People v. Jasper

• Decision Date: 29 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99SC987.,99SC987.
• Citation: 17 P.3d 807
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Everett W. JASPER, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

17 P.3d 807

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Everett W. JASPER, Respondent.

No. 99SC987.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

January 29, 2001.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing February 20, 2001.

Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Christine Cates Brady, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Petitioner.

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Katherine Brien, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Respondent.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this appeal we hold that a trial court possesses the inherent authority to impose a plea cutoff deadline as part of its case management responsibilities provided the parties have notice of the deadline. If the parties seek to tender the plea after the deadline, then they have the burden to establish good cause to bypass the deadline. Here, they have failed to do so. The determination of good cause in this context rests with the sound discretion of the trial court.

In this case, the prosecution, the petitioner before us, reached a plea agreement with the respondent, defendant Everett Jasper, which the trial court rejected as untimely because the parties failed to tender it before the expiration of a court-imposed plea cutoff deadline. On appeal, the court of appeals in People v. Jasper, 984 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Colo. App.1999) reversed, holding that the trial court acted arbitrarily because it failed to consider the terms of the proposal before rejecting the plea bargain. In addition, the court of appeals held that the trial court acted arbitrarily by rejecting the plea agreement solely because the parties failed to meet the trial court's plea cutoff deadline. Id.

The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to determine the terms of the plea bargain, to consider the propriety of the agreement, and to state its reasons for rejecting or accepting the agreement. Id. The court of appeals directed that if the trial court accepts the agreement, then that court is to vacate the defendant's convictions and resentence the defendant. Id. If the trial court rejects the plea, then it is to return the case to the court of appeals for resolution of issues raised but not determined on appeal. Id.

We perceive the issue in this case more narrowly than did the court of appeals and consequently address only the question of whether a court may exercise its procedural authority to reject a plea agreement when the parties miss a plea cutoff deadline. We hold that a trial court may impose and enforce a plea cutoff deadline as part of its case management authority. In order to prevent arbitrary rejection of untimely pleas, however, a trial court must provide adequate notice to the parties of the plea cutoff deadline and must permit an exception to the deadline for good cause. The parties, not the court, bear the burden of establishing an exception to the plea cutoff deadline. Unless the parties specifically inform the court of facts constituting good cause, the parties waive any objection to the court's enforcement of the deadline.

Applying these legal principles to this case, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion by enforcing its plea cutoff deadline. Although we disapprove of the way that the trial court summarily cut short the prosecutor when he attempted to explain the proposed plea bargain, our review of the entire trial record convinces us to hold that the parties had notice and failed to state good cause to tender an untimely plea agreement. Hence, we conclude that the court did not act arbitrarily by enforcing the plea cutoff deadline. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to that court to address other issues raised but not resolved on appeal.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant appeals his jury convictions for the crimes of first degree assault, felony criminal mischief, vehicular eluding, felony menacing, and driving after judgment prohibited.¹ On the Friday before the Monday when the defendant's trial was to begin, the court held a pretrial hearing in part to determine whether the case was ready for trial or if the parties had reached a plea agreement. Neither party informed the court of a plea agreement.

On the morning of trial, after jury selection, the prosecutor stated that the parties had agreed to a plea bargain. The court rejected the plea agreement without considering its terms, asserting that, by failing to tender the bargain by the previous Friday, the parties had missed the plea cutoff deadline. The trial judge stated that the only agreement he would accept was a complete dismissal of all charges or pleas of guilty to all charges:

Prosecution: Your honor, if we — it's come to my attention, and I understand how Your Honor is going to be probably somewhat upset at this point — prior to picking the jury, we had discussed plea negotiations —

The Court: Call your first witness.

Prosecution: And now he's indicated he wants to plead.

The Court: No. There won't be any pleas. What I will take right now is dismissal by the People or guilty to all charges. Only two things. Proceed with your first witness. That's why we have pretrial hearings on Friday, to make certain that this doesn't happen.

The case then proceeded to trial, resulting in convictions. At sentencing, the defendant recounted the negotiation history. He said the prosecutor made several offers before the plea cutoff deadline. One of these included reducing the First Degree Assault charge to Second Degree Assault. The defendant stated he rejected these offers because he "would not plead to a charge that [he] did not commit, nor intend to commit." He also said these offers did not include drug rehabilitation treatment, which the defendant stated was part of early plea negotiations upon which he relied to waive his preliminary hearing. The defendant said that, after jury selection, the prosecutor offered, for the first time, to dismiss the assault charge completely. Although drug rehabilitation was not mentioned by the prosecutor then, the defendant agreed to the offer because he "felt that it was [in his] best interests." The precise terms of the proposed plea bargain are unclear, as is the sequence of negotiations. However, neither the prosecutor nor the defense counsel corrected or clarified the defendant's statements.

On appeal, the court of appeals addressed our rule of criminal procedure and statute which mandate that the court exercise independent judgment when deciding to accept or to reject a plea bargain. See Crim. P. 11(f)(5); § 16-7-302(3), 6 C.R.S. (2000). The court reasoned that exercising independent judgment cannot be done arbitrarily, but rather that a court's discretion when making this determination is subject to limitations. Jasper, 984 P.2d at 1186-87. Relying in part on federal circuit court cases, see United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1995);²United States v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir.1990),³ the court of appeals implicitly held that failure of the trial court to state the reasons for rejecting a plea agreement constituted an arbitrary rejection of the plea. Such an action failed to demonstrate that the court exercised independent judgment and thus constituted an abuse of discretion. Jasper, 1984 P.2d at 1186-87. Hence, the court concluded that by rejecting the bargain of the parties without considering the terms of the agreement, the trial court acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion. Id. at 1187.

Additionally, the court of appeals ruled that the trial court's sole reason for rejecting the plea bargain, that it was presented on the day of trial, was insufficient to justify a rejection of the plea agreement. Id. Again relying on Robertson, the court found that "[w]hile a trial court has considerable authority in managing its docket, scheduling concerns, even though of great importance to busy trial judges, are not sufficient by themselves to justify a rejection of a plea bargain." Id.

The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to determine the precise terms of the proposed agreement, consider whether to accept the agreement, and to state its reasons for rejecting or accepting the decision on the record. Id. The court of appeals instructed that, if the trial court accepts the plea agreement, then that court should vacate the defendant's conviction and sentence. Id. On the other hand, if the trial court rejects the proposed plan, then the court must return the case to the court of appeals for consideration of other issues not yet resolved on appeal. Id.

We granted certiorari to consider whether it is within the sound discretion of a trial court to reject a plea agreement based on a plea cutoff date and under what circumstances the court should grant an exception to a plea deadline.⁴

III. ANALYSIS

A.

As a threshold matter we note that we perceive the issue in this case more narrowly than did the court of appeals. In its decision, that court concluded that a trial court may not arbitrarily reject a plea agreement. Although we agree that a court may not reject a plea arbitrarily, we distinguish between a court's discretion to reject a plea agreement on the merits of the bargain and the court's discretion to reject a plea agreement because the parties failed to comply with a court-imposed plea cutoff date. We conclude that this case presents only the procedural issue of the authority of the trial court to impose plea deadlines in criminal cases, and what limitations exist on this authority.

We begin our review by examining the court of appeals' holding that a trial court abuses its discretion by rejecting a plea agreement solely for failure to tender it before a plea cutoff deadline.

B.

Plea bargains in criminal law are an accepted part of our jurisprudence and are specifically sanctioned by statute, court rule and case law. "Where it appears that the effective...