People v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 17 March 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 52410
• Citation: 104 Mich.App. 629,305 N.W.2d 560
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David JOHNSON, and William Johnson, Defendants-Appellants. 104 Mich.App. 629, 305 N.W.2d 560
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 560

305 N.W.2d 560

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David JOHNSON, and William Johnson, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 52410.

104 Mich.App. 629, 305 N.W.2d 560

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

March 17, 1981.

Released for Publication May 15, 1981.

[104 MICHAPP 630] George E. Pawlowski, Frank E. Stanley, Grand Rapids, for defendants-appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., David H. Sawyer, Pros. Atty., Mark R. VanderMolen, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before ALLEN, P. J., and J. H. GILLIS and WALSH, JJ.

J. H. GILLIS, Judge.

Defendants were charged with four counts of cruelty to animals. M.C.L. § 752.21; M.S.A. § 28.161. After a bench trial, David Johnson was convicted of all four counts and sentenced to 18 months probation, 60 days of which were to be served in jail, and certain fines and costs. William Johnson was convicted of only one count, and similarly sentenced. After unsuccessfully moving for a new trial, defendants appealed as of right to the circuit court. Upon affirmance of their convictions, defendants applied for, but were denied, leave to appeal to this Court. Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave, remanded[104 MICHAPP 631] the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted, 409 Mich. 854 (1980).

The charges against the defendants were based on their alleged mistreatment of four horses, with each count pertaining to one of the horses. The animals were owned by the Grand Rapids Polo Club, an organization comprised of defendants and their father, John Johnson. The horses were kept on land owned by David Johnson's roommate, Douglas Fruechtenicht. David Johnson testified that he was solely responsible for the care of the horses and that he and his father arranged for food and care. Fruechtenicht indicated that William Johnson had on several occasions ridden the horses and that it was possible that he fed or watered them at those times.

On October 24, 1977, Mary Mutchler, the president of H.O.R.S.E., a branch of the Humane Society of Kent County, was notified by neighbors that there were sick horses on the Fruechtenicht property. Ann Sullivan, the cruelty investigator for the Humane Society, received a similar report. They each went to the property and discovered four emaciated horses, one of which was lying on the ground. The horses were dazed and listless, dragging their back hooves. They were in a dry, sandy pasture area with some weeds. All of the trees in the area had been gnawed free of bark, some as high as 14 feet from the ground.

Both Mrs. Mutchler and Miss Sullivan believed that the horses' lives were endangered. Miss Sullivan contacted the local sheriff's department and attempted to get in touch with two different judges, both of whom were unavailable. Deputy Sheriff Ronald Ditmar met Mrs. Mutchler at the property and supervised the removal of the horses. The animals were taken to a veterinarian for examination and then placed in a foster home. No [104 MICHAPP 632] warrant was obtained to search the premises prior to the removal of the horses.

The horses were diagnosed as suffering from starvation and parasitism. One of the horses, Hazel, had dropped from a normal weight of 1000 pounds to 585 pounds. That horse died four days after it was taken from the property. William Johnson's sole conviction was for the mistreatment of Hazel. There was testimony that he purchased the animal on behalf of the Grand Rapids Polo Club in August of 1974. The trial judge viewed this as evidence that William Johnson owned the horse individually or along with his father and brother.

On appeal, defendant William Johnson initially argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. At the close of the prosecution's proofs, he moved for dismissal on the ground that there was no proof of his care or custody of Hazel at the time of the alleged cruelty.

M.C.L. § 752.21; M.S.A. § 28.161 provides in pertinent part:

"Whoever overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, cruelly beats, mutilates, or cruelly kills, or causes or procures to be so overdriven, overloaded, driven when overloaded, overworked, tortured, tormented, deprived of necessary sustenance, cruelly beaten, mutilated, or cruelly killed, any animal, and whoever having the charge or custody of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the same, or wilfully fails to provide the same with proper food, drink, shelter or protection from the weather, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned for not more than 3 months, or fined not more than $500.00, or by both."

There was no evidence at trial that William Johnson personally deprived the horse of sustenance[104 MICHAPP 633] or that it was in his charge or custody. Therefore, his conviction must fail unless we conclude that the owner of an animal necessarily has charge or custody of it.

No Michigan case has construed the statute in this regard. However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has interpreted an identically worded statute to require that an owner actually have charge and custody of the animal at the time of the alleged incident. State v. Spink, 19 R.I. 353, 36 A. 91 (1896). In Spink, a criminal complaint was held defective for failing to allege this additional element. The Court observed that it is not "an offense to neglect to provide these things, if the (defendant), even though he is the owner, does not have the charge and custody of the animals". Id., 356, 36 A. 91. See also State v. Yorczyk, 167 Conn. 434, 356 A.2d 169 (1974).

We agree with this interpretation. A criminal statute is to be construed according to its language and not beyond it. Where a statute is drawn to be confined in its operation to certain persons, or persons having a certain intent or quality, it should be enforced according to those terms. Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99, 111-112 (1875). Here, the phrase "as owner or otherwise" refers to the fact that a person having charge or custody of an abused animal may be held liable without regard to ownership. To hold an owner liable without proof that he had charge or...