People v. Johnathan T. (In re Johnathan T.)

• Decision Date: 21 January 2022
• Docket Number: Docket No. 127222
• Citation: 2022 IL 127222,193 N.E.3d 1240,456 Ill.Dec. 832
• Parties: IN RE JOHNATHAN T., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Johnathan T., Appellant).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2022 IL 127222

193 N.E.3d 1240

456 Ill.Dec. 832

IN RE JOHNATHAN T., a Minor(The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Johnathan T., Appellant).

Docket No. 127222

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed January 21, 2022.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Ellen J. Curry, Deputy Defender, and Eun Sun Nam, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick, Mitchell J. Ness, and Joshua M. Schneider, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Johnathan T. was adjudicated a delinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) ( 705 ILCS 405/5-701 (West 2018) ) after he was found guilty of 10 counts of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault ( 720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(b)(i) (West 2018)) in the circuit court of Massac County. Johnathan appealed his adjudication and argued that the circuit court failed to conduct an inquiry into his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed. 2021 IL App (5th) 200247, ¶ 53, 449 Ill.Dec. 929, 180 N.E.3d 854.

¶ 2 We granted Johnathan's petition for leave to appeal in this court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court judgment in part and reverse the judgment in part.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 As the factual background was fully disclosed in the appellate court's decision, we will focus on the facts that are relevant to the issues presented in this court. In April 2018, the Massac County State's Attorney filed a delinquency petition against Johnathan alleging that he committed 10 acts of aggravated criminal sexual assault against B.A.B., a minor who was seven years old at the time of the incidents, in violation of section 11-1.30(b)(i) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code). 720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(b)(i) (West 2018).

¶ 5 The alleged acts occurred between August 1, 2017, and January 18, 2018, when Johnathan was 15 and 16 years old. Counts I through VII alleged that Johnathan committed acts of sexual penetration with B.A.B. by placing his penis in contact with B.A.B.’s anus. Counts VIII through X alleged that Johnathan committed acts of sexual penetration by placing his penis in contact with B.A.B.’s vagina. On November 15, 2019, the circuit court oversaw an adjudication hearing on the State's petition.

¶ 6 A. Circuit Court Decision

¶ 7 On December 4, 2019, the circuit court entered an order finding Johnathan guilty on all counts. Thereafter, the circuit court directed the probation department, pursuant to section 5-701 of the Act, to prepare a social investigation report (SIR) and ordered Johnathan to undergo a sex offender evaluation prior to a dispositional hearing. 705 ILCS 405/5-701 (West 2018) (social investigation report shall be prepared upon the order of the court). During the sex offender evaluation, the evaluator asked Johnathan, "What kind of job is your lawyer doing?" Johnathan responded, "We don't talk. I'm never prepared for the stand. He does not answer calls." The sex offender evaluation, which included Johnathan's answer to the evaluator's question about his attorney, and the SIR were filed and reviewed by the circuit court prior to the dispositional hearing.

¶ 8 In August 2020, the circuit court conducted the dispositional hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that it was in the best interest of Johnathan and the public that Johnathan be made a ward of the court. The court found that probation would depreciate the seriousness of the offenses and would not serve the best interests of Johnathan and the public. The court stated as follows:

"Based upon the social investigation report and the sex offender report, I think the Department of Juvenile Justice is the least restrictive alternative based on the evidence, and his secure confinement is necessary based upon services in the Department of Juvenile Justice which will meet his individualized needs, his criminal background, physical, mental, emotional help, where reasonable efforts have been made to prevent, to eliminate, the need for removal from the home is in his best interest."

¶ 9 The circuit court sentenced Johnathan to the Department of Juvenile Justice for an intermediate period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. Johnathan appealed the adjudication of delinquency and his sentence.

¶ 10 B. Appellate Court Decision

¶ 11 On appeal, Johnathan argued that the circuit court erred because it did not conduct a preliminary inquiry pursuant to People v. Krankel , 102 Ill. 2d 181, 80 Ill.Dec. 62, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984), regarding his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court explained that in Krankel this court established a procedure that circuit courts must follow when a defendant makes a pro se , posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2021 IL App (5th) 200247, ¶ 18, 449 Ill.Dec. 929, 180 N.E.3d 854.

¶ 12 First, the appellate court observed that it had to address the threshold question of whether the Krankel procedure applies in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Id. ¶ 22. The appellate court relied on In re T.R. , 2019 IL App (4th) 190051, ¶ 29, 431 Ill.Dec. 624, 127 N.E.3d 1157, where the court observed that the purpose of Krankel applies equally to juvenile delinquency cases and that juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent have a very limited opportunity to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 2021 IL App (5th) 200247, ¶ 23, 449 Ill.Dec. 929, 180 N.E.3d 854. The appellate court agreed with the T.R. court's analysis. Id. ¶ 24.

¶ 13 The appellate court recognized that, although juvenile delinquency proceedings are civil in nature, minors in delinquency proceedings have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. The court noted that in People v. Austin M. , 2012 IL 111194, ¶ 76, 363 Ill.Dec. 220, 975 N.E.2d 22, this court stated that, "[w]ith the exception of the right to a jury trial, the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution extends to delinquent minors all of the basic rights enjoyed by criminal defendants." See 2021 IL App (5th) 200247, ¶ 24, 449 Ill.Dec. 929, 180 N.E.3d 854. Accordingly, the appellate court found no basis to exclude this court's Krankel procedure from being applied in delinquency proceedings. Id.

¶ 14 Second, the appellate court had to determine whether Johnathan's statement in the SIR should have triggered a Krankel inquiry. The appellate court observed that this court, in People v. Moore , 207 Ill. 2d 68, 79, 278 Ill.Dec. 36, 797 N.E.2d 631 (2003), held that to trigger the Krankel procedure a defendant must bring his or her claim to the trial court's attention. 2021 IL App (5th) 200247, ¶ 52, 449 Ill.Dec. 929, 180 N.E.3d 854. The appellate court determined that Johnathan's answering a question during the sex offender evaluation with statements about his attorney did not constitute bringing a claim to the circuit court's attention. Id.

¶ 15 The appellate court then clarified that its holding was not that statements in a sex offender evaluation can never trigger Krankel . Id. ¶ 53. The court found that considering the vagueness of Johnathan's statements, together with the context in which Johnathan made the statements, it could not fault the circuit court for failing to conduct a Krankel inquiry. Id. The court specifically stated that

"[n]othing in the record suggests that by answering the social worker's question Johnathan T. was attempting to bring complaints about his attorney specifically to the circuit court's attention, and the circuit court would not have been expected to discern a Krankel complaint, as the report was not designed to elicit such information." Id.

¶ 16 The appellate court held that Johnathan's vague statements made during the sex offender evaluation, without more, were insufficient to trigger a Krankel inquiry. Id. Finally, the appellate court rejected Johnathan's argument that the State failed to prove he was guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault as alleged in count I. Id. ¶ 55.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 Before this court, Johnathan argues that the circuit court erred when it failed to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. Johnathan contends that the Krankel procedure should apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Johnathan also contends that he made a clear claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when he answered the evaluator's question in the sex offender evaluation regarding his counsel's performance by stating, "We don't talk. I'm never prepared for the stand. He does not answer calls."

¶ 19 The State agrees that the Krankel procedure should apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. However, the State argues that the Krankel procedure is inapplicable here because Johnathan had retained counsel. Alternatively, the State argues that Johnathan's statement in response to the evaluator's question did not trigger the circuit court's obligation to conduct a preliminary inquiry. According to the State, the circuit court was not made aware of Johnathan's ineffectiveness of counsel claim because it was in the sex offender evaluation and was nothing more than a general complaint.

¶ 20 A. Standard of Review

¶ 21 Whether the Krankel procedure applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. People v. Custer , 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 25, 440 Ill.Dec. 604, 155 N.E.3d 374 ; People v. Taylor , 237 Ill. 2d 68, 75, 340 Ill.Dec. 161, 927 N.E.2d 1172 (2010). Whether a pro se juvenile's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel memorialized in a court-ordered SIR triggered the circuit court's duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry is also a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Custer , 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 25, 440 Ill.Dec. 604, 155 N.E.3d 374.

¶ 22 B. Preliminary Krankel Inqu...