People v. Johnson
Citation | 121 Cal.App.4th 1409,18 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 |
Decision Date | 31 August 2004 |
Docket Number | No. A105199.,A105199. |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Keith Leviol JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Julie Schumer, Orinda, by appointment of the First District Court of Appeal Independent Case System, for Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General; Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Martin S. Kaye, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
Keith Leviol Johnson appeals from a judgment sending him to prison for three years for a probation violation. He contends the admission of a hearsay laboratory report at the revocation hearing violated his constitutional rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (Crawford). We disagree, and affirm the judgment.
Johnson was put on probation after pleading no contest to a charge of petty theft with a prior. Probation revocation proceedings were initiated after a police officer observed Johnson selling a rock of cocaine on a Berkeley street. At the hearing, the court admitted a report from the Alameda County Crime Laboratory analyzing the rock that was the subject of the transaction. Defense counsel unsuccessfully objected on "hearsay and foundation grounds."
After the hearing, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Crawford, holding that admission of "testimonial" out-of-court statements is barred by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1374; U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) Johnson acknowledges that the laboratory report in this case was admissible under California case law approving the use of various forms of documentary evidence at probation revocation hearings despite hearsay objections. (E.g., People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707, 716-717, 217 Cal.Rptr. 676, 704 P.2d 743 [ ]; People v. Brown (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 452, 455, 263 Cal.Rptr. 391 [ ]; People v. O'Connell (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066-1067, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 [ ].)1 However, Johnson claims a different rule applies under Crawford.2
We disagree. Crawford's holding is based squarely on the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 38-39, 68, 124 S.Ct. at pp. 1357, 1374.) Probation revocation proceedings are not "criminal prosecutions" to which the Sixth Amendment applies. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 781, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656.) Probationers' limited right to confront witnesses at revocation hearings stems from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment. (Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 610, 612, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 636.) Thus, Crawford's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment does not govern probation revocation proceedings. (See United States v. Barraza (S.D.Cal. 2004) 318 F.Supp.2d 1031, 1035.)
Sixth Amendment cases, however, may provide helpful examples in determining the scope of the more limited right of confrontation held by probationers under the due process clause. (See People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1158, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631, 875 P.2d 736 (Arreola).) Even in that respect, Crawford lends no support to Johnson's attempt to exclude the laboratory report. Although the Crawford court expressly refrained from attempting a comprehensive definition of "testimonial" (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 68, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1374), it did provide the following analysis:
"Various formulations of this core class of `testimonial' statements exist: `ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent — that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,' [citation]; `extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,' [citation]; `statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,' [citation]." (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 51-52, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1364.)
Johnson contends the laboratory report amounted to "testimonial" hearsay, because the person completing the report would have expected it to be used for criminal prosecution. Setting aside the problem that a probation revocation hearing is neither a "prosecution" nor a "trial," we believe Johnson misapprehends Crawford's discussion of what amounts to "testimonial" hearsay. A laboratory report does not "bear testimony," or function as the equivalent of in-court testimony. If the preparer had appeared to testify at Johnson's hearing, he or she would merely have authenticated the document. In Arreola, supra, our Supreme Court explained:
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