People v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 18 June 1979
• Docket Number: Nos. 12,11,Docket Nos. 60015,60169,s. 12
• Citation: 279 N.W.2d 534,406 Mich. 320
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Willie JOHNSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar406 Mich. 320, 279 N.W.2d 534
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 534

279 N.W.2d 534

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Willie JOHNSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 60015, 60169.

Calendar Nos. 12, 11.

406 Mich. 320, 279 N.W.2d 534

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 11, 1979.

Decided June 18, 1979.

Leonard Townsend, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Willie johnson, jr.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Wayne County, Michael R. Mueller, Raymond P Walsh, Larry L. Roberts, Asst. Pros. Attys., Detroit, for the People.

Gail Wingard, Chairperson Legal-Legislative Committee, Southeast Michigan Anti-Rape Network, amicus curiae.

Alvin C. Sallen, Southfield, for defendant-appellant Richard Johnson.

FITZGERALD, Justice.

In these separate criminal cases, which we consolidated for appeal, both defendants were charged with and convicted of multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree arising from single acts of sexual penetration.

The threshold question is one of statutory interpretation: When the Legislature enacted the first-degree criminal sexual conduct statute, M.C.L. § 750.520b; M.S.A. § 28.788(2), did it intend that a single sexual penetration, accompanied by more than one of the statute's enumerated special circumstances, result in multiple criminal charges for purposes of trial, conviction, and sentencing? We answer this question in the negative. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to address the issue of whether the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy would be violated by a multiple conviction of criminal sexual conduct based upon one sexual act.

I

Defendant Willie Johnson, Jr., was tried on an information charging him with four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of armed robbery. The trial record indicates that on October 11, 1975, complainant and her husband and their guest drove to Detroit from London, Ontario to visit relatives. In the vicinity of Ethel's Bar on the east side of Detroit, complainant was threatened with a gun, beaten into submission, and robbed and raped by defendant Willie Johnson and an accomplice. It appears from the record that during this criminal activity, complainant's husband was in the back seat of another car sleeping off the effects of a day-long drinking spree, and the couple's guest was confined by the culprits in the back seat of the car in which the rape and robbery occurred. Complainant testified that after defendant Willie Johnson had severely beaten her on the face, the accomplice got into the car, and she was driven to a more secluded spot where she was first raped by the accomplice and then raped by Willie Johnson. Seminal stains of the same blood type as appellant's and seminal stains of a different type were later found on both the clothing of complainant and Willie Johnson. When defendant Willie Johnson was apprehended soon after the commission of the crimes, blood of the same type as the victim's was found on his clothing.

Willie Johnson was charged with the following counts:

1) Sexual penetration with another "under circumstances involving the commission of any other felony". M.C.L. § 750.520b(1)(c); M.S.A. § 28.788(2) (1)(c).

2) Sexual penetration with another by force while "aided or abetted by 1 or more other persons". M.C.L. § 750.520b(1)(d)(ii); M.S.A. § 28.788(2)(1)(d) (ii).

3) Sexual penetration with another while "armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon". M.C.L. § 750.520b(1)(e); M.S.A. § 28.788(2)(1)(e).

4) Sexual penetration with another by force causing personal injury to the victim. M.C.L. § 750.520b(1)(f); M.S.A. § 28.788(2)(1)(f).

5) Robbery armed. M.C.L. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797.

The trial court instructed the jury that defendant Willie Johnson could be found guilty or not guilty on any or all of the five separate offenses with which he was charged. The jury found defendant guilty of counts 2 and 4, but were unable to reach a verdict on the remaining counts.

Defendant Richard Johnson was charged in a three-count information with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count armed robbery. It appears from the record that the charges against Richard Johnson arose from a rape and armed robbery of a woman at a newspaper substation in Detroit on July 11, 1975. Defendant entered the substation around closing time and indicated that he had a gun by holding his hand under his jacket. He then raped the complainant, took the money out of her purse, and drove away in her car. On February 18, 1976, defendant Richard Johnson pled guilty as charged to the following counts:

1) Sexual penetration with another while "armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon". M.C.L. § 750.520b(1)(e); M.S.A. § 28.788(2)(1)(e).

2) Sexual penetration with another "under circumstances involving the commission of any other felony". M.C.L. § 750.520b(1)(c); M.S.A. § 28.788(2) (1)(c).

3) Robbery Armed. M.C.L. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797.

On appeal both defendants argued that it was improper to charge, convict, and sentence them for multiple counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct because there was evidence of only a single sexual penetration.

On April 19, 1977, the Court of Appeals panel which heard defendant Willie Johnson's case unanimously accepted defendant's argument and vacated Willie Johnson's conviction on count 4 and affirmed the remaining conviction on count 2. 75 Mich.App. 221, 255 N.W.2d 207 (1977). The panel held that it was not the intent of the Legislature that a defendant be convicted of multiple counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct when there was only a single sexual penetration.

However, the Court of Appeals panel which heard defendant Richard Johnson's case disagreed, and on May 10, 1977, that panel granted the prosecution's motion to affirm.

While we are without the benefit of the Court of Appeals analysis in the case of Richard Johnson, a different panel of the Court of Appeals subsequently held that it was the intent of the Legislature to allow for multiple convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct where there was only a single sexual penetration and that such multiple convictions are not violative of constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. People v. Nelson, 79 Mich.App. 303, 261 N.W.2d 299 (1977).

In view of the conflicting opinions of the Court of Appeals on this issue, we granted leave to appeal in the instant cases to determine the scope of criminal liability under M.C.L. § 750.520b; M.S.A. § 28.788(2). 402 Mich. 826-827 (1977).

II

With the enactment of the criminal sexual conduct statute, 1974 P.A. 266, the Legislature replaced a variety of obsolescent statutory provisions ¹ relating to sexually assaultive crimes with a unified statute more reflective of contemporary understanding of the nature of criminal sexual conduct and the interests of modern society. The "new" statute represents an effort to clarify definitions relating to criminal sexual conduct and to delineate precisely the conduct proscribed. In recognition that some forms of criminal sexual conduct are more heinous than others, the Legislature set forth in the statute four degrees of criminal sexual conduct which are distinguished in their severity by the nature of the conduct (penetration or contact) and the circumstances under which the conduct occurs.

In the instant cases, defendants were both charged with and convicted of multiple counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, contrary to M.C.L. § 750.520b; M.S.A. § 28.788(2). The statute in question provides as follows:

"(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following circumstances exists:

"(a) That other person is under 13 years of age.

"(b) The other person is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is a member of the same household as the victim, the actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the fourth degree to the victim, or the actor is in a position of authority over the victim and used this authority to coerce the victim to submit.

"(c) Sexual penetration occurs under circumstances involving the commission of any other felony.

"(d) The actor is aided or abetted by 1 or more other persons and either of the following circumstances exists:

"(i) The actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.

"(ii) The actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes but is not limited to any of the circumstances listed in subdivision (f)(i) to (v).

"(e) The actor is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.

"(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to accomplish sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes but is not limited to any of the following circumstances:

"(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical violence.

"(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence on the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats.

"(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim, or any other person, and the victim believes that the actor has the ability to execute this threat. As used in this subdivision, 'to retaliate' includes threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, or extortion.

"(iv) When the actor engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim in a manner or for purposes which are...