People v. Johnson

• Citation: 903 N.Y.S.2d 299,929 N.E.2d 361,14 N.Y.3d 483
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Terrance JOHNSON, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 04 May 2010
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

903 N.Y.S.2d 299 14 N.Y.3d 483 929 N.E.2d 361 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Terrance JOHNSON, Appellant. Court of Appeals of New York. May 4, 2010.

Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Timothy P. Murphy, David C. Schopp and Barbara J. Davies of counsel), for appellant.

Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Shawn P. Hennessy and Donna A. Milling of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GRAFFEO, J.

In this case, we consider whether defendant's waiver of his right to appeal became invalid when the court later decided notto honor two aspects of defendant's plea agreement. Based on the facts before us, we conclude that the court's modification of those sentencing terms voided defendant's prior waiver of appeal and required the reallocution of the waiver. Because that did not occur, defendant was entitled to pursue an appeal challenging his sentence.

In October 2006, defendant Terrance Johnson, a 16-year-old student, attacked a female teacher with a wooden board near a school. After striking her several times, defendant took the keys to her car and drove away in the teacher's vehicle. Defendant was later apprehended and indicted for robbery in the first degree and two counts of robbery in the second degree.

[903 N.Y.S.2d 300, 929 N.E.2d 362]

On the day the trial was scheduled to begin, Supreme Court was informed that a plea agreement had been reached between the People and defendant. In furtherance of the negotiated agreement, Supreme Court indicated that in exchange for a guilty plea to first-degree robbery and a waiver of the right to appeal, defendant would be adjudicated as a youthful offender with a maximum prison sentence of 1 1/3 to 4 years. During the plea allocution, defendant acknowledged that he was facing up to 25 years in prison without the plea deal and he agreed to waive his right to appeal. The court further warned defendant that the maximum sentence could be imposed if he failed to appear for sentencing, did not cooperate with the probation department or committed another crime. After allocuting that he injured the teacher with a board and stole her car, defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree.

Before sentencing occurred, Supreme Court reconsidered the terms of the plea agreement and decided that it could not abide by all of the terms because "it would be inappropriate to grant youthful offender status, in light of the seriousness of the crime, the injuries to the victim, and other factors." The court also noted that the probation department had recommended against youthful offender treatment. The judge offered defendant the option of withdrawing his plea and proceeding to trial, or retaining the guilty plea and receiving a sentence of five years of imprisonment and five years of postrelease supervision, but without adjudication as a youthful offender. Defense counsel advised the court that defendant did not wish to withdraw his plea and the judge thereafter imposed the new agreed-to sentence, which did not include youthful offender status.

Defendant appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that defendant's waiver of his right to appeal remained valid despite the modification of the sentencing component of the plea agreement and that defendant's waiver encompassed any challenge he might have had regarding the denial of youthful offender treatment and the severity of his sentence (60 A.D.3d 1396, 874 N.Y.S.2d 834 [4th Dept.2009] ). A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (12 N.Y.3d 855, 881 N.Y.S.2d 666, 909 N.E.2d 589 [2009] ).

Defendant urges that his waiver of appeal was invalidated when Supreme Court lengthened his prison sentence and declined to adjudicate him a youthful offender as this was a significant change in circumstances. The People, in contrast, contend that the court's inability to adhere to the original agreement did not undermine the waiver because defendant was originally advised that he faced imprisonment for up to 25 years and had been offered the opportunity to withdraw his plea.

A waiver of the right to appeal may be elicited as a condition of a plea bargain ( see People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022 [1989] ), but it must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered into by the accused ( see e.g. People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273, 280, 590 N.Y.S.2d 46, 604 N.E.2d 108 [1992] ). We have repeatedly observed that there is no mandatory litany that must be used in order to obtain a valid waiver of appellate rights ( see e.g. People v. Moissett, 76 N.Y.2d 909, 910-911, 563 N.Y.S.2d 43, 564 N.E.2d 653 [1990] ) and a waiver will be enforceable if the record demonstrates that the defendant "intentionally relinquishe[d] or abandon[ed] a known right that would...