People v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 05 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1-15-2310 |
| Citation | 182 N.E.3d 182,450 Ill.Dec. 736,2021 IL App (1st) 152310 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerome JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Tomas G. Gonzalez, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Robert Milan, Special State's Attorney, of Chicago (Eugene Steingold, Assistant Special Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant, Jerome Johnson, appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition under section 122-1(f) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2014)). Defendant's successive postconviction petition was based, in relevant part, on his claim that he was coerced into confessing that he was involved in the murder of a 14-year-old girl. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him leave to file his successive petition because he stated the gist of cause in that he had newly discovered evidence of systematic police torture of suspects, which he could not have discovered earlier, that corroborated his claim that he was coerced into confessing to the charged crimes. In addition, plaintiff argues that he was prejudiced in that the coerced confession was used as the factual basis of his guilty plea, thus violating his right to due process and rendering his plea involuntary. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition because, by pleading guilty, defendant waived any claim that his confession was coerced.
¶ 3 In September 1994, defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder and attempted first degree murder in exchange for a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction, to run concurrently with a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment on the attempted first degree murder conviction. Prior to accepting defendant's guilty plea, the trial court admonished defendant that by pleading guilty, defendant was giving up his rights to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury trial, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and present witnesses and evidence on his own behalf. The trial court also admonished defendant regarding the possible sentences on each of the charges. Defendant stated that he understood the rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty, that he still desired to plead guilty, that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, and that no one was forcing him to plead guilty. Thus, the trial court accepted defendant's guilty pleas, and the State proffered the following factual basis for a finding of guilty:
After correcting that it was George Anderson and not defendant who waited nearby during the shooting, defendant stipulated to the factual basis. The trial court found the factual basis to be sufficient and entered findings of guilty.
¶ 4 After defendant waived his right to a presentence investigation but prior to the trial court imposing the sentence, defendant presented the trial court with a note he had written, which the trial court read into the record:
Ultimately, the trial court imposed the agreed-upon sentence.
¶ 5 Just a few weeks after pleading guilty, defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate his guilty plea, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate potential defenses, interview witnesses, and failing to pursue suppression motions. The trial court denied defendant's motion after a hearing, and that decision was affirmed on appeal. People v. Johnson , No. 1-95-0338, 291 Ill.App.3d 1118, 240 Ill.Dec. 284, 716 N.E.2d 878 (1997) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ). Defendant did not argue police coercion at that time.
¶ 6 In 1998, defendant filed his initial postconviction petition, which was dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. This petition does not appear in the record on appeal, so we cannot ascertain the allegations it contained. Defendant acknowledges in his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, however, that the initial petition was filed and dismissed.
¶ 7 In July 2011, defendant filed a second motion to vacate his guilty plea, this time arguing that he would not have pleaded guilty had the State not suppressed evidence of systematic police torture that was similar to the abuse that defendant claims he experienced leading up to and resulting in his confession. The trial court denied defendant's motion as untimely.
¶ 8 On October 11, 2012, defendant filed the motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition that is the subject of the present appeal. In that motion and in the successive postconviction petition attached to it, defendant alleged that during police questioning at Area 3 of the Chicago Police Department, he was "kicked, slapped, and unnecessarily handcuffed in an awkward position that required him to sit awkwardly in an overheated locker room." Defendant alleged that officers and detectives Stark, Kill, Halloran, Boudreau, Smith, Stehlik, and O'Brien participated in the questioning and abuse of him. In his attached affidavit, defendant elaborated that on August 21, 1991, he was arrested and taken to Area 3 headquarters where he was placed in what appeared to be a locker room and was cuffed to a ring on the wall. While awkwardly cuffed to that ring, officers slapped him, kicked his handcuffs, and threatened him repeatedly over the course of three days. Officers also forced him to sign an already partially written confession. Officers told defendant that they knew he had not shot anyone, but that if he told them what they wanted, he could go home. Defendant could not say how many officers participated in his abuse because they all looked the same to him, but there were never more than two in the room at a time.
¶ 9 As a result of the abuse, defendant alleged, he confessed to a crime1 that he did not commit. Defendant also alleged that the State covered up the systematic practice of abuse and torture of suspects in Area 3, resulting in an inability by trial counsel to provide defendant with effective assistance and denying him a fair suppression hearing.2 According to defendant, the coerced confession and the State's cover up of systematic abuse rendered defendant's plea involuntary and not knowingly made. Defendant also noted that there were no eyewitnesses to testify against him, no physical evidence against him, and his guilty pleas were supported by only his illegally obtained confession.
¶ 10 As cause for failing to raise these claims in his initial postconviction petition, defendant alleged that there was newly discovered evidence of systematic torture of suspects and of the concealment of evidence regarding the systematic torture. He also alleged newly discovered evidence in the form of the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission's (TIRC) disposition of codefendant George Anderson's claim of police abuse, which was issued on June 13, 2012, and a letter from the TIRC stating that its funding had been eliminated before it could address defendant's claims.
¶ 11 The TIRC's disposition on Anderson's claim and the TIRC's letter to defendant were attached to defendant's successive postconviction petition. The TIRC's...
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