarvis

• Decision Date: 23 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2–14–1231.,2–14–1231.
• Citation: 405 Ill.Dec. 211,58 N.E.3d 18
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Ronald JARVIS, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

58 N.E.3d 18

405 Ill.Dec. 211

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Ronald JARVIS, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 2–14–1231.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Feb. 23, 2016.

Joseph H. McMahon, State's Attorney, of St. Charles (Lawrence M. Bauer and Joan M. Kripke, both of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

Thomas A. Lilien and Bruce Kirkham, both of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Elgin, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice ZENOFF

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The State appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County granting defendant Ronald Jarvis's motion to suppress evidence found during a strip search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. Because the search warrant authorized a search of defendant's person for narcotics, the strip search was within the scope of the warrant and did not violate the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV

), the search-and-seizure clause of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6 ), or the privacy clause of article I, section 6 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6 ). Therefore, we reverse and remand.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by information with one count of manufacture or delivery of 1 or more but less than 15 grams of a controlled substance (cocaine) within 1,000 feet of a school (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1)

, 401(c)(2) (West 2012)) (count I), one count of manufacture or delivery of 1 or more but less than 15 grams of a controlled substance (heroin) within 1,000 feet of a school (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1), 401(a)(2) (West 2012)) (count II), one count of manufacture or delivery of 1 or more but less than 15 grams of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2012)) (count III), one count of manufacture or delivery of 1 or more but less than 15 grams of heroin (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1) (West 2012)) (count IV), one count of possession of less than 15 grams of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2012)) (count VII), one count of possession of less than 15 grams of heroin (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1) (West 2012)) (count VIII), and two counts of aggravated battery of a peace officer ( 720 ILCS 5/12–3.05(d)(4)(i)

(West 2012)) (counts V and VI). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the controlled substances found during the strip search.

¶ 4 The following facts are taken from the hearing on the motion to suppress. On August 1, 2013, Officer Kevin Stankowitz of the Carpentersville police department applied for a warrant to search both defendant and his vehicle. The complaint for the search warrant stated, among other things, that there were reasonable grounds to search “[t]he person” of defendant. The complaint incorporated Officer Stankowitz's affidavit.

¶ 5 The affidavit stated, among other things, that on approximately July 31, 2013, a confidential source purchased MDMA (ecstasy) and heroin from defendant. Both purchases occurred in defendant's car.

¶ 6 The trial court issued a search warrant. The search warrant authorized a search of defendant's vehicle and “[t]he person of [defendant].” The search warrant described the things to be seized as including “[a]ny and all [controlled] substances” and “[p]araphernalia used in the manufacture, processing, delivery or use of a controlled substance.”

¶ 7 On August 2, 2013, Officer Stankowitz stopped defendant while defendant was driving the car described in the search warrant. After doing so, Officer Stankowitz had defendant exit the vehicle and showed him the search warrant. He then handcuffed defendant, patted him down, and searched his pockets. Officer Stankowitz found $90 but no weapons, contraband, or controlled substances.

¶ 8 Officer Stankowitz then had defendant transported to the police station. At the station, defendant was placed in an interview room. The video cameras and the door window were covered to maintain privacy.

¶ 9 Officer Stankowitz told defendant that defendant was going to be strip searched. With Officer Murphy of the Carpentersville police department present, Officer Stankowitz had defendant remove defendant's pants and underwear. After doing so, defendant was “naked from the waist down.” Defendant and both officers are male.

¶ 10 Officer Stankowitz, who was behind defendant, asked defendant to squat and cough

. According to Officer Stankowitz, one of the reasons for having defendant do so was to “separate the butt cheeks so that [he] could better visually see between them.” He added that after defendant squatted he was “better able to see * * * between [defendant's] butt cheeks.”

¶ 11 While defendant was squatting, Officer Stankowitz could see a piece of toilet paper between defendant's buttocks. As a result, he asked defendant to “squat down further and spread his legs further” so that he could visually examine the piece of toilet paper. When defendant squatted down further, the piece of toilet paper fell to the floor. Inside the toilet paper was a clear plastic baggie containing a controlled substance. When defendant squatted, he did not use his hands to spread his buttocks. Nor did either officer touch defendant's buttocks, anus, or genitals.

¶ 12 Officer Stankowitz admitted that he neither obtained written permission from his supervisor nor completed an authorization form for the strip search. When asked why not, he responded that he did not believe that he needed to do so, because defendant was searched pursuant to the search warrant.

¶ 13 In denying the State's motion for a directed finding, the trial court ruled that the search warrant did not authorize the strip search. The court explained that it had not been provided the affidavit in support of the warrant, which might indicate that “contraband was likely to be contained somewhere on or in the defendant's body.” The court added that, if the affidavit established probable cause to that effect, “then the search warrant would have authorized the search.”

¶ 14 After the court denied the motion for a directed finding, the State introduced the search warrant, the complaint for the search warrant, the supporting affidavit, and the return. After reviewing those documents, the court granted defendant's motion to suppress. Following the denial of its motion to reconsider, the State filed a certificate of impairment pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1)

(eff. Feb. 6, 2013) and a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, the State contends primarily that the strip search was constitutional because it was within the scope of the search warrant, which authorized a search of defendant's person. Defendant responds that the search violated both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970

because the search warrant and the supporting documents did not specify a strip search.¹

¶ 17 In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we greatly defer to the trial court's findings of fact and will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 22, 381 Ill.Dec. 593, 10 N.E.3d 1196

. We review de novo the court's legal ruling on whether the evidence should be suppressed. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 22, 381 Ill.Dec. 593, 10 N.E.3d 1196.

¶ 18 A defendant bears the burden of proof on a motion to suppress. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 23, 381 Ill.Dec. 593, 10 N.E.3d 1196

. If a defendant makes a prima facie showing that the evidence was obtained illegally, then the burden shifts to the State to provide evidence to counter the prima facie case. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 23, 381 Ill.Dec. 593, 10 N.E.3d 1196. The ultimate burden of proof, however, remains with the defendant. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 23, 381 Ill.Dec. 593, 10 N.E.3d 1196.

¶ 19 At the outset, we emphasize what is not at issue in this case. The strip search did not involve any physical intrusion into defendant's body. Rather, it was limited to a visual examination of the exterior of defendant's body. We recognize that the visual examination of defendant's buttocks might have exposed defendant's anus. However, there was no visual inspection of the interior of defendant's anus, let alone any physical intrusion. Therefore, those cases addressing the propriety of a body-cavity search (see, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)

), or other physical intrusion into the body (see, e.g.,

Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) ), are not controlling.

¶ 20 In addressing whether the strip search violated the fourth amendment, we initially note that the police conducted the strip search pursuant to a search warrant.²

That is significant because the United States Supreme Court has historically expressed a strong preference that police obtain a search warrant before conducting a search. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105–06, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)

(the informed and deliberate determinations of judges empowered to issue warrants are preferred over the hurried actions of police officers, and, in a doubtful or marginal case, a search under a warrant might be sustainable where without one it would fail). We certainly agree. Recognizing that the strip search was conducted pursuant to an otherwise valid search warrant, defendant maintains only that the strip search exceeded the scope of the warrant.

¶ 21 The fourth amendment requires that a search warrant particularly describe both the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. People v. Bui, 381 Ill.App.3d 397, 410, 319 Ill.Dec. 235, 885 N.E.2d 506 (2008)

(quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97, 126 S.Ct. 1494, 164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006) ). A search warrant is sufficiently descriptive if it enables a police officer executing it, with reasonable effort, to identify the place to be searched. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill.2d 109, 149, 306 Ill.Dec....