People v. Jimenez

• Decision Date: 29 June 1978
• Docket Number: Cr. 20123
• Citation: 580 P.2d 672,147 Cal.Rptr. 172,21 Cal.3d 595
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 580 P.2d 672 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert JIMENEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 172

147 Cal.Rptr. 172

21 Cal.3d 595, 580 P.2d 672

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert JIMENEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 20123.

Supreme Court of California.

June 29, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 24, 1978.

Paul Halvonik, State Public Defender, Charles M. Sevilla, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, Kent L. Richland, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Howard J. Schwab and Alexander W. Kirkpatrick, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MANUEL, Justice.

Defendant Robert Jimenez appeals following judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of one count of first degree murder (Pen.Code, § 187), three counts of armed robbery (Pen.Code, § 211) and one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.Code, § 245(a)).

Among other contentions, defendant asserts that the trial court committed reversible error when it permitted the prosecution to introduce into evidence defendant's tape-recorded confession, on the grounds that (1) the record does not reflect that the trial judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary, which defendant argues is the standard of proof required under California law, and (2) that defendant's confession was involuntary because it was induced by promises of leniency. For the reasons set forth below, we agree that the prosecution must prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. We also conclude that the defendant's confession was involuntary, having been induced by promises of leniency. It was therefore prejudicial error to admit his confession and defendant's conviction must be reversed.

On January 11, 1976, about 3 p. m., defendant and another man entered the El Norteno bar in El Monte. They sat down at the bar and ordered beer which they were served in a bottle by Mrs. Maria Insunza. After they drank their beer, both men left, but returned shortly thereafter. Defendant sat at the bar near the cash register and ordered another bottle of beer. His companion again left the building, but returned momentarily carrying a firearm. He fired one shot at the ceiling, telling everyone to stand still, and fired another shot at Mr. Soto, a customer. This shot went over Mr. Soto's head. Defendant then led Mrs. Insunza by the arm to the cash register and ordered her to open it and give him the money which it contained. Defendant removed approximately $70 from the opened cash drawer. Mrs. Insunza observed that defendant was not armed.

The wallets of several customers were also taken. One of these customers Portunato Rodriquez, started to leave the bar through the back door. He was warned to stop, and was then shot by defendant's companion. He later died as a result of the gunshot wound. After shooting Mr. Rodriquez, defendant's companion called defendant by his first name, Robert, and said they should leave. Both men then ran out of the bar. Police arrived shortly thereafter and Mrs. Insunza gave them the beer bottle from which defendant had been drinking. Defendant's fingerprints were found on the bottle.

On January 23, 1976, defendant and his companion were arrested at the latter's residence. ¹ Alfred Sett, a deputy sheriff assigned to Los Angeles County's Homicide Bureau was present when defendant was arrested and transported to the East Los Angeles sheriff's station. Shortly after defendant arrived at the station he was interrogated by Sergeant Sett along with Officer Mascorro of the El Monte Police Department. Both officers were present during the entire interrogation process which lasted several hours. Defendant first gave an oral statement in which he admitted that he had participated in the robberies, that his codefendant had used a .22 caliber automatic rifle during the course of the robberies, that his codefendant had shot the gun at one of the customers and had shot another customer, and that defendant had driven the getaway car and had later split the money taken in the robberies with the codefendant. Several hours later, defendant gave a second statement essentially the same as the first. This second statement was tape recorded. Defendant moved to suppress this tape-recorded statement on the grounds that it constituted an involuntary confession because it was induced by promises of leniency. After a hearing on the admissibility of the statement, the trial court, without mentioning what standard of proof it was applying, found that the defendant's statement was voluntary. The tape-recorded statement was subsequently played to the jury at defendant's trial. ²

I

,2] It is axiomatic that the use in a criminal prosecution of an involuntary confession constitutes a denial of due process of law under both the federal and state Constitutions. (Payne v. Arkansas (1957) 356 U.S. 560, 561, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975; People v. Berve (1958) 51 Cal.2d 286, 290, 332 P.2d 97; People v. Trout (1960) 54 Cal.2d 576, 6 Cal.Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231; People v. Sanchez (1969) 70 Cal.2d 562, 75 Cal.Rptr. 642, 451 P.2d 74.) In California, before a confession can be used against a defendant, the prosecution has the burden of proving that it was voluntary and was not the result of any form of compulsion or promise of reward. (People v. Trout, supra, 54 Cal.2d 576, 6 Cal.Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231; People v. Berve, supra, 51 Cal.2d 286, 332 P.2d 97; People v. Jones (1944) 24 Cal.2d 601, 608, 150 P.2d 801; People v. Rogers (1943) 22 Cal.2d 787, 804-5, 141 P.2d 722; People v. Siemsen (1908) 153 Cal. 387, 394, 95 P. 863.)

Although this court has never decided the issue of the degree of proof by which the prosecution must prove the voluntariness of a confession, a number of decisions in the California Courts of Appeal have addressed the issue. Prior to 1972, these decisions uniformly concluded that the prosecution must establish proof of the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Stroud (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 670, 678, 78 Cal.Rptr. 270; People v. Daniels (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 367, 374, 81 Cal.Rptr. 675; People v. Jackson (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 95, 100, 96 Cal.Rptr. 414; People v. Superior Court (Bowman) (1971) (dictum) 18 Cal.App.3d 316, 320-321, 95 Cal.Rptr. 757.) This conclusion apparently was based on what was thought to be the rule under the federal Constitution as implied in Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, in which the United States Supreme Court held that an accused is entitled to a clearcut and reliable determination of the voluntariness of his confession before it can be introduced against him at trial.

In 1972, however, the Supreme Court held, in Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 that for purposes of the federal Constitution, the prosecution need only prove the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. In Lego, application of the reasonable doubt standard had been urged on two separate grounds: (1) that this result was mandated by In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, which requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the offense charged, and (2) that those values that exclusionary rules are designed to serve can only be protected by application of the reasonable doubt standard.

Rejecting the contention that Winship required application of the reasonable doubt standard in determining the voluntariness of a confession, Justice White, writing for the majority in Lego, analyzed Jackson v. Denno, supra, and concluded that the hearing required by Jackson was not designed to enhance the reliability of jury verdicts so as to make application of the reasonable doubt standard necessary and that Jackson had neither implied nor suggested to the contrary.

The majority in Lego also rejected the contention that the reasonable doubt standard should be applied in order to safeguard the high value that our society places on the right of the individual to be free from coerced self-incrimination. Observing that federal constitutional rights appeared to be adequately protected by existing exclusionary rules which preclude use of coerced confessions against the accused at trial, the majority concluded that it was unnecessary to require application of the reasonable doubt standard in determining the preliminary question of the admissibility of confessions. At the same time, however, the majority made clear that the states, pursuant to their own law would be free to adopt a higher standard of proof and could differ as to the resolution of the values they find at stake.

Decisions of the California Courts of Appeal after Lego stated that Lego called into question the continued validity of the pre-Lego California decisions which had required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the voluntariness of a confession. These post-Lego decisions, concluded that California law did not require application of a standard of proof stricter than that required under the federal rule as articulated by Lego. (See People v. Barrow (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 984, 990, 131 Cal.Rptr. 913; People v. Moreno (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 688, 132 Cal.Rptr. 569; see also People v. Hutchings (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 16, 106 Cal.Rptr. 905 (dictum) and People v. Chen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1046, 112 Cal.Rptr. 894 (dictum).)

In People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 965, 127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335 fn. 10, this court, noting the disparity in result between Lego and the pre-Lego California decisions, expressly left open the question which we now decide whether California law requires a standard of proof stricter than that required by the federal Constitution.

In this state, whether a confession is voluntary and therefore admissible into evidence is a determination to be made outside the presence of the jury by the trial court, as provided in ...