People v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 10 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 3–13–0610.,3–13–0610.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Daniel L.G. JOHNSON, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

46 N.E.3d 274

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Daniel L.G. JOHNSON, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 3–13–0610.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Dec. 10, 2015.

Maureen Williams (argued), Peoria, for appellant.

Stewart J. Umholtz, State's Attorney, Pekin (Richard T. Leonard (argued), of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice LYTTON

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Daniel L.G. Johnson, appeals from his convictions of aggravated battery of a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/12–3.05(d) (4)

(West 2010)) and resisting a peace officer resulting in injury (720 ILCS 5/31–1(a–7) (West 2010)). He argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing a video of the incident to be played in the courtroom during deliberations, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support convictions for aggravated battery of a peace officer and resisting a peace officer resulting in injury, and (3) he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 At Defendant's trial, Michael Ward testified that he is a police officer with the Pekin police department. On October 8, 2011, Ward was dispatched to the parking lot of Goodfellas, a local bar in Pekin, Illinois. When he arrived, he found Defendant intoxicated and slurring his words, and he placed him under arrest. At Defendant's trial, Ward testified that Defendant was combative at the scene and would not comply with his instructions to enter the squad car. Eventually, Ward placed Defendant in the squad car and transported him to the Tazewell County Justice Center. Defendant threatened him and called him names during the drive to the center.

¶ 4 Upon arrival at the justice center, Ward asked Defendant to exit the squad car, but he refused to comply and had to be physically removed. Defendant was placed against the pat-down wall to be searched prior to entering the jail. Ward informed one of the correctional officers that Defendant had been tasered at the bar and still might have probes on him from the taser. “At that time [Defendant] was tensing his muscles a lot, he was just squirming around, wasn't staying still, wasn't listening to commands just to relax, just to stand there, let us do our jobs, get processed. He was always fidgeting [and] * * * somewhat belligerent.”

¶ 5 While several officers were restraining him and patting him down, Defendant “head-butted” Brad Catton, a correctional officer at the justice center. Ward testified that the sound was very loud, and he believed it was purposeful. After the head-butt, the officers restrained Defendant on the ground in an effort to control him. Ward attempted to cover Defendant's mouth because Defendant spit on him, and Defendant bit Ward's left hand. Ward was wearing gloves at the time. Ward punched Defendant in the back of the head with his right hand so that Defendant would stop biting him. Ward broke his right hand when he struck Defendant. Ward testified that there was no visible injury to his left hand but that it was sore and tender for a few days.

¶ 6 David Harper testified that he is employed as a correctional officer at the justice center. Harper assisted in processing Defendant. Harper testified that Catton found a barb or probe in Defendant's shirt from a taser used at the local bar. Catton said the probe was not in Defendant's skin. Ward explained that when Catton pulled it out of Defendant's clothing, Defendant head-butted Catton. Catton testified that, “as soon as I yanked it out, I felt a strike to my left forehead area.”

¶ 7 The State then moved to admit a surveillance video of the incident. The State's motion was granted and the video was played in the courtroom. The video was shown to the jury twice during the trial. It is consistent with the officers' testimony to the extent it shows Defendant head-butt Catton while Defendant is up against the pat-down wall. Specifically, Defendant jerks his head in an extended motion to the right and strikes Catton with his head. The video does not show Defendant biting Ward's hand. Ward's back is facing the camera, blocking Ward's hand movements and Defendant's mouth. It also shows Ward punching Defendant one time with his right hand and then pulling his left hand away.

¶ 8 Defendant did not testify.

¶ 9 During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge, asking to see the video intake sheet and to view the video a third time. The judge noted that he had discretion to determine which exhibits would be allowed to go back to the jury during deliberations. He denied the request to see the intake sheet but decided to allow the jurors to watch the video in the courtroom. Before the jury viewed the video, the prosecutor asked if the attorneys and Defendant would be staying in the room with the jurors and the judge indicated they would, but it would be silent. Defense counsel asked the trial judge whether the reason the video was not being shown to the jurors in the jury room was because there was no capability for it to be viewed there. The judge responded that since there was no equipment in the jury room and that viewing the video in that room would be difficult. He explained that he was taking an incremental approach to the jury's request to view the video, stating:

“It wasn't a request for any specific portion of the video, and if there is a follow-up question, we will address that in due course. I am not ruling out anything that you might suggest, but I would rather take an incremental approach and respond to additional specific requests from the jury then.”

¶ 10 The judge then called the jury into the courtroom and played the video again. The judge, the parties and counsel were present in the courtroom while the jury watched the video. After a short recess, defense counsel filed a motion to allow the jury to take the video into the deliberation room, which the judge denied. The jury did not ask to see the video again.

¶ 11 The jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated battery against Officer Catton and aggravated battery and resisting a peace officer resulting in injury against Officer Ward. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 48 months' probation for the aggravated battery charges and 30 months' probation for resisting a peace officer resulting in injury.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 I

¶ 14 Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to allow the jury to take the video into the deliberation room. First, he argues that the court erred in failing to perform a balancing test to determine probative value versus prejudicial effect. He also argues that manner in which the jury was allowed to review the video was presumptively prejudicial because the presence of the judge, attorneys and parties impaired the jury's ability to deliberate and thoroughly examine the evidence.

¶ 15 Initially, we emphasize that the trial court allowed the jury to view the video after the conclusion of the trial, albeit in the courtroom. This act demonstrates that the trial court properly determine that additional viewing of the video was probative and not unduly prejudicial. See People v. Williams, 97 Ill.2d 252, 291–93, 73 Ill.Dec. 360, 454 N.E.2d 220 (1983)

. We also note the exercise of the court's discretion in denying the jury's request to see the intake sheet but granting its request to view the video. Thus, the trial court was aware of the need to balance the probative and prejudicial values when determining whether to allow the jury to view the video again.

¶ 16 We are left with the narrow question of whether the manner in which the jury was allowed to view the video was sufficient or whether it caused prejudice to the extent that the judge should have granted Defendant's subsequent motion to allow the jury to take the video into the jury room for private viewing.

¶ 17 It is a basic principle of our justice system that jury deliberations shall remain private and secret. Unites States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir.1964)

. The primary purpose of this honored rule is to protect the jurors from improper influence. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737–738, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Although the presence of a third party impinges on the privacy and secrecy of deliberations, reversal is not warranted if no harm resulted from the intrusion. Id. at 738, 113 S.Ct. 1770.

¶ 18 In Olano, the United States Supreme Court considered the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room during deliberations under federal rules of criminal procedure. Two alternate jurors were permitted to retire with the jury and were present throughout deliberations. Because the defendants failed to object to the presence of the alternate jurors, the Supreme Court considered the matter under the federal plain error rule. The Court acknowledged that the presence of the alternates contravened the rule that deliberations should remain “private and secret” but held that it generally “analyzed outside intrusions upon the jury for prejudicial impact.” Id. The Court noted that it would not presume prejudice or find that the error was “ ‘inherently prejudicial’ ” where the alternate jurors were instructed not to participate in the deliberations. Id. at 739–40, 113 S.Ct. 1770

(quoting United States v. Olano, 934 F.2d 1425, 1439 (9th Cir.1990) ). The Court then concluded that the defendants failed to meet their burden of showing that the error resulted in prejudice. Id. at 741, 113 S.Ct. 1770.

¶ 19 Illinois courts have adopted the same approach; we review outside jury intrusions for prejudicial impact. See People v. Thornton, 333 Ill.App.3d 638, 651, 267 Ill.Dec. 271, 776 N.E.2d 643 (2002)

. Prejudice is not presumed from a third-person's interference with the jury. People v. Epps, 197 Ill.App.3d 376, 380, 143 Ill.Dec. 702, 554 N.E.2d 637 (1990). The record must demonstrate that prejudice resulted or that there was an intent to...