People v. Jenkins

Decision Date08 December 2021
Docket Number1-20-0458
Citation2021 IL App (1st) 200458,193 N.E.3d 722,456 Ill.Dec. 482
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DeAngelo JENKINS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Andrew Rima and Betsy Farrington, of Goldman Ismail Tomaselli Brennan & Baum LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (John E. Nowak, Tasha-Marie Kelly, and Brian A. Levitsky, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 A jury convicted defendant DeAngelo Jenkins of being an armed habitual criminal. He raises two issues on appeal. First, he alleges ineffective assistance, based on counsel's failure to move for suppression of the gun, his criminal history, and an inculpatory statement—all fruits, he says, of an arrest without probable cause. Second, he claims the trial court erred in finding that the State's key witness, a Chicago police officer assigned to the United States Marshals Fugitive Task Force (Task Force), was not required to wear a body camera. This finding, in turn, led the trial court to erroneously limit his cross-examination of the officer and to deny his proposed nonpattern jury instructions addressing the officer's lack of a body camera. We find no error and affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 I

¶ 4 Defendant was arrested on the 2800 block of West Harrison Street after Chicago police officer Sherry Kotlarz saw him put a gun into a parked car. Officer Kotlarz and her two partners, Officer Joseph Fitzgerald and Detective Christopher Ross, were assigned at the time to the Task Force. They had converged on this particular block to interview someone who might have information about the whereabouts of a fugitive in an unrelated case. They were not looking for defendant and had no idea who he was before they encountered him here.

¶ 5 The officers came in separate unmarked cars. Officer Kotlarz was the first to arrive. She saw defendant while walking westbound on the sidewalk, on the south side of Harrison Street. A grey Jeep had parked on the same side of the street. Defendant got out, walked up to a clothing store, and stood in front of the door. Soon enough, he turned around and was facing Officer Kotlarz, who was approaching from the east, donning her vest and star, radio, cuffs, and sidearm.

¶ 6 Officer Kotlarz testified that she thought defendant "had looked right at [her]" and "made eye contact." She also noted that Detective Ross was making a U-turn in the street directly behind her at the time. Defendant "slouch[ed]" or "crouched down" and walked back to the Jeep. When Officer Kotlarz demonstrated his manner of walking, the trial court described it as "crouch[ing] down and walk[ing] like a duck walk." Because the Jeep was parked about two car lengths to the east of the store, he was walking toward Officer Kotlarz at the time.

¶ 7 With his left hand, defendant opened the rear passenger side door "slightly," "just enough to squeeze his arm through there." With his right hand, he took a gun from his waistband and put it inside the door. The right side of his body faced Officer Kotlarz, who claimed to have an "unobstructed" view of the gun for "a couple seconds" from 20 to 25 feet away. Defendant closed the door and walked back to the clothing store.

¶ 8 Meanwhile, Officer Fitzgerald had just parked on the same block. He met Officer Kotlarz on the sidewalk. She pointed to defendant, who was still in front of the store, and said he had just put a gun in the back of a car. Together, the officers approached the passenger side of the Jeep with their guns drawn. Detective Ross saw them and approached the driver side. There were three passengers inside—a man in the rear passenger side seat and two women in the front and rear driver side seats.

¶ 9 Officer Fitzgerald ordered the passengers to put their hands up, which they did, and then opened the rear passenger side door. Detective Ross opened the rear driver side door. Upon opening the doors, both officers immediately saw a "large" and "silver-ish" handgun. Officer Fitzgerald testified that it was "in between like the doorjamb of the rear passenger seat and the seat." Detective Ross testified that it was in "a standing up position as if it was tucked in either between the seat and the body portion of the vehicle," "where the door opens and meets the body of the car." Similarly, Officer Kotlarz testified that "when you open the [rear] passenger side door, it was between like the doorjamb and the passenger side seat." She acknowledged that in her police report, she wrote that the gun was "resting on the seat."

¶ 10 Officer Kotlarz secured the gun, which was loaded. The officers ordered the passengers out of the Jeep. Backup officers detained them on the sidewalk, while Officers Fitzgerald and Kotlarz and Detective Ross went into the store to look for defendant.

¶ 11 Defendant was in the store bathroom, with the door locked. Officer Fitzgerald ordered him to come out and then to "get on the ground," both of which he did. After he was handcuffed, defendant asked what all of this was about. Officer Fitzgerald said, "we saw you put the gun in the back of the car," and "you're getting arrested today." Defendant replied, "Man, I f*** up. I'm on parole. Is there some way I can help you out so I don't have to catch this case?"

¶ 12 II

¶ 13 As it turned out, the Jeep belonged to Terri McCain, the woman in the front seat, who was defendant's girlfriend and the only defense witness at trial. (They lived together at the time of the arrest but split up before the trial.) McCain testified that she had defendant drive her and her friend Kanisha, the woman in the rear driver side seat, to a job orientation. With them was one "Little Lord," the man in the rear passenger side seat, who earlier that day had offered to pay McCain for a ride to somewhere on Laramie Avenue. McCain agreed, because she needed the money.

¶ 14 McCain testified that, after the job orientation, defendant drove to a clothing store on West Harrison Street. He parked and made his way toward the store, but he came back to the Jeep to get his wallet, which he had left in an "open spot" under the glove compartment. McCain passed it to Little Lord, who in turn passed it to defendant. McCain was not sure if he passed it through a partially open window or if defendant opened the door. In any event, defendant got his wallet and went back to the store.

¶ 15 A "bunch" of police officers soon approached the Jeep. McCain didn't know why and was nervous. She looked back and caught "a glimpse" of "Little Lord" "trying to tuck a gun" into his waistband or "rear of the pants area." The officers removed everyone from the Jeep, handcuffed them, and took their IDs. After they were uncuffed, "Little Lord" fled, but McCain had "no clue" where. McCain testified one of the officers said, "if we don't find him, we are going to place the gun on one of you guys." McCain did not see where the gun was when the police seized it. And she never saw defendant with a gun that day.

¶ 16 III

¶ 17 On direct examination, the State elicited from Officer Kotlarz that she was not wearing a body-worn camera. Officers assigned to the Task Force, she testified, "do not wear body-worn camera *** [b]ecause we're on the fugitive task force so we're exempt from the body-cam." The defense did not object to that testimony.

¶ 18 But on cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Kotlarz about her knowledge of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) directive supposedly "requiring you to be equipped with a body-worn camera." The trial court sustained the State's objection and, after a sidebar held off the record, instructed the jury to disregard that question.

¶ 19 After Officer Kotlarz testified, and outside the presence of the jury, the trial court made a record of the earlier sidebar. The defense believed that it should be permitted to cross-examine Officer Kotlarz on her claim that she was "exempt" from CPD's directive requiring officers to wear body cameras. More specifically, the defense wanted to question Officer Kotlarz about her knowledge of the directive and "who should have [body-worn cameras] and when they should have them."

¶ 20 The trial court barred that line of questioning or the following reasons. First, "[t]he fact of the matter is that not every police officer is assigned body-worn cameras," including some detectives and tactical officers, and "officers in certain units such as this one *** where she is actually assigned to the marshal's department of the United States government."

¶ 21 Second, Officer Kotlarz was a fact witness, but the meaning of the directive is a question of law. For this reason, cross-examining the officer on her own knowledge or understanding of the directive would be "totally misleading to the jury."

¶ 22 Third, during the sidebar, defense counsel had cited a provision of the CPD directive that apparently implied that all officers are required to wear body cameras. But defense counsel had taken that provision "out of context" because the directive at issue "doesn't apply to every single police officer in every setting, especially officers not in uniform." Giving the jury the impression that every officer must wear a body camera, either through cross-examination or instructions, "would be totally misleading."

¶ 23 The defense was free to argue "that in a perfect world or a better world," these officers, too, would have been issued body-worn cameras, but it could not cross-examine Officer Kotlarz on her knowledge of the directive, and there would be no instruction employing the language cited "out of context" by counsel. With that said, the trial court gave defense counsel the floor to "make your record."

¶ 24 Counsel argued that it was Officer Kotlarz who first brought up the directive, and so the defense should be allowed to cross her on that topic. And apart from the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • People v. Edwards (In re Edwards)
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 8, 2021
  • People v. Jones
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 7, 2023
    ...We take judicial notice of this CPD directive, which is published on CPD's website. See People v. Jenkins , 2021 IL App (1st) 200458, ¶ 100, 456 Ill.Dec. 482, 193 N.E.3d we will not consider it.6 A CPD directive states that "ShotSpotter's audio sensors will guide field units by *** assistin......
  • People v. Whiles
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 14, 2024
    ...suspicion does not require an officer to rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jenkins, 2021 IL App (1st) 200458, ¶ 47. the obviously defective driving that Ferrion observed, it was reasonable to suspect defendant of DUI, and Aliu stood on Ferrio......
  • United States v. Williams
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
    • October 24, 2024
    ...conduct, and thus it no longer automatically provides probable cause for an arrest (or a search) in every instance.” People v. Jenkins, 2021 IL App (1st) 200458, ¶42, appeal denied, 187 N.E.3d 728 (Ill. 2022). argues that Morgan simply saw a Black man place a gun in his hoodie pocket and wa......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT