People v. Johnson

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Citation: People v. Johnson, 94 A.D.3d 1529, 942 N.Y.S.2d 738, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 3317 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
• Decision Date: 27 April 2012
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James D. JOHNSON, Defendant–Appellant.

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 03317

94 A.D.3d 1529

942 N.Y.S.2d 738

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.James D. JOHNSON, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

April 27, 2012.

Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Kristen McDermott of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Susan C. Azzarelli of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his guilty plea, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16[12] ). The conviction was based on defendant's possession of cocaine that was found by a parole officer in the center console of a motor vehicle driven by defendant shortly before the vehicle was searched. Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine, contending that the warrantless search was not supported by probable cause. In denying the motion, Supreme Court determined as a preliminary matter that, because defendant did not own the vehicle, he failed to establish that he had standing to contest the search of the vehicle. The court in any event concluded that the search was lawful because it was rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the duties of defendant's parole officer, and that defendant's status as a parolee was not exploited as a pretext for what would otherwise be an unlawful police-initiated search. Defendant thereafter entered a guilty plea, and on appeal he contends that the court erred in denying his suppression motion. We affirm.

On the evening in question, defendant's parole officer was working with a joint task force involving the Division of Parole, the Onondaga County Department of Probation, the Onondaga County Sheriff's Department, the Syracuse Police Department and the New York State Police. The joint task force, consisting of between 12 and 14 law enforcement officials, had a list of at least 15 parolees and probationers to be searched, and defendant's name was on that list. As a condition of his parole, defendant had consented to searches of his residence, property and person. Defendant's parole officer testified at the suppression hearing that he included defendant on the list of parolees to be searched because, among other reasons, defendant had recently moved into a new apartment that had not yet been inspected by the parole officer.

Defendant's parole officer and a fellow parole officer arrived at defendant's apartment shortly before his 9:00 P.M. curfew, but defendant was not there. Defendant arrived minutes later in a motor vehicle he was operating, with no passengers. Upon parking in the lot next to his apartment, defendant exited the vehicle and locked the doors. He was then approached by the parole officers, who explained that they were there to inspect his residence. Defendant's parole officer notified the other members of the joint task force, who were waiting nearby and arrived momentarily. Upon entering his apartment with the officers, defendant placed the keys to the vehicle on a table before he was handcuffed for safety reasons. The officers proceeded to search the apartment, finding therein a digital scale and $839 but no contraband. While the apartment was being searched, one of the parole officers took the keys to the vehicle from the table and used them to open the vehicle, which he then searched. The parole officer found cocaine weighing more than one half of an ounce in the false bottom of a beverage container located in the center console, along with marihuana and $572 in cash.

We agree with defendant that the court erred in determining that he lacked standing to contest the legality of the search of the vehicle. Although “a defendant seeking to suppress evidence, on the basis that it was obtained by means of an illegal search, must allege standing to challenge the search and, if the allegation is disputed, must establish standing” ( People v. Carter, 86 N.Y.2d 721, 722–723, 631 N.Y.S.2d 116, 655 N.E.2d 157, rearg. denied 86 N.Y.2d 839, 634 N.Y.S.2d 447, 658 N.E.2d 225 [emphasis added] ), here at no time did the People contend that defendant lacked standing to challenge the search ( see People v. Hunter, 17 N.Y.3d 725, 726, 926 N.Y.S.2d 401, 950 N.E.2d 137). “Since the issue of defendant's standing was not raised, the court had no occasion to rule on that issue” ( id. at 727, 926 N.Y.S.2d 401, 950 N.E.2d 137). In any event, the evidence adduced at the hearing by the People established that defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle, which he parked directly outside of his apartment in a private parking lot and then locked before he was approached by his parole officer. We conclude,...