People v. Jensen, Docket No. 92199

Decision Date01 October 1987
Docket NumberDocket No. 92199
Citation412 N.W.2d 681,162 Mich.App. 171
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard JENSEN, Defendant-Appellant. 162 Mich.App. 171, 412 N.W.2d 681

[162 MICHAPP 172] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Lansing, G. Michael Hocking, Pros. Atty., and David J. Wallace, Asst. Pros. Atty., Charlotte, for people.

State Appellate Defender by Peter Jon Van Hoek, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

[162 MICHAPP 173] Before CYNAR, P.J., and SHEPHERD and JASPER, * JJ.

SHEPHERD, Judge.

After a jury trial, defendant Richard Jensen was convicted of making a false application for an automobile title, M.C.L. Sec. 257.254; M.S.A. Sec. 9.1954. Defendant appeals as of right. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The prosecutor alleged in his opening statement that defendant made two misrepresentations to the Secretary of State in his April 29, 1985, application for transfer of title of a 1984 Chevrolet Camaro. The first alleged misrepresentation was that the title had no lien on it, when in fact there was an outstanding security interest to the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). The second alleged misrepresentation was that the owner of the car intended to transfer title to defendant on April 29, 1985, when in fact he did not.

Leora Doty, of the Secretary of State's office in Windsor Township, Eaton County, Michigan, testified that defendant applied for a transferred title on the car on April 29, 1985. Doty's office was authorized to give a quick title for a car after checking the relevant information. After reviewing the existing title on the car, however, she went to her supervisor because she felt that the GMAC termination information on the face of the title looked unusual. On cross-examination, Doty stated that defendant readily gave her his driver's license when she asked him for identification.

Robert Hodges, Doty's supervisor, testified that his office could only issue a quick title if all liens on the existing title had been validly terminated. He was suspicious of the discharge of GMAC's lien on the face of the title because GMAC usually used [162 MICHAPP 174] a stamp and this discharge appeared to be typed. Hodges called GMAC and was told that the lien on the car had not been discharged. Hodges then called the police. Hodges did not recall if defendant had a certificate of insurance with him. He stated that defendant offered no explanation about the lien. On cross-examination, however, Hodges acknowledged that defendant appeared surprised when he was questioned about the lien discharge. Defendant was cooperative and gave Hodges no difficulty.

Michael Gotshall, a Michigan State Police trooper, responded to Hodges' call. According to Officer Gotshall, defendant told him that he purchased the car on March 22, 1985. Officer Gotshall stated that defendant said there must have been a mistake made by GMAC or by the prior owner of the car, and that defendant did not appear to be very concerned about the situation. Officer Gotshall confiscated the title. He did not recall defendant asking for a copy of the title or for a receipt for the confiscated title.

David Bart testified that he was the titleholder of the 1984 Camaro. He purchased the car in 1984 and financed it through payroll deductions from his job with General Motors. As of April, 1985, he owed about $9,800 on the car.

Bart testified that he agreed to sell the car to defendant on April 12, 1985. Bart acknowledged that at the preliminary examination he had stated that the date of the agreement was April 26. He then asserted that the 12th was the correct date. He had known defendant for eight or nine months, having met him in a bar that Bart frequented. According to Bart, the agreement was made at defendant's house with only the two of them present. The terms were a purchase price of $10,000, payable at $2,000 a month for five months. Defendant[162 MICHAPP 175] was also to give Bart a 1971 Plymouth that he owned. Bart stated that he received no money on April 12, but that they exchanged the two cars. Later that day, he went to defendant's insurance agent for a copy of defendant's insurance certificate on the Camaro.

Bart testified that on April 28 he dropped off the Camaro title in defendant's mailbox. He stated that he and defendant had talked over the situation and that he had agreed to give defendant the title as a showing of good faith. Bart stated that he had not typed anything on the title before giving it to defendant. He denied writing a sales price of $8,000 or a sales date of March 22 on the title. He acknowledged signing the title in August, 1984, when he had previously tried to sell the car, but denied putting any writing on the title other than his signature.

According to Bart, defendant called him on May 1 and told him the police had taken the title. He met defendant that day. Defendant told him they could both get into a lot of trouble and that if he was questioned by the police he should tell them that someone else had discharged the lien on the title before he gave it to defendant. Bart admitted telling the police that a man he met in a bar had agreed to sign that the lien had been discharged. He stated that he was afraid that he would get into trouble, so he lied to the police. Bart testified that the car was eventually repossessed and sold. He still owed $2,100 to $2,400 on the car. Bart acknowledged that he had been charged with forging a title and knowingly possessing a forged title and that the charges had been reduced to a misdemeanor in a plea bargain exchange for his testimony against defendant. He had not yet been sentenced.

On cross-examination, Bart testified that he had [162 MICHAPP 176] told the police that the car's selling price was $10,000. He denied that defendant had in fact paid him $8,000 for the car. At the time of the preliminary examination, Bart had been suspended from his job for disciplinary reasons. He was not current on his car payments as of April 12. He stated that he returned the 1971 Plymouth to defendant in August because he could not afford insurance on the car. He also told defendant that he had a bad driving record and could not afford the insurance on the Camaro. Bart indicated that he intended to file for bankruptcy in light of the remaining money that he owed on the car. When defense counsel asked about other reasons why he might be intending to file for bankruptcy, the prosecutor objected on grounds of relevancy. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to any further questions on Bart's financial situation and on his intent to file for bankruptcy.

Jack Heeres, an insurance agent for Allstate, testified that on April 12, 1985, he spoke to defendant and discussed adding the Camaro to defendant's insurance. Later that day he gave a copy of the proof of insurance to a man who came to his office. According to Heeres, defendant told him on April 12 that there was no lien on the car.

Philip Monterusso, from GMAC, stated that his company normally discharges a lien by using a rubber stamp and a signature of a GMAC agent. The Camaro title had not been discharged in this normal fashion. Monterusso could not identify the signature on the title, which appeared to read "Bob Woodward" or "Bob Wentworth," as that of anyone who worked at the GMAC Grand Rapids office which serviced Bart's account. Monterusso testified that he spoke to Bart on May 28, 1985. At that time, Bart stated that he was in the process of selling the car, that the police had confiscated [162 MICHAPP 177] the title, that he intended to pay off the lien when the title was released, and that defendant had the car.

Michigan State Police Detective Robert Golm interviewed defendant at his home on May 8, 1985. Detective Golm testified that defendant said that he had agreed to pay Bart $8,000 for the car, but had not given him any cash yet. He told Golm he was going to pay Bart when he got clear title. Defendant also stated that he received the title from Bart personally on April 27. Defendant stated that he was not sure if he had filled out the information on the back of the title concerning the purchase price and mileage of the car. Defendant denied making the discharge of the lien, stating that it was already on the title when he received it.

On May 7, Detective Golm talked to Bart, who told him that a man he met in the bar who identified himself as a GMAC employee had told him he could get a clear title if he paid off the lien within ten days. Bart told him that the car was sold for $8,000. On June 13, Bart told Detective Golm that he had agreed to sell the car to defendant for $10,000 and the Plymouth.

The first defense witness was John Koval, who stated that he worked the same shift as Bart and was somewhat acquainted with him. One night at a card game with other people from work, Bart mentioned that he wanted to sell the Camaro. Koval stated that Bart had mentioned a price in the range of $8,000 to $9,000. A few weeks later, Koval approached Bart about the car and was told that he had already sold it. When Koval asked Bart if he had already gotten the money for the car, Bart responded "Yeah, it's gone." At the preliminary examination, however, Koval had testified that defendant had not paid Bart. Koval [162 MICHAPP 178] indicated that he was an acquaintance of defendant and had known him for around one year.

Defendant testified that he had known David Bart for around one year. In early April, 1985, he was at a card game where Bart and John Koval were present and overheard them discuss Bart's Camaro. About one week later, he told Bart that he would buy the car for $8,000. Defendant denied that he had ever agreed to pay $10,000 in monthly installments. Defendant testified that he reached an agreement with Bart on April 12. He took possession of the car and...

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5 cases
  • People v. Buck
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • December 8, 1992
    ...those instances where the trial is a credibility contest between the defendant and the accomplice. Id.; People v. Jensen, 162 Mich.App. 171, 188-189, 412 N.W.2d 681 (1987). We are not persuaded that the case at bar was a credibility contest between Buck and Cameron. Much of Cameron's testim......
  • People v. Perry
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • August 30, 1996
    ...the cautionary instruction regarding accomplice testimony, was an error requiring reversal of the convictions. In People v. Jensen, 162 Mich.App. 171, 412 N.W.2d 681 (1987), the defendant purchased an automobile from David Bart. In applying to the Secretary of State for a transfer of the au......
  • People v. Wood
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • October 28, 2014
    ...[her] bias or self-interest.”We find no error in the trial court's use of an instruction modeled on CJI2d 5.4. People v. Jensen, 162 Mich.App. 171, 187–188, 412 N.W.2d 681 (1987) (explaining that in light of a witness's “admissions and his guilty plea to a reduced charge arising from the in......
  • Wood v. Nagy
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • August 3, 2020
    ...[her] bias or self-interest."We find no error in the trial court's use of an instruction modeled on CJI2d 5.4. People v. Jensen, 162 Mich.App.171, 187-188, 412 N.W.2d 681 (1987) (explaining that in light of a witness's "admissions and his guilty plea to a reduced charge arising from the inc......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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