People v. Johnson
Citation | 383 N.E.2d 648,66 Ill.App.3d 84,22 Ill.Dec. 840 |
Decision Date | 09 November 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 77-83,77-83 |
Parties | , 22 Ill.Dec. 840 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Curtis L. JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Rosborough, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Daniel M. Kirwan, Asst. State App. Defender, Fifth Judicial Dist., Mount Vernon, for defendant-appellant.
Clyde L. Kuehn, State's Atty., St. Clair County, Belleville, Bruce D. Irish, Deputy Director, Ann E. Singleton, Staff Atty., State's Attys. App. Service Commission, Mount Vernon, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant, Curtis Johnson, entered a negotiated plea of guilty in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County to an indictment charging murder and was sentenced to a term of 14 to 20 years imprisonment. Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea contending that his plea was a result of coercion by his attorney, thus rendering it involuntary, and that there was an insufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea to the charge of murder.
Defendant was indicted on October 16, 1975, for the offense of murder allegedly committed on September 3, 1975. Defendant was represented by an assistant public defender at his arraignment on October 22, 1975, at which time he pleaded not guilty to the charge; however, he informed the court on that date that his attorney was Robert Godfrey and that although he had not yet paid Godfrey to represent him, he intended to do so. For the purposes of the arraignment, the assistant public defender continued to represent the defendant with the understanding that if Godfrey desired to enter the case the public defender would withdraw. On October 31, 1975, Robert Godfrey, acting for the defendant, filed a motion for discovery. Thereafter, on November 18, 1975, Godfrey appeared in open court with the defendant and moved orally for a continuance which was granted. On December 29, 1975, a motion to suppress was filed on behalf of the defendant through his attorney, Robert Mays, who was acting as co-counsel with Robert Godfrey. The case was called for trial on January 21, 1976, at which time Godfrey, with the defendant's consent, requested that the cause be continued. This motion for continuance was granted and the matter was set down for trial on February 18, 1976.
Immediately prior to the commencement of trial on February 18, 1976, defendant informed the court that he wished to have a bench trial and that he was waiving his right to a jury trial. Godfrey related to the court that he had discussed this matter with the defendant and that he had advised him of the alternatives. Defendant at that point informed the court that he wished to have a new lawyer appointed. For his explanation, defendant stated "(b)ecause he say that, you know, we're not getting along, I feel that I'm defending myself because he's saying that you can't, you know, what he can't do for me, you know." Thereafter the following colloquy occurred:
The State presented its opening statement and the testimony of its first witness, Devie Williams. Ms. Williams testified that she had accompanied the defendant and Otis Williams to a restaurant on September 3, 1975. She took along a bag which had her belongings in it and a dismantled sawed-off shotgun belonging to the defendant. She was not carrying shotgun shells in her bag, but she stated that she had seen some in the defendant's shirt pocket.
Upon arriving at the restaurant, Ms. Williams and the defendant went inside and placed an order to take out. While awaiting their order, Ms. Williams and the defendant went outside where the defendant took the shotgun from her purse, assembled it and loaded it. Ms. Williams related that the defendant wrapped the shotgun in a towel and followed her into the restaurant to pick up their order. Once inside, the defendant began to argue with a male customer who was looking at Ms. Williams. The couple returned to their automobile, which was parked in front of the restaurant, and the defendant sat in the front seat while Ms. Williams sat in the rear. The aforementioned male customer stood in the front doorway of the restaurant and continued to exchange words with the defendant.
Ms. Williams stated that at that point the defendant fired a shot from the front seat of the auto towards the restaurant and then fired a second time. The shots went through the open front door where several people were standing. Ms. Williams testified that after the first shot the male customer with whom the defendant had been arguing ducked away from the door. She further testified that the man did not have a gun nor did he make any movement with his hand as if he had a gun. She also stated that it did not appear as though the man was going out of the restaurant towards the auto before the shots were fired. At the time he fired the shots, the defendant was sitting inside the auto and the motor was not running. She related that immediately prior to firing the shotgun the defendant had told the male customer to "dance with this." One of the defendant's shots fatally injured another customer, Calvin Beamon, who was inside the restaurant.
At the conclusion of Ms. Williams' testimony the defendant indicated that he wished to withdraw his not guilty plea and plead guilty to the charge. Following a short recess, the State informed the court that in exchange for the defendant's plea it would recommend a sentence of 14 to 20 years imprisonment. Defendant related to the court that he understood the charge and consented to the plea bargain. He also told the court that he was satisfied with his attorney's handling of the case and declined the court's offer of more time to confer with counsel. The trial court read the indictment to the defendant and admonished him of the possible sentences he could receive as well as the various rights he would be relinquishing by pleading guilty. Defendant again stated that he wished to plead guilty and indicated to the court that his plea was not the result of any threats or promises. The State then set forth the factual basis for the charge which the defendant substantially agreed with.
The trial court accepted the defendant's plea and advised him of his right to a presentence investigation. Defendant waived the presentence investigation and was sentenced to the negotiated term of 14 to 20 years imprisonment.
On March 4, 1976, defendant filed a Pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the public defender's office was appointed to assist him. Two claims were presented in defendant's amended motion to withdraw his plea of guilty: (1) that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel from Robert Godfrey, and (2) that the factual basis, as presented by the State and through the testimony of Devie Williams, was not sufficient to support the charge because the court, when accepting the plea, had not determined whether defendant had the intent to commit murder.
A hearing was conducted on the defendant's motion on December 23, 1976. Defendant testified that his attorney had only conferred with him once, four months after his arrest, prior to the date on which he pleaded guilty to the charge. At that meeting, defendant told Godfrey that he had fired the shotgun believing that another man was trying to kill him. Defendant related that he had also spoken with Godfrey the day before trial at which time counsel advised him to plead guilty to the charge. He stated that Godfrey had not discussed the defense of self-defense with him, but that he had told the defendant that it was murder. Defendant further stated that Godfrey had not informed him of the lesser offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Defendant related that he had not intended to kill the man he shot, but was merely trying to defend himself as he had observed the man unbuttoning his coat as if he was reaching for a gun. He further testified that he had only intended to scare the man when he fired the shotgun in order to give himself time to get away from...
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