People v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 30 June 2022
• Docket Number: 18CA2337,Court of Appeals No. 18CA2337
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Parties: The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Schuyler Adonis Johnson, Defendant-Appellant.

2022 COA 68

The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Schuyler Adonis Johnson, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18CA2337

Court of Appeals of Colorado, Division III

June 30, 2022

Announced June 30, 2022.

SUMMARY

As a matter of first impression in this direct appeal concerning the revocation of a youth offender's sentence, a division of the court of appeals determines the applicability and interplay of two provisions under section 18-1.3-407(5) C.R.S. 2021, the Youth Offender System (YOS) statute. Based on a plain reading of the statute's language, the division determines that subsection (5)(a) applies to a YOS sentence revocation only when the offender poses a danger to himself, herself, or others. Moreover, subsection (5)(c) identifies those categories of offenders whose original sentence must be reimposed for failing to successfully complete their YOS sentence - including an offender returned to the district court under subsection (5)(a).

Arapahoe County District Court No. 11CR568 Honorable Jeffrey K. Holmes, Judge.

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul E. Koehler, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Ryann S. Hardman Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION

TAUBMAN, JUDGE. ^[*]

¶1 Defendant, Schuyler Adonis Johnson, appeals the district court's order that revoked his six-year youth offender sentence and imposed a suspended sentence of eighteen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). He contends that the district court erred by misapplying subsection (5)(c) of section 18-1.3-407, C.R.S. 2021, the Youth Offender System (YOS) statute. Johnson argues that because the district court did not return him to the YOS within sixty days following his detention in the county jail, as required by subsection (5)(a) of the YOS statute, the court improperly revoked his YOS sentence, which he says should have been deemed completed.

¶2 We conclude, however, based on a plain reading of the statutory language, that the district court correctly applied section 18-1.3-407(5)(c) to revoke Johnson's YOS sentence for failing to comply with its terms and conditions. In addition, we reject Johnson's other challenges to the revocation and thus affirm.

I. Background

¶3 On August 24, 2012, after Johnson pleaded guilty to first degree assault, a district court sentenced him to six years in the YOS and an eighteen-year suspended sentence in the custody of the DOC under section 18-1.3-407.^[1] At the time, Johnson was eighteen years old.

¶4 About five years into his YOS sentence, Johnson started Phase III - the community supervised release portion of the program. Phase III allowed Johnson to live in his mother's basement while complying with certain terms and conditions. For example, the program required that Johnson report to his community parole officer to approve visitors, avoid using marijuana and alcohol, find employment, maintain curfew, periodically submit to certain drug tests, and continuously wear an ankle monitor.

¶5 However, because Johnson failed to comply with the terms and conditions of his YOS sentence, YOS held a suitability hearing and recommended that it be revoked; this decision was upheld by a review panel. Pursuant to section 18-1.3-407(5)(c), the YOS warden and the DOC executive director upheld the DOC's decision. Consequently, on August 29, 2018, the People moved to revoke Johnson's YOS sentence and impose the suspended prison sentence.

¶6 Johnson's counsel moved to dismiss the People's complaint to revoke Johnson's YOS sentence. Defense counsel argued that Johnson had committed only technical violations and the district court had violated section 18-1.3-407(5)(a) by improperly holding Johnson in county jail after not taking action within sixty days.^[2]

¶7 In response, the People argued that subsection (5)(a) applies to a YOS sentence revocation only when an offender poses a danger to himself, herself, or others and that Johnson did not. Instead, the People asserted, subsection (5)(c) applied to Johnson's YOS revocation because he failed to comply with the terms and conditions of his YOS sentence.

¶8 On October 26, 2018, following a hearing, the district court denied Johnson's motion to dismiss.

¶9 Defense counsel further argued that if the court agreed to revoke Johnson's YOS sentence, it was not required to reinstate his original suspended sentence because it had discretion to choose any alternative sentence authorized by statute.

¶10 Based on the People's evidence, the district court found that Johnson had violated the conditions of his YOS sentence, and the statute required it to impose Johnson's suspended sentence of eighteen years in the custody of the DOC. The court further explained that despite disagreeing that it had improperly held Johnson in county jail longer than sixty days, it nonetheless granted him additional presentence confinement credit (PSCC) in the event that it erred in considering that offenders serving "community supervision time" are ordinarily not entitled to PSCC. See § 18-1.3-407(2) (b). Consequently, the district court revoked Johnson's YOS sentence and resentenced him to eighteen years in DOC custody with PSCC and mandatory parole.

¶11 Johnson timely appealed.

II. Discussion

¶12 Johnson contends that the district court erred by (1) misapplying section 18-1.3-407(5) (c) to revoke his YOS sentence and thereby not acting within the required sixty days after his detention in county jail; (2) improperly concluding that it was statutorily required to reimpose his original suspended DOC sentence; and (3) abusing its discretion when it revoked his YOS sentence. We address and reject each of these contentions in turn.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶13 "Statutory interpretation involves questions of law, which we review de novo." Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20, ¶ 15, 392 P.3d 1198, 1202; see People v. Garcia, 2016 COA 124, ¶ 6, 382 P.3d 1258, 1260 (applying de novo standard to determine whether, under section 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(I), a court may award a YOS offender PSCC at his initial sentencing).

¶14 Our goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent. People v. Vidauri, 2021 CO 25, ¶ 11, 486 P.3d 239, 242. "To do so, we look to the statute's plain language and 'give its words and phrases their ordinary and commonly accepted meaning[s].'" Howard v. People, 2020 CO 15, ¶ 13, 458 P.3d 893, 897 (quoting People v. Hoskin, 2016 CO 63, ¶ 7, 380 P.3d 130, 133); see Mosley, ¶ 16, 392 P.3d at 1202 ("[A] statute must be read and considered as a whole," so that our interpretation provides a "consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts." (citing People v. Dist Ct, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986))). We also avoid interpreting a statute in a manner "that would render any words or phrases superfluous or that would lead to illogical or absurd results." People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 16, 459 P.3d 516, 519 (citing McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d 379, 389)). If the statute's language is clear, then "we apply it as written" and look no further to other rules of statutory construction. Howard, ¶13, 458 P.3d at 897 (quoting Munoz v. Am. Fam. Mat. Ins. Co., 2018 CO 68, ¶ 9, 425 P.3d 1128, 1130).

B. Analysis

1. Section 18-1.3-407(5)(c)

¶15 The YOS statute allows youthful offenders^[3] convicted of felonies as adults to serve their sentences in a facility separate from the DOC. People v. Miller, 25 P.3d 1230, 1231 (Colo. 2001) (referring to the YOS statute in its previous location at section 16-11-311, C.R.S. 2000). Youthful offenders under the YOS undergo highly structured and monitored community supervision. Id.; see People v. Martinez, 2015 COA 33, ¶ 16, 350 P.3d 986, 989 (The YOS statute provides "a sentencing option for certain youthful offenders [in] a controlled and regimented environment." (quoting § 18-1.3-407(1)(a))).

¶16 If an offender fails to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her sentence, section 18-1.3-407(5) provides specific procedures to revoke a YOS sentence.

¶17 Subsection (5) (a) provides as follows:

Except as otherwise provided by paragraph (b) of this subsection (5), the department of corrections shall implement a procedure for the transfer of an offender to another facility -when an offender in the system poses a danger to himself or herself or others. The executive director of the department of corrections shall review any transfer determination by the department prior to the actual transfer of an inmate, including a transfer back to the district court for revocation of the sentence to the youthful offender system. A transfer pursuant to this paragraph (a) shall be limited to a period not to exceed sixty days, at which time the offender shall be returned to the youthful offender facility to complete his or her sentence or returned to the district court for revocation of the sentence to the youthful offender system. In no case shall an offender initially sentenced to the youthful offender system be held in isolation or segregation or in an adult facility for longer than sixty consecutive days without action by the sentencing court. § 18-1.3-407(5)(a) (emphasis added).

¶18 Subsection (5)(c) states:

The department of corrections shall implement a procedure for returning offenders who cannot successfully complete the sentence to the youthful offender system, or who fail to comply with the terms or conditions of the youthful offender system, to the district court. An offender returned to the district court pursuant to subsection (5) (a) of this section or because he or she cannot successfully complete the sentence to the

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