People v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 23 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 161.,161.
• Citation: 898 N.E.2d 553,11 N.Y.3d 282
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jonathan JENKINS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

898 N.E.2d 553

11 N.Y.3d 282

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v.Jonathan JENKINS, Appellant.

No. 161.

Court of Appeals of New York.

October 23, 2008.

Office of the Appellate Defender, New York City (Margaret E. Knight, Richard M. Greenberg and Rosemary Herbert of counsel), for appellant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CIPARICK, J.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether Supreme Court was compelled to grant defendant specific performance of a plea agreement providing for dismissal of an indictment upon his alleged successful completion of a drug treatment program.We conclude that Supreme Court acted within its discretion in denying dismissal of the indictment.

I.

Having been arrested in June 1999 and indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39[1]) for selling two bags of crack-cocaine to an undercover police officer, in December 1999defendant pleaded guilty as a second felony offender to a reduced charge of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 220.31), a class D felony, permitting him to avoid incarceration conditioned upon his satisfying the following obligations as set forth in a written plea agreement: (1) completing a 12-to-18-month residential drug treatment program at Veritas Therapeutic Community, a Drug Treatment Alternative to Prison (DTAP) program, and completing its aftercare or live-out treatment; (2) completing vocational training including obtaining a general equivalency diploma (GED); (3) securing full-time employment and (4) finding "suitable" housing.The plea agreement additionally required defendant to make every court appearance and not be rearrested.Sentencing was initially adjourned until August 2001.

In the event that defendant successfully completed the drug treatment program and otherwise complied with the terms of the plea agreement, the Office of Special Narcotics Prosecutor(OSN) would join in an application to the court to have defendant's case dismissed.If defendant failed to fulfill any of these obligations, the agreement prescribed alternative sentences: 3½ to 7 years' imprisonment if he left the program without authorization or otherwise did not complete treatment and did not voluntarily return to court, and 2 to 4 years' imprisonment if he was not accepted by the program or if he failed the program but voluntarily returned to court.The plea agreement states that the determination of whether defendant violates the terms and conditions of the plea is at the "sole discretion" of OSN and the court.

Defendant began the residential phase of the Veritas program in January 2000, completing it in March 2001.He then began the outpatient phase, living with his girlfriend in New Jersey and attending a relapse-prevention aftercare program.Veritas reported to the court that defendant had obtained employment and opened a savings account.And, in a letter dated October 11, 2001, Veritas reported that defendant had successfully completed all phases of the drug treatment program, but that he had unresolved family issues that would create further problems for him if not addressed.The letter noted that although Veritas attempted to provide the couple with family services, defendant's girlfriend was recalcitrant towards attending counseling sessions.

Defendant filed a Clayton motion(CPL 210.40;seePeople v. Clayton,41 A.D.2d 204, 206-208, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106[2d Dept.1973]) to dismiss the indictment in the furtherance of justice, alleging that he had complied with the terms of the agreement by completing the Veritas program and committing no new crimes.At a court appearance, on October 12, 2001, the People stated that they would not join in defendant's motion at that time because they had not received documentary proof that defendant successfully completed his GED, obtained full-time employment, opened a bank account and met the other plea conditions.OSN requested a two- or three-week adjournment to provide defendant with ample time to submit the documentation and to allow the People to evaluate defendant's progress and respond to the motion.After a bench conference, defendant withdrew his motion and likewise requested a several-week adjournment.

Supreme Court then read the portion of the Veritas letter to defendant that indicated concerns about his domestic problems.Afterwards, the court requested of defendant that during the adjournment he seek support services for his own benefit to prevent a "relapse."The court additionally said to defendant that he had shown "attitude problems" and "resistance" to timely providing the required documents to demonstrate his completion of the plea conditions.Defendant confirmed his intention to promptly provide the required documentary proof including bank statements and pay stubs.Following a colloquy, the court adjourned the case to November 16, 2001.¹

On November 2, 2001, defendant's compliance with the plea conditions began to worsen dramatically.He was rearrested in New Jersey for charges involving a domestic violence assault against his girlfriend, which charges were subsequently dismissed.By November 14, 2001, defendant had lost his job and failed to attend treatment consistently Additionally, defendant continued residing with his girlfriend despite their apparently tumultuous relationship and after having been warned by OSN that residing with her could breach the condition requiring defendant to maintain "suitable" housing.

On February 1, defendant was remanded to custody after a report from Veritas that, since December of the previous year defendant was not employed and had failed to attend group and family counseling.On February 5, in open court, defendant signed a written agreement in the presence of his attorney providing him with yet another opportunity to continue with drug treatment instead of being sentenced to incarceration for having violated his plea agreement.Under this second agreement, defendant would attend biweekly counseling services until he obtained full-time employment, continue drug testing and attend one family counseling session per week with his girlfriend.Defendant agreed to the terms, signed the agreement and noted that he was not pressured or forced into doing so.

Defendant, however, soon stopped attending group meetings and failed to maintain contact with Veritas.On April 23, 2002, Veritas terminated him from the program for failing to appear for more than 30 days.Supreme Court then issued a bench warrant for his arrest for failing to make court appearances.On May 28, 2003, after two New Jersey arrests, defendant was involuntarily returned on the warrant.Thereafter, defendant renewed his Clayton motion.This time, he claimed that he was entitled to specific performance of his plea agreement as of October 12, 2001 when Veritas had confirmed his completion of the drug treatment program and he had orally asserted that he complied with the other terms.Defendant argued that the problems arose only after he was required to attend more counseling sessions, which he claimed were outside the scope of the plea agreement.

On June 6, 2004, defendant, with newly appointed counsel, withdrew his renewed Clayton motion, despite making a lengthy record that he should be granted a dismissal in the furtherance of justice or in the alternative a hearing to determine his compliance with his plea conditions.Defendant stated that he had obtained a GED, acquired vocational training certificates, secured full-time employment and that his housing had been, at some earlier time, approved by OSN.The People maintained that OSN had discretion to require defendant to participate in further support services relating to his unresolved family issues.Prior to sentencing defendant to 3½ to 7 years' incarceration, Supreme Court informed him that the withdrawal of his motion was without prejudice to pursue his claims on appeal.

The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, held that Supreme Court was not obligated to grant defendant specific performance of the plea agreement on October 12, 2001 because defendant had failed to provide proof by that date that he had completed his plea obligations (44 A.D.3d 1, 840 N.Y.S.2d 334[2007]).The court also rejected defendant's claim that the February 2002 agreement constituted a unilateral alteration of the plea agreement by Supreme Court.The dissent asserted that the People breached the plea agreement by refusing to grant defendant the benefit of the bargain, including dismissal of the indictment, because he had met all of his plea obligations and that Supreme Court erred by not dismissing the indictment.A Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and we now affirm.

II.

In deciding a motion to dismiss an indictment in the interest of justice (seeCPL 210.40, 210.45[1], [2]), a court must strike a "sensitive balance between the individual and the State" interests to determine whether the ends of justice are served by dismissal of the indictment (Clayton,41 A.D.2d at 208, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106).Such a value judgment "hinge[s] on the production of facts in the possession of the prosecution and the defendant"(id.).Based upon such proffered facts, the court must consider applicable factors under CPL 210.40"individually and collectively" before concluding that dismissal of the indictment is in the interest of justice (seePeople v. Berrus,1 N.Y.3d 535, 536, 770 N.Y.S.2d 691, 802 N.E.2d 1089[2003]).

Here, the language of the plea agreement itself specifically gave broad discretion to the court and the People to decide whether defendant had complied with it—"Whether the defendant violates the terms and conditions of this agreement is at the sole discretion of OSN and the court."Thus the court and the People were entitled to insist on strict compliance with every term.They had no obligation to overlook what might seem minor deficiencies, or to accept as...