People v. Jewell

• Decision Date: 30 December 1904
• Citation: 101 N.W. 835,138 Mich. 620
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. JEWELL.

101 N.W. 835

138 Mich. 620

PEOPLE v. JEWELL.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 30, 1904

Exceptions from Circuit Court, Livingston County; Stearns F. Smith Judge.

Fobes C. Jewell was convicted of carrying away public records, and excepts. Reversed.

Edmund C. Shields, Pros. Atty., for the People.

Person & Person, for respondent.

MONTGOMERY J.

The respondent was convicted of a violation of section 11,361, Comp. Laws 1897, which contains the following provision: 'All books, papers and records, belonging or in anywise appertaining to the offices of the several townships and school district officers of this state, are hereby declared to be public property, belonging to the people of the state of Michigan, to be used and preserved by and under the direction of said officers, and be by them preserved during their continuance in office; and any person or persons who shall willfully carry away, mutilate, or destroy and of such books, papers, records, or any part of the same * * * shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding three years.' The testimony disclosed that in the spring of 1903 one G. A. Kirkland was the supervisor of the township of Iosco, Livingston county and in his official capacity called upon the respondent for a statement of his taxable property. Such a statement was made out and signed by the respondent and left with the supervisor, who took it to his office. The respondent stated that in a certain contingency he might wish to make a change in the statement later. A few days later the respondent went to the office of the supervisor, the statement was produced, and an attempt made to make a new statement. This was, however, abandoned. The first statement disappeared during the conversation, and respondent, on being asked for it, declared that he must have torn it up and thrown it in the stove. A search of the stove being made disclosed that it was not there, and the inference which the jury drew, that the respondent took it away, was amply justified.

Two questions are discussed in the brief of respondent's counsel. It is contended, first, that the paper in question does not fall within the terms of the statute. So far as this question depends upon the fact that the statement was not sworn to, section 3843 determines its character as a public document, as by the express terms of that statute the supervisor was required to retain the same in his office. It is said, however, that, as there was a declared purpose to amend this statement or substitute another for it, this paper never became a part of the public record. We do not think any such inference is justified. What the effect of substituting another paper for the original may have been is not the question. The statement was signed and delivered to the supervisor, intended to be effective, at least until a substitute was prepared, and this was never done.

The second point relied upon is the failure of the circuit judge to give respondent's fourth request, as follows: 'If Jewell did carry away the paper it was not willful if Jewell thought he had a right to carry it away.' The court did charge the jury as follows: "Willfully' means designedly and intentionally. I don't think it would be necessary to establish the fact that he did it maliciously or that his intention must have been to that wicked extent that would be involved in the crime of larceny; but he must have acted knowingly, and must have willfully intended to take that paper away from his office and keep it away from there to deprive the supervisor of that township, the officer, the supervisor, of the custody of that paper permanently. He must have intended to have done that before you can find him guilty; he must have had that intent; the defendant must have had that intent to remove that from that office, to carry it away without justification or excuse.' What we might conclude upon the merits of this question of good faith is unimportant...