People v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 18 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. S039538,S039538
• Citation: 893 P.2d 1224,40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903,10 Cal.4th 234
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 893 P.2d 1224 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Robert Earl JENKINS, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 903

40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903

10 Cal.4th 234, 893 P.2d 1224

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Robert Earl JENKINS, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S039538.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

May 18, 1995.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Bass, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald E. Niver and David H. Rose, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and appellant.

Stuart R. Rappaport, Public Defender, and Michael L. Chastaine, Deputy Public Defender, for defendant and respondent.

GEORGE, Justice.

We granted review in this case to resolve several questions that have arisen with regard to the proper application of Penal Code section 667.7, ¹ a habitual offender sentencing provision enacted in 1981 and predating the recently enacted "three-strikes" legislation. ² In particular, we must determine (1) whether a defendant who is convicted of murder and meets the requirements for sentencing as a habitual offender under section 667.7, subdivision (a), properly should be sentenced under section 190 (as the Court of Appeal held in this case) or instead under section 667.7; (2) if a defendant convicted of murder properly may be sentenced under section 667.7, whether the minimum period of imprisonment that he or she must serve before becoming eligible for parole is determined by taking into consideration the term imposed pursuant to any sentence enhancement for one or more prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)); and (3) whether a defendant who has committed more than one violent felony, each of which independently would subject the defendant to a life term under section 667.7, may receive consecutive life term sentences under section 667.7 or instead is limited in a single proceeding under that statute to receive a potential sentence of a single life term.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude (1) that a defendant who is convicted of murder and meets the requirements for sentencing as a habitual offender under section 667.7, must be sentenced under that section rather than section 190; (2) the terms of any applicable sentence enhancements, including an enhancement imposed for a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), must be included in the calculation of the minimum period of imprisonment that a defendant is required to serve before becoming eligible for parole; and (3) section 667.7 does not preclude the imposition of consecutive life terms upon a defendant who commits several offenses, each of which is punishable under section 667.7. Because the Court of Appeal reached a contrary conclusion as to the first issue, the judgment of that court must be reversed.

I

On September 9, 1990, at 2:30 a.m., defendant entered the San Jose residence of Raymond Pacheco, Ben Padilla, and Cecilia McLaughlin. He strangled and stabbed Pacheco, fatally wounding him. He then threatened Padilla with a knife and struck his head with a toaster, causing a serious laceration.

By information defendant was charged with one count of murder (§ 187), with the additional allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon during the commission of that offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)), as well as two counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon Padilla (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The information alleged, with respect to all three counts, that defendant met the requirements of habitual offender status under section 667.7, subdivision (a), in that he used force likely to produce great bodily injury in committing each of the current offenses and had served two prior separate prison terms for offenses listed in section 667.7, subdivision (a). It was further alleged, with respect to all three counts, that defendant had suffered two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a).

Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of one count of second degree murder and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and the jury found true the allegation that he personally had used a deadly weapon in the commission of the murder. The jury also found true the allegations qualifying defendant as a habitual offender under section 667.7, subdivision (a), and the allegations of two prior serious felony convictions under section 667, subdivision (a).

At sentencing, the trial court concluded that defendant's sentence for the second degree murder conviction should be imposed pursuant to the habitual offender provisions of section 667.7. On this basis, the court sentenced defendant, on the second degree murder conviction, to a term of life imprisonment, with a minimum period of confinement of 20 years prior to parole eligibility. ³ The court also imposed a three-year term of imprisonment, with a ten-year enhancement for the two prior felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), for each of the two assault-with-a-deadly-weapon convictions, but pursuant to section 654 stayed the sentence for one of these convictions and ordered both of them "stricken," purportedly pursuant to the mandate of section 667.7 (as interpreted in a prior Court of Appeal decision (People v. Victor (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 518, 278 Cal.Rptr. 7)). As a result, the trial court sentenced defendant, in total, to a life term, with a 20-year minimum parole eligibility date.

Both the People and defendant appealed from this initial judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and upheld the use-of-a-deadly-weapon finding, but reversed the finding of habitual offender status under section 667.7 on the ground the jury was instructed improperly with regard to section 667.7, subdivision (a)'s element of use of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The Court of Appeal accordingly vacated the sentence and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion rendered on appeal. The People's appeal was dismissed as moot.

At resentencing, the trial court indicated it would reimpose a sentence of "20 to life" in the event defendant admitted the allegations of personal use of force likely to produce great bodily injury within the meaning of section 667.7, subdivision (a), with respect to each of the three counts of which he stood convicted. The prosecutor objected on the following grounds to this proposed sentence. First, contrary to defendant's argument, the court was not required "to incorporate everything into a 20 year to a life sentence," i.e., imposition of a life sentence under section 667.7 on one count did not preclude imposition of consecutive life terms of imprisonment on separate, additional counts. In this regard, the prosecutor argued that under the circumstances of the present case, a separate habitual-offender life term or terms for the assault-with-a-deadly-weapon convictions should be imposed consecutively to the sentence for the second degree murder conviction. Second, the prosecutor further argued that the "20 to life" sentence was itself contrary to law, and that, under a proper interpretation of section 667.7, defendant should face a minimum sentence of at least 25 years--15 years for the murder, plus a 10-year enhancement term for the 2 prior serious felony convictions--rather than the 20-year period specified by the court.

Following defendant's admission, with respect to each count, that he had acted with the specific intent to inflict great bodily injury in committing the offenses, the trial court sentenced him to a life term under section 667.7 for the second degree murder conviction, with a 20-year minimum period of imprisonment prior to parole eligibility, and ordered stricken the section 12022, subdivision (b), enhancement. The court again imposed a term of three years, with a ten-year enhancement term for the two prior felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), for each of the two current assault convictions but then again "struck" the sentences for the assault convictions on the ground that, under section 667.7, these sentences "merged" into the life sentence imposed by the court under section 667.7 for the second degree murder conviction.

The People once again appealed from the judgment, challenging the sentence. The Court of Appeal reversed a second time, concluding that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant under section 667.7 for the second degree murder conviction, the appellate court construing the then-recently filed decision in In re Diaz (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1755, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 395 (discussed in more detail, post ) as exempting a murder conviction from the sentencing provisions of section 667.7. The Court of Appeal also concluded that the trial court, in striking the sentences for the two assault convictions, had proceeded under the erroneous premise that it lacked discretion to impose sentences for these separate offenses that would run consecutively to the life sentence imposed under section 667.7 on the second degree murder conviction. The Court of Appeal remanded the case for resentencing.

On petition of both defendant and the People, we granted review. Both parties contend the Court of Appeal erred in holding that defendant's conviction of second degree murder was excluded from the sentencing scheme of section 667.7. Additionally, the People contend that, in determining the minimum period of imprisonment under a life term imposed pursuant to section 667.7, the trial court must include in its calculation the term of any applicable enhancements, including those imposed pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a), for prior serious felony convictions. Defendant contends that the imposition of a life term under section 667.7 precludes the imposition of additional terms for separate current offenses consecutively to the life term sentence.

We shall address each of these contentions below.

II

Section 667.7 creates a self-contained sentencing scheme for habitual violent offenders, mandating a life sentence upon conviction of a felony involving the infliction of, or use of...